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This thesis investigates Local Area Agreements as a tool for the effective delivery of 
local public services focusing on three main areas: 
 
- Centre-Local Relations and the Vertical Governance of LAAs 
- Intra Local Relations and the Horizontal Governance of LAAs 
- Learning from LAAs to improve the future practice of local public service delivery. 
 
In exploring these areas, the thesis draws upon several academic theories; principally 
the Strategic Relational Approach and New Institutionalism. 
 
These themes are explored in a two-tiered methodology.  The first is a national overview 
survey of LAA practitioners which then informed the second stage; detailed interviews 
across two case study areas (Liverpool and St Helens) as well as with civil servants and 
elected politicians from national government.   
 
In relation to vertical-governance, the thesis discusses the national indicator dataset and 
the ability for areas to adequately focus on local policy priorities, the top-down 
governance of LAAs and a discussion about the role of Government Office for the 
regions in negotiating and delivering LAAs.  In relation to horizontal governance, the 
research identifies both stronger and weaker actors within the local governance process, 
discusses the value of differing actor approaches, investigates how internal 
accountability affects the relationship with a wider partnership and discusses the role of 
elected members.  The final section discusses how practitioners feel that LAAs could be 
improved, before discussing how current Coalition policy addresses these concerns, 
before drawing some final conclusions about the relative success of the LAA project.  
 
The findings show that despite initial overtures of greater local discretion over setting 
priorities, strong central control remained.  In particular, this was seen through the 
indicator selection process, with areas adopting indicators that were not seen as local 
priorities.  At the local level it is shown that a long or short term operating horizon 
affected how actors worked with the LAA and that those actors that traditionally operated 
on shorter time scales (i.e. police, fire and rescue service) were more likely to register 
frustration with longer term bureaucratic processes.  It was also found that those actors 
that viewed partnership working on LAA targets as an investment for long term results 
were viewed as being more effective than those which simply saw it as a cost. 
  
In terms of Coalition policy in the post LAA period, it appears that many lessons have 
gone unheeded, particularly around the components of effective partnership working.  
However, the new City Deal programme presents a renewed sense of optimism for 
effective (and locally responsive) local public service delivery. 
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Chapter One – Introduction 
This thesis investigates Local Area Agreements and their effectiveness as a 
vehicle for the delivery of effective local public services.  This formed one of the 
latter stages of New Labour’s local government modernisation agenda (LGMA) – 
a broad programme of policy reform covering the institutions of local government. 
 
Between its inception in 2004 and its abolition in 2010, the LAA served as the 
delivery document for a Sustainable Community Strategy which, in turn, was a 
long term vision for an area, setting out the policy goals for a period of 20 years.  
The priorities of the SCS were defined by a partnership of local actors and 
stakeholders known as a ‘Local Strategic Partnership’.  This partnership was 
comprised of a variety of public and private sector actors as well as 
representation from the voluntary or ‘third’ sector.  These organisations were of 
various capacities, with some having had experience of previous public service 
delivery schemes, while some had little to no experience. 
 
The LAA itself represented a three year ‘contract’ between Central and Local 
government, whereby each area selected up to 35 indicators from a suite of 198 
national indicators.   Progress against these indicator/target selections was then 
monitored.  This agreement was ‘signed off’ by the Government Office for the 
Region, which acted as the representative of central government.  The GORs 
were given this role due to their increased knowledge of the local areas, which 
allowed them to be more locally responsive. 
 
Once the LAA was in place, the local actors worked together to deliver the 35 
priorities via an executive board (covering the whole LAA) and a series of 
thematic partnerships – which were more specialised in nature and involving only 
the relevant actors for each theme.   
 
As will become clear, this process raised a multitude of questions about centre-
local relations and local governance relations.  In particular questions arose 
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about how national policy priorities were reflected through the LAA and whether 
this actually limited a local area’s responsiveness.  This also placed a focus on 
the role of GOR and the extent to which they were locally responsive in their 
dealings throughout the negotiation process.  At the local level, questions arose 
about how actors of various capacities could work together – particularly focusing 
on those actors with greater capacity and past experience, and how those actors 
with little prior experience of local public service delivery at this level could 
engage with the LAA. 
 
However, in order to reflect events, this thesis has had to adapt in nature.  In 
2008 when the research began, the LAA was an active government policy, in 
place in 152 authority areas across England.  However, from May 2010, following 
the election of the Coalition government, the LAA was abolished, thus becoming 
a comparatively short exercise in the delivery of local public services.  
Consequently, while the initial aim was to explore the issues around LAAs in 
order to provide some policy recommendations that could improve its future 
practice, the focus had to shift slightly in order to consider the ways that LAA 
lessons could generally be applied to the future practice of local public service 
delivery. 
 
Owing to the way that the research was funded – as a joint venture between the 
University of Liverpool and Liverpool First1 – the research objectives were initially 
defined during the project’s genesis.  Therefore, it seems logical to discuss them 
in this fashion, before moving on to how they were subsequently refined.  Upon 
beginning the research in October 2008 the parameters of the project, as defined 
in the initial project bid document, were: 
 
- Through detailed analysis, to explore the broad governance and 
accountability mechanisms of LAAs, including the degree to which 
                                            
1
 Liverpool's Local Strategic Partnership 
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they have been shaped, managed and delivered through 'top down' 
or 'bottom up' approaches; 
- Through stakeholder analysis, to explore the relationships and 
accountabilities within and between LAAs and public, private and 
voluntary and community sector interests operating both locally, 
regionally and nationally and the implications that arise for service 
delivery; 
- To identify the extent to which engagement mechanisms appear to 
be supportive of both wider stakeholder involvement and local 
interests, and the implications for local prioritisation of needs through 
LAA-type arrangements; 
- To assess the influences and accountabilities of relevance to 
decision-making and the broader implications for centre-local 
relations, the devolution of power and responsibilities to localities to 
deliver public services and the implications for future interventions 
therein. 
 
These initial themes were to be conducted under the two broad arches of 
governance and accountability, with the ability to decide which themes would 
take greater prominence as the research developed.  This process of refinement 
took place over much of the first year of the PhD, reflecting a period of detailed 
literature review and lengthy discussions with the funders, before a final set of 
research questions was defined (see chapter three).  Reflecting this, what follows 
is an introduction to the research that was undertaken and an outline of how 
these initial research objectives were developed in order to best scrutinise the 
LAA model of local public service delivery.   
 
Before setting out what each chapter will focus on in more detail, a more general 
discussion of the thesis and its structure is helpful (a diagram outlining the 
structure of the thesis as a whole can be viewed in figure 1.1, at the end of the 
introduction).  The chapters are clustered into three sections.  The first is a 
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literature review charting the development of local public service delivery in the 
post-WWII period, drawing upon academic and government documents.  The 
second section covers the theoretical and methodological considerations of the 
research.  The third section focuses on the research findings and analysis. 
 
Chapter Two provides an account of the policy environment during the 20th 
century, briefly covering the periods before and after World War II, before moving 
to explicitly consider the Neo-Liberal period of the Thatcher/Major governments.  
The chapter concludes by discussing the emergence of the 'Third Way' period of 
the Blair government and the development of New Labour’s public service 
delivery policy.  This chapter begins to establish some of the main research 
questions, particularly around top-down control over local policy and the power 
shifts and interactions of local partners within a shifting policy environment.  By 
charting the development of New Labour’s urban policy the chapter provides an 
account of the policy environment which led to the establishment of the LAA and 
thus also provides an early indication of the policy problems for which the LAA 
was meant to find a solution. 
 
Chapter Three continues by explicitly focusing on the LAA itself, exploring both 
the government rhetoric and guidance around LAAs and comparing/contrasting it 
with the academic literature.  These initial research objectives formed the 
foundation of this process, serving as the lens through which the research would 
focus on the LAA.  Once again the chapter highlights trends around the issue of 
top-down control and the ability for LAAs to be locally responsive, as well as the 
local governance of the LAA and the implications that good partner interactions 
could have on an LAA’s effectiveness.  As part of this, the chapter considered 
wider international examples from the devolved UK, Europe and North America 
to see if similar issues emerged.  This chapter culminates in an expansion of the 
initial research objectives, with the definition of more detailed research questions.  
These questions, reflecting the findings of the previous two chapters were 
categorised into three main themes; 
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- Vertical (Top-Down) Governance 
- Horizontal (Local) Governance 
- Improving Future Practice 
 
Following this, Chapter Four then sets about defining the theoretical framework, 
or frameworks, that could be useful in exploring these issues further and helping 
to better understand any findings.  In particular, this chapter focused on Jessop’s 
(1990) Strategic Relational Approach which considers the notion of a strong state 
and its ‘privileging’ of actors through the designation and allocation of policy.  The 
chapter also identified a number of other theories which were of use in analysis 
including New Institutionalism, which focused on the role of agencies/partners 
and the ways in which they interact with any particular scheme. 
 
Chapter Five sets out the dual-methodology that would be used in the research.  
The first part outlines a national overview survey that would be sent to every LAA 
manager in England, with the aim of exploring the initial research questions and 
to obtain a sense of whether they held relevance in practice or not.  The 
subsequent analysis then provides a reconsideration of the research questions in 
the light of the overview findings, jettisoning some, and expanding others.  The 
methodology then outlines the criteria that will be used for selecting detailed case 
study areas so as to provide the best platform from which to analyse the 
research questions.  This process led to the selection of Liverpool and St Helens 
in the North West of England as the two case studies, given their historical 
context, close socio-economic similarities and the range of responses they 
provided within the overview. 
 
The next three chapters then outline the results to arise from the case studies, 
particularly drawing upon interviews with the key actors involved with the LAA in 
those areas, and from a national level.   
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Chapter Six focuses explicitly on the vertical governance of LAAs, looking at the 
nature of top-down control.  It first looks at the National Indicator Dataset, 
exploring issues of homogeneity and the ability for areas to be locally responsive 
through their indicator selections or whether the NID represents the imposition of 
a centralised policy agenda.  It then goes on to explore the role of GOR in the 
LAA process, in particular exploring two competing models to explain how GOR 
operated – one of which contends that the effectiveness of GOR approach was 
based around local actor’s understanding of GOR’s role, the other that GOR’s 
effectiveness is based on their ability to fully involve and engage with the area. 
 
Chapter Seven focuses on the horizontal governance of LAAs, looking at the 
interactions of the local partners within each of the case studies.  This explores 
issues around stronger and weaker actors, to discover whether agencies have a 
tendency to dominate proceedings, or if any agencies particularly struggle to 
engage.  This chapter also considers the nature of internal agendas, to assess 
how well agencies have aligned their own internal programmes with that of the 
LAA and issues arising from this.  This chapter also examines the LAAs 
accountability and governance structures – notably the Executive Board and 
Thematic Partnerships.  This considers how effective they are as a vehicle for 
delivering LAA business, and the extent to which they represent good partnership 
working and reflect the working principles of the LAA. 
 
Chapter Eight has two roles.  The first is to provide a consideration of the 
effectiveness of the LAA model overall, considering its strengths and 
weaknesses, as viewed by those tasked with delivering it, before moving to 
assess whether or not the LAA has been a success in terms of achieving its 
stated aims.  The chapter then moves to provide a consideration of how the 
lessons of the LAA can be transferred to future practice.  This begins by 
discussing how actors felt the LAA model could have been improved.  The 
chapter then provides a consideration firstly of how the LAA might have 
developed under a hypothetical fourth term Labour Government, before  
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discussing the Coalition policies that replaced the LAA.  In doing this, the chapter 
provides a short assessment of how each scheme would prove successful or 
otherwise in addressing these shortfalls. 
 
In concluding, the final section draws all the finding chapters together, before 
making a final move towards considering the relative success or not of the LAA 
and the importance of lesson learning from past practice in order to inform and 



















    
Policy Overview – Setting out the development of the delivery of Local 
Public Services from the turn of the 20th Century until Local Area 
Agreements.   
LAAs and the Future – Focusing on the critique of LAA working, 
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coalition government. 
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conceptual approaches would be most pertinent to analyse the 
research questions.   
LAA Overview / International Examples – Detailed literature review 
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covers schemes of international comparison.  This chapter also raises 
research questions of pertinence.   
Vertical Governance – Focusing on the centre-local aspect of LAA 
governance, particularly town down control around indicator/target 
selection and the role of GOR. 
Horizontal Governance – Focusing on the inter-partner relationships 
at the local level, outlining the concept of strong/weak actors and the 
balancing of internal and external agency agendas 
Conclusions / Policy Recommendations 
Methodology and Case Study Selection – First sets out the national 
overview survey of LAAs, which in turn was designed to help identify 

















Chapter Two – The Development of Local Governance 
and the Delivery of Local Public Services in England 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The search for good governance in the effective delivery of local public services 
is not a new one (Darlow et al: 2007).  This begs the question about what 
precedents there are – a question that forms the purpose of this chapter  This 
search has been shaped by the respective governments of the day and the 
changing view of the role of local government in delivering these services.   
 
Between 2005 and 2010 Local Area Agreements sat at the forefront of local 
public service delivery in England.  Designed as three year contracts between 
Central and Local Government, which identified priorities and set accompanying 
targets for delivery, these agreements raised numerous core themes revolving 
around the relationship between the state and local areas, as well as the impact 
on partnership working on a local scale.   
 
However before moving to consider the most recent efforts to deliver local public 
services in England, it is crucial to set this work within an appropriate context.  By 
charting the development of local public service delivery prior to Local Area 
Agreements, one can gain a deeper understanding of the policy environment 
from which the LAA emerged and the problems - both of a practical and 
governance nature - that LAAs were intended to tackle.   
 
In particular, given that many policy issues regarding public service delivery are 
enacted by Whitehall and then implemented in the localities, policy changes can 
have serious implications for central-local relations.  Thus, one of the key themes 
of this chapter will be to consider how the relationship between central and local 
government has changed over time. 
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By undertaking such an exercise one can assess the extent to which the issues 
and themes that were of relevance to LAAs have previously been faced and 
addressed.  In doing this, one can gain a sense of the key policy lessons to be 
taken from past practice and whether LAAs appropriately reflected and sought to 
learn from those lessons. 
 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to chart the development of local public 
service delivery in the United Kingdom and specifically England, while identifying 
the key governance issues along the way, particularly of relevance to central-
local relations and the devolution of power away from the state. 
 
2.2 Pre World War Two 
The first significant move towards the forms of local governance that exist today 
came through the Local Government Acts of 1888 and 1894, which introduced 
elected local authorities across England, operating on a two-tier county and 
district model, with the exception of major cities which were exempt from county 
jurisdiction (Leach and Percy-Smith: 2001), in an electoral format which is still 
recognisable today.  These new authorities became responsible for a ‘range of 
major functions’ (ibid p50) with governance split between county and town halls.  
This system slowly replaced the ad-hoc system of single-purpose bodies that 
characterised the Victorian period.  (Ashworth: 1954 cited in Mawson: 2009). 
 
The creation of this new form of local government required an element of vertical 
interaction between Central Government and the newly created localities which 
had never been seen before.  Thus, as a by-product of this system there 
emerged an issue that is still remains a key factor in modern day local 
governance: central-local relations.   
 
2.3 Post World War Two  
Post-war Britain was characterised by a period of extreme change but also 
consensus about the nature of this change.  The urgent need for post-war 
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reconstruction to rebuild cities and infrastructure led to the adoption of the 1947 
Town and Country Planning Act – laying the foundation for the modern planning 
system - yet Taylor contends that post-war Britain was largely governed by 
‘consensus politics... characterised by both radical and conservative ideas to 
construct a “middle-way” between the extremes of liberalism and socialism’ 
(Taylor, 1998: 21).  This is a view that is shared by Cullingworth (1975) 
suggesting that if the Conservative Party had formed the post-war government 
rather than Labour it is likely that they would have enacted a similar set of 
policies.  
 
This period of uncontentious top down policy creation (largely driven by 
necessity) would not continue for very long, however.  Indeed, Darlow (2007) 
identifies a trend beginning in the 1960’s of a mounting challenge to Local 
Government as a provider of services, starting with the Royal Commission  
Redcliffe-Maud Report (HMSO: 1969). 
 
The Redcliffe-Maud report was a major study undertaken into the appropriate 
scale at which to deliver local public service.  The changing demographic 
structure and distribution of English population, the requirements of citizens, and 
tellingly the increasing role of central government in economic matters and urban 
regeneration were all cited as being drivers behind the study (Wise, 1969), noting 
that this changing face of England made the delivery of local public services such 
as planning and transport ‘impossible’ (HMSO: 1969).  The report proposed the 
scrapping of the two-tier council system, replacing it with a series of unitary areas 
with a population between 250,000 and 1,000,000.  In all it proposed the creation 
of 58 new unitary authorities, based largely around major towns, however there 
was an awareness of the distinctiveness of the issues that faced urban and rural 
areas, which also influenced this selection (Wise, 1969). 
 
The Redcliffe-Maud Report proposed a new tier of government grouping known 
as ‘Provinces’ (HMSO: 1969) which opted to split several of the traditional county 
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areas, but also were, interestingly, grouped along very similar lines to the 
Government Office Regions introduced in 1994 (see Figure 2.1). 
 
This report marked the first major shift in central-local relations since the 1894 
Act, with the proposed change in local government being instigated from 
Westminster.  This was in acknowledgement of the fact that the existing scales of 
working made it difficult for the developing role of the state in the localities (i.e. 
planning) to be effective.  This proposed change was designed to improve the 
efficiency of public services at the local level, but was done in a way so as to 
make the state’s role in delivering them easier, rather than to reform the actual 
public services in order to make them more reflective of local need.  Therefore,  it 
could be argued that the Redcliffe-Maud report represented one of the first 
significant moves by the central state to alter an aspect of public life to better suit 
its own purposes, as opposed to the purposes of those that were directly affected 





Figure 2.1 Provinces as envisaged in the Redcliffe Maud Report (HMSO: 1969) 
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Ultimately, the recommendations of the Redcliffe-Maud report were not adopted 
directly, in part due to the 1970 general election in which the Labour led 
Government of Harold Wilson lost to the Conservatives led by Edward Heath.  
However, they went on to significantly inform the Local Government Act of 1972, 
which carried out significant changes to local government boundaries, and in turn 
the methods of governance (HMG: 1972).  The key difference between the 1972 
Act and the 1969 report reflected the fact a two-tier approach to local government 
was still favoured.  Consequently, local government was organised as such, with 
predominately rural areas taking on a county and district model, and the major 
urban centres being classified as metropolitan counties, with a number of districts 
or boroughs beneath.  This new system of working raised similar questions to 
those initially cited within the 1969 Redcliffe-Maud report about whether the 
reforms were designed to benefit the state, or the localities.  This was also 
coupled with a new tension within the county and district model over the 
governance arrangements within this two-tier structure and issues about the 
levels of control over local services. 
 
2.3.1 Inner City Partnerships 
With the publication of the ‘Policy for the Inner Cities’ White Paper (DoE: 1977) 
the Labour government developed a scheme that would introduce two new 
concepts into local governance and service delivery.  The ‘Inner City 
Partnerships’ that would emerge were the first schemes to explicitly focus on 
inner city urban areas and the first to introduce the notion of partnership to public 
policy.  This new concept of partnership was defined as ‘all public agencies and 
authorities whose policies are of importance to the inner city… brought together 
to initiate a co-ordinated strategy’ (Nabarro: 1980, p25). 
 
Run by the Department of Environment, through its guidance – which was not 
mandatory – the scheme encouraged local areas to assess the situation within 
their respective inner city area and the policies they had in place that related to it.  
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After then identifying any policy gaps they would specify a course of action, 
including spending priorities for a period of three years.  This three year time 
horizon to deliver improvement, as will become apparent, became a recurring 
theme within public service delivery, especially with the LAA. 
 
In an initial assessment of the scheme, Nabarro (1980) pointed to areas 
struggling to fully grasp the nature of these new partnerships and the governance 
arrangements that they entailed.  This in turn led to a low ‘buy in’ from senior 
public officials whose presence and support was considered necessary for 
success.  As the next section will make clear, the writing proved to be on the wall 
for Inner City Partnerships, with many of the schemes producing their first three 
year partnership budget to take effect in April 1979, only one month before the 
general election.  However their legacy, both in terms of explicitly focusing on 
inner city areas and introducing the concept of partnership working, is one that 
would continue to resonate through the coming decades of policy around local 
public service delivery. 
 
 
2.4 1979-1997 – Conservatives and Neo Liberalism 
From the mid 1970s public policy began a process of centralisation, starting with 
the scaling back of local government grants by the Labour Government (Savage, 
1994), however this process accelerated in 1979 with the election of Margaret 
Thatcher’s Conservative administration.  Up until this point, local public services 
were still largely delivered at a local authority level, with the only significant 
alterations coming from amendments to local government boundaries, which 
were intended to help these services be delivered more efficiently.  The period 
following 1979 saw the local public service become increasingly influenced by a 
neo-liberal model of delivery (ibid). 
 
The emergence of the neo-liberal model of governance led to a dramatic shift in 
the priorities and direction of central government.  This was characterised 
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primarily by a desire to boost economic development above all other forms of 
development, under the principle that economic prosperity would drive 
improvements in other areas.  Confirming this, Robson (1988) identifies the 
Department of the Environment (DoE) as having a specific ‘presumption in favour 
of projects that have as their objective the stimulation of economic activity in their 
area’ (In Robson: 1988 p99).  As well as the shift in favour of economic 
development, throughout this period, Leach and Percy Smith (2001) noted a shift 
across government policy that saw the drastic taking back of central government 
control and a significant reduction of power for local areas, with top down 
governance characterising Whitehall policy throughout the 1980s, with increased 
controls over the nature of funding and greater involvement in state actors within 
schemes relating to local areas. 
 
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a change in policy. For example, in the 
context of regeneration – and arguably across public services more generally – 
there was a greater emphasis on partnership working and community 
involvement in shaping and delivering public services (Clark & Stewart 1999).   
 
2.4.1 Partnership authorities  
One of the first major initiatives to embody the new neo-liberal principles was the 
establishment of Partnership Authorities.  This expanded upon the earlier moves 
towards partnership in local public service delivery with actors from central 
government (Department of the Environment (DoE), Department for Trade and 
Industry (DTI) and Department for Education (DE)) and local (local authority) 
working together under the leadership of the DoE (Robson: 1988). 
 
These ‘public-private partnerships’ were seen as the first step in delivering a 
private city, free of state/government influence, yet as a result of this view these 
schemes were heavily criticised (Boyle and Rich: 1984).  One reason for this was 
down to the increasing bureaucracy of governance through the creation of extra 
committees, rather than reducing it as intended.  However the severest criticism 
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related to how private sector enterprise was now able to influence the direction of 
local governance.  Following its neo-liberal ideology, Whitehall was keen to 
encourage private sector led enterprise, which in turn served to marginalise local 
authorities, affirming the contempt that they believed central government held 
them in.  This made maintaining an effective relationship between central 
government and local governments increasingly difficult. 
 
2.4.2 Urban Development Corporations 
Whilst the development of a ‘best value’ agenda and the growth of public-private 
partnerships saw the seeping away of local authorities’ functions to the private 
sector, the government also began introducing a number of new agencies which 
quickened and deepened the effects of this process.   The most significant of 
these were the Urban Development Corporations (UDC) established by – then 
Secretary of State for the Environment, now Lord - Michael Heseltine in 1980. 
 
These were designated areas located within a local authority that were given 
powers to assemble and regenerate derelict land whilst also planning for its 
subsequent use – seen as a ‘direct assault’ on local authorities and their planning 
powers as they stood at that time (Robson, 1988).  This was done in response to 
concerns in government that local authorities didn’t embody the neo-liberal 
values of Whitehall in that they were ‘too slow, too lacking in commercial interest, 
and too trammelled with the dictates of local democracy’ (Robson: 1988, p126) 
and thus only by allowing the private sector and market led principles to guide 
regeneration could these local areas obtain the regeneration that was required. 
 
The UDC scheme began with two areas, the London Docklands Development 
Corporation and Merseyside Development Corporation.  London’s scheme was 
the larger of the two, comprising of 5100 acres of land, which contained some 
15,000 dwellings of which 95% were council property.  In contrast Liverpool’s 
UDC comprised 860 acres and contained no private residences (Robson:1987).  
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Both schemes were responsible for development schemes which are still in place 
today (LDC: Canary Wharf and London Docklands Railway, Liverpool: Albert 
Dock and Tate Modern North).  In terms of the more general success of the UDC 
their fortunes were rather different, owing to the idea that each scheme would 
seek to draw in private sector investment to (at least) match that which was put 
forward from the public purse.  In London this proved to be a resounding 
success, with the scheme leveraging private funds at a ratio of 1:6 (Public: 
Private), whereas Liverpool could only generate a ratio of 1:0.5 (Robson: 1988, 
p127), meaning, in the first instance that it turned out to be substantially publicly 
funded – against the principles in which the scheme was established – which in 
turn limited the capacity of the Liverpool UDC to deliver.   
 
During their development the schemes proved to be unpopular with local 
residents, particularly in London, where concerns were raised through resident 
forum groups about the improvements making housing in the area unaffordable, 
coupled with the unattainable nature of the jobs being created in the area 
(Robson, 1988).   
 
Indicating the top-down nature of Whitehall policy at the time, the Urban 
Development Corporations were criticised as giving the perception that the 
Conservative administration was taking action in cities desperate for 
regeneration.  However, this was on their own terms rather than by acting upon 
specific demand from those cities (Goodwin and Painter: 1996).  Indeed, 
Goodwin and Painter go on to contend that the UDC simply formed part of a 
wider strategy of using regulation as a political tool against the Labour party 
(which controlled the councils of most inner urban areas at the time) and local 
government, while elsewhere they were described as undemocratic, leading to 
the ‘undermining of local authorities (Ho: 2003). 
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As an addendum, Lord Heseltine spoke anecdotally2 of how the first two UDCs 
were established to circumvent planning laws that were in place and to avoid a 
time consuming and potentially unfruitful period of passage through the House of 
Commons.  Originally the plan was to introduce one scheme: The London 
Docklands, but by introducing two schemes, Parliamentary procedures could be 
avoided as the scheme would be administered through special ministerial 
initiative.  Consequently, Liverpool – deemed to be the second worst performing 
area in the country at the time and thus more likely to benefit from the scheme3 – 
was included as a second area.  This indicates that policy development is not 
always carefully planned, with the case of Liverpool illustrating that areas can 
inadvertently benefit from schemes designed to improve other parts of the 
country. 
 
2.4.3 Task Forces 
The next major policy initiative to be brought forward were City Action Teams 
(CAT) and Task Forces, originally established in 1985 as a way of co-ordinating 
the activities of the numerous central departments activities in relation to urban 
renewal and job creation in the localities.  The aim was to end the element of 
disjointedness that existed between Whitehall and the localities in delivering 
these projects by creating stronger links between the two tiers of government, 
however there were concerns surrounding the danger of ‘parachuting’ central 
government departments into the localities with minimal understanding of local 
priorities or working cultures (Robson: 1988). 
 
Five CAT areas were originally established in the partnership authority areas of 
Birmingham, Liverpool, London, Manchester and Newcastle – with Leeds and 
Nottingham added to the scheme in 1988.   
 
                                            
2
 In a speech to the Town and Country Planning Association in Liverpool, 9
th
 November 2011 
3
 See footnote one 
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The Task Forces operated on a small geographical scale - similar to that of the 
UDC - with the aim of stimulating local economic growth through job creation.  
However the limited funding available led to the schemes being seen as largely 
cosmetic in nature and to accusations that they raised hopes only to 
subsequently dash them – particularly in ethnic minority communities (Robson: 
1988) and the scheme’s outright emphasis on economic regeneration led to 
strong and sustained critique from academics, voluntary groups and local 
activists (Ho, 2003). 
 
They were also hampered by the fact that many inner city areas were 
predominately controlled by Labour run councils which, at the time, sought to 
resist the control of the Thatcher government.   One way they did this was to 
refuse to fully engage with the schemes, thus preventing them from developing in 
the way that the government envisaged.  This lasted until the 1987 general 
election win for the Conservative Party, after which the Labour stance was 
softened.  
 
2.4.4 Local Government Reorganisation 
In 1985 the Government published the ‘Lifting the Burden’ White Paper (DoE: 
1985) which proposed the relaxing of regulations around planning and other 
aspects of local governance that could lead to economic development.  This, in 
turn, was seen as laying the foundations for one of the most overt assertions of 
central control over the localities – the 1986 local government reorganisation.  
This was a major reorganisation of local authorities4, sweeping away the Greater 
London Authority and the Metropolitan counties, giving their composite districts 
unitary authority status.  The reorganisation, in turn, was justified as a cost 
saving measure (Stewart: 2003), removing what was said to be a costly and 
bureaucratic layer of government.   
 
                                            
4
 Although it only affected the Metropolitan areas 
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However, it has previously been mentioned that Government sought to use its 
ability to define the parameters of local authority power in order to suppress the 
Labour controlled councils (Goodwin and Painter: 1996, Ying Ho: 2003).  Indeed, 
the 1986 re-organisation was widely seen as being a continuation of this and a 
direct challenge to the Labour controlled Greater London Council, which had 
been in direct conflict with the Whitehall administration for a number of years.  
Similarly, the reorganisation was seen as an effective way of limiting the powers 
of other Labour run councils, particularly in Liverpool where the Militant Labour 
movement also clashed with the government, particularly over budget setting, in 
the early 1980s (Parkinson: 1985).  This analysis is strengthened by the fact the 
re-organisation ran counter to the recommendations of the Redcliffe Maud report 
on local government, recommendations which were fully accepted by the 
Conservative government of Edward Heath at the time of their publication. 
 
2.4.5 Neo-Liberalism under Major: City Challenge 
In 1990, Margaret Thatcher resigned as Prime Minister, being replaced by John 
Major.  Major, with former Environment Secretary Michael Heseltine as his 
Deputy, set about delivering a new package of local public service delivery policy 
which, whilst still remaining true to the principles of neo-liberalism, marked a shift 
from the top-down control shown throughout the 1980s. 
 
One of the most significant schemes to emerge from this period was established 
in 1991 – City Challenge.  The scheme was one which placed an emphasis on 
citywide regeneration, whilst simultaneously using this work to improve the worst 
performing areas.  The Department of the Environment (DoE) envisaged that the 
project would achieve success by: 
 
- Developing disadvantaged areas which have significant development 
potential for the city and are a major constraint on a city wide development 
- Providing disadvantaged residents with access to opportunities produced 
by regeneration through specific measures 
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- Linking disadvantaged areas and their residents to a city’s mainstream 
economy 
(DoE 1991 para 1.2) 
 
Originally the project was planned to encompass 10 local authorities, for a period 
of 5 years, with a budget of £37.5m each.  However after the initial bidding 
process, 11 ‘pacemaker’ authorities were designated from the 15 that bid (Ho: 
2003). 
 
The intention was that these schemes would be led by the local authority, acting 
as the head of a Public-Private Partnership.  These ‘City Challenge Partnerships’ 
were governed by a board of directors comprising all the key agency members in 
the area, as well as representatives of business groups and the voluntary sector. 
 
In terms of the delivery of the project itself, it was identified that difficulties could 
arise due to the fact that those who were responsible for negotiating the initial 
targets in the original City Challenge plan would not necessarily be the same 
people who were tasked with implementing it (Ying Ho: 2003). 
 
However, while there may have been a shift away from the paternalism of the 
1980s, there was still a strong culture of central control woven into the fabric of 
City Challenge.  Indeed, it was to incorporate a four tier hierarchy of agencies 
that would be echoed by LAAs some 10 years later.  The DoE were at the top of 
the hierarchy, with Government Office for the Regions (established in 1994 as 
the representatives of Whitehall in each of the regions) overseeing the process.  
In turn, each locality was represented within this hierarchy by its City Challenge 
Partnership and those responsible for delivery.  This hierarchy illustrated that 
whilst the City Challenge areas were allowed to lead their own schemes they 
were still subject to significant top-down oversight from central government with 
each scheme being led by a Minister from the Government, as well as review 
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and vetting from GOR (the former aspect is one that would be replicated later in 
the LAA). 
 
The City Challenge was also one of the first schemes to include a significant 
monitoring element to it, where continued funding was based on the strength of 
achievements within the scheme.  Each City Challenge was required to set a 
number of targets, which would be activity orientated and quantifiable – e.g. job 
creation.  However, it became clear that the purpose of this monitoring process 
was principally for the benefit of Whitehall’s agenda and its progress rather than 
the progress of each individual scheme (Ho: 2003).   
 
Furthermore, the official evaluation report of the City Challenge cast greater 
doubt over the efficiency of the monitoring process, noting little/no correlation 
between the target setting and attainment and drawing into question the 
usefulness of such a procedure as a predictive tool – particularly where 
incentives are attached (Russell et al: 1996).  Questions were also raised as to 
the efficiency of the target setting system, particularly relating to when an area 
was deemed to have over-achieved against any particular target.  The evaluation 
identified the difficulty of ascertaining whether progress on a target was due to 
the success of the scheme or down to simply underestimating the target.  This 
same principle would also apply to targets that had failed to be achieved.  Whilst 
this clearly created problems for the incentive process, this may have been 
avoided through use of improved baseline data.  Indeed, evidence bases would 
go on to carry much greater significance in many of the schemes rolled out under 
New Labour.  
 
Ultimately however, the evaluation only added to the criticisms that the City 
Challenge did not alleviate previous allegations of top-down control from central 
government.  A significant criticism was that the monitoring was overly 
bureaucratic in nature, and that as a result it added little to improving the best 
practice of the localities.  Thus it was of little relevance to local areas, whilst 
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offering more benefits to Whitehall in terms of monitoring the performance of the 
scheme and by extension their policy priorities. 
 
2.4.6 Area Based Initiatives: Areas for Improvement 
Reflecting upon the relative successes of the various Area Based Initiatives to 
have been implemented in Britain, Matthews (2012) points to an academic 
consensus that considers these schemes to have been largely ineffective.  In 
particular, Matthews cites studies which find;  
 
 a succession of policy changes and parallel schemes have left areas 
unable to make consistent progress (Tunstall and Coulter: 2006)  
 a failure to target funding on those most in need (Dabinett et al: 2001) 
 a failure to take a strategic view of the wider economy of the area and its 
implications (Carley and Kirk: 1998, Gripaios: 2002) 
(Cited in Matthews: 2012, p148) 
 
As well as these shortcomings, there was also a general consensus that 
successive schemes, particularly in the 1980s, undermined the strength and 
confidence of local government in the UK, rendering local actors less able to 
devise and deliver effective responses to the needs of their areas.  
Consequently, it is now time to discuss the way that New Labour, in the period 
following 1997 sought to respond to these criticisms and the success that they 
had in doing so. 
 
2.5 1997 - New Labour – New Policy Environment? 
In the period from 1997 onwards, following the election of a Labour Government, 
a new set of policy developments were brought forward, aimed at changing the 
way local decisions were made and public services delivered as well as the 
relationship between central and local government.  However, this process of 
change did not start begin immediately. 
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2.5.1 Academic Forerunners 
In the years leading up to Labour’s return to office in 1997, much work was done 
by academics which went on to create the foundation what became know as ‘The 
Third Way’.  The most notable of these academics and one of the principle 
architects of The Third Way was the sociologist Anthony Giddens.  Although he 
tended towards broader ideas rather than specific policy prescriptions, Giddens 
set out many of the principles which would impact on local governance 
procedures in the coming years.   
 
Giddens first defined the new challenge of operating in a peacetime world, post 
World War and post ‘Cold War’ as a ‘State without Enemies’ which whilst not 
facing external threats, still faced legitimate dangers in this new policy landscape 
and thus had to seek out new sources of legitimacy. (Giddens: 1998) 
 
Setting out the defining principle of the Third Way, Giddens sought to reconcile 
the market led principles of neo-liberalism expounded under the Conservative 
government of the 1980s with the statist principles of Social Democracy which 
stood as the other significant political viewpoint of the time.  It was felt that neo-
liberalist market led principles were still relevant to economic policy, particularly 
noting the view that “Government is mistrusted because it is cumbersome and 
ineffective, business can change rapidly… [but government] still has much to  
learn from business best practice including target culture, efficiency and auditing” 
(Giddens: 1998 p75). As a result Giddens felt that “by lacking market discipline 
state institutions become lazy and the services they deliver shoddy” (Giddens: 
1998. p75) and thus opening the state up to market led principles would deliver 
greater efficiency.  However, whilst seeking to maintain the general market led 
principles through which Thatcher and other neo-liberal governments sought to 
modernise the institutions of governance, Giddens’ model saw value in 
maintaining the principles of social democracy including the “deepening and 
widening of democracy [through which] Government can act in partnership with 
agencies in civil society to foster community renewal and development.” 
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(Giddens: 1998, p69).  Giddens felt that the shift of power away from Whitehall 
and increased self governance could lead to regeneration of cities, although he 
did acknowledge that this approach could lead to heightened inequalities as 
some areas would grasp/be better equipped to grasp these opportunities more 
than others, worsening ‘the marked regional inequalities that already exist in the 
UK’ (Giddens: 1998, p78).   
 
Summing up the basic principles of the Third Way model, Massey (2001) argued 
that the direction of New Labour policy was similar to Conservative principles, 
just simply repackaged, whilst Wilks-Heeg (2009) went further, arguing that ‘the 
Third Way constituted an implicit acceptance of key Thatcherite principles… 
[coupling them] …with more nebulous ideas of ‘renewal’, ‘modernisation’ and 
‘social inclusion’ (Wilks-Heeg: 2009, p24).  As became clear during the following 
years, many of these principles became core aspects of New Labour policy.  
Most notably the development of target culture and devolution of power away 
from Whitehall to the UK states and communities became key themes of the New 
Labour policy approach.   
 
The ‘Third Way’ was not without its early critics, however, with Midwinter (2001) 
noting that under Tony Blair, New Labour’s stance towards local government 
became less sympathetic.  The most obvious manifestation of this was the 
change of tone in the policy rhetoric, with the emphasis being placed on 
‘modernisation’ to cope with market principles as opposed to more local 
autonomy – something that traditional social democracy would argue for (Wilks-
Heeg: 2009) and many Labour Controlled local authorities were disappointed to 
see these relations formalised, rather than repealed. (Leach: 2010). 
 
2.5.2 Lord Rogers – Towards an Urban Renaissance 
Following Labour’s return to office, the Government set up the Urban Task Force 
led by Lord Richard Rogers, ‘to identify causes of urban decline and establish a 
vision for our cities, founded on the principles of design excellence, social 
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wellbeing and environmental responsibility’ (Urban Task Force: 2005, p2).   In 
1999 Lord Rogers delivered the Task Force’s final report ‘Toward an Urban 
Renaissance’.   
 
The task force identified the importance of good governance and social well-
being in their vision for successful urban areas.  One of the key principles they 
felt was essential in delivering the concept of an Urban Renaissance was an 
increase in the investment in Urban Government.  This included a change from 
paternalistic top down government to a more participatory system involving local 
citizens in the decisions which affect them.   
 
This principle also included firm support for the notions of partnerships.  This 
renewed partnership movement would lead to flexible, city wide policy and a 
providing a clarity of vision with joined up policies across the area (Rogers: 
1999).  The Task Force outlined specific management structures which they felt 
where necessary to deliver on their vision for the urban renaissance.  This was 
centred around a single management framework, which tied all the relevant 
partners to one organisation, established a visible presence in the area and 
provided a senior manager with the authority to effect delivery (Rogers: 1999).  
These principles bear a strong resemblance to the Local Strategic Partnership 
structures. 
 
The task force also advocated the use of a set of national indicators which could 
then be used to compare performance with similar urban areas as well as to 
establish instances of best practice. 
 
Like the broader theoretical work of Giddens, The Urban Task Force’s 
recommendations would prove to be highly influential.  Indeed, the framework it 
sets out can be clearly identified as Labour moved towards implementing these 




2.6 From Theory to Practice: The Emergence of Labour’s Urban Policy 
From 1998 onwards, Britain saw numerous policy initiatives introduced which set 
out Labour’s vision for the development of urban areas, covering practical 
planning issues (e.g. through updated Planning Policy Statements (PPS) - 
replacing the Planning Policy Guidance (PPG) introduced under the Major 
Government) but also relating to the governance of localities and urban areas. 
 
2.6.1 The Local Government Modernisation Agenda 
All of these schemes were implemented under what became known as the Local 
Government Modernisation Agenda (LGMA) – a broad policy umbrella aiming to 
update the institutions and governance structures of local government to bring 
them in line with the new ‘Third Way’ political philosophy which was informing 
Labour’s policy outlook. 
 
Downe and Martin (2006) identified five main stages of the LGMA (see table 2.1) 
of which the LAA forms the final part.  Whilst some of stages will be expanded 
upon in the coming sections, it is helpful to consider the LGMA in light of the 
theoretical principles outlined earlier. 
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- Largely based around efficiency and ‘best value’ 
II 
2000 
- Introduction of the Local Government Act (2000) 
- Separates executive and non-executive functions 
- Embraces concerns about democratic accountability 
III 
2001-2002 
- Rescuing  the improvement agenda from best value 
- Too many best value reports produced than inspectors 
could handle 
- Proposed ‘Earned Autonomy’ – I.e. Best performing 
councils would receive less inspection 
IV 
2003-2005* 
- Heightened interest in  Local Authority’s community 
leadership 
- Formation of LSPs 
- Introduction of cross-cutting initiatives designed to give 
local authorities more policy freedom 
V* 
2006-2010* 
- Improved Performance Management 
- Local Area Agreements 
Adapted from Downe and Martin: 2006 
*Author’s analysis 
 
In essence it can be split into two key sections – focusing on the establishment of 
Third Way principles through policy, followed by implementation.  What becomes 
clear however is that as the LGMA develops, it is almost as if the two sections 
moderate each other to maintain the third way and prevent a shift to full social 
democracy or neo-liberalism.   
 
‘Stage I’ clearly embraced the market led efficiency drive with the development of 
‘best value’ schemes whilst ‘Stage II’ indicated a development of the social-
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democratic aspects with the Local Government Act and the beginnings of local 
government institutional reform.  Indicating the need for constant moderation, 
‘Stage III’ seeks to intervene in the competing interests of Stages I and II, with 
Downe and Martin (2006) indicating that the deepening of social democracy 
needed ‘rescuing’ from the market driven efficiency agenda which threatened to 
swamp progress with excessive bureaucracy.  
 
Stages IV and V sought to continue the development of the Third Way reform 
model by beginning the processes of devolving power away from Whitehall, with 
the development of LSPs and subsequently LAAs. 
 
It is important to consider, as these policy developments from 2000 onwards are 
outlined in more detail, that they represent a continuous moderation of two 
competing political philosophies i.e. market led neo-liberalism and social 
democracy.  As such it is essential to keep in mind how they embody each of 
these aims and the implications that each competing direction can have on the 
effectiveness on the local public services that are delivered under this policy 
umbrella. 
 
2.6.2 Modern Local Government, Local Government Act and the Urban White 
Paper 
The first practical move of the LGMA came with the 1998 White Paper ‘Modern 
Local Government – In Touch with the People’ (DETR: 1998).  Amongst the key 
aspects of this, the White Paper proposed significant changes to the way elected 
officials led councils, the establishment of Regional Development Agencies and 
most importantly the introduction of performance management.  This 
performance management would be achieved by utilising a set of national 
performance indicators measuring ‘efficiency, cost and quality’ to ensure best 
value for local citizens (DETR: 1998, p5).  The principle behind this was that 
councils could subsequently identify and improve their worst performing areas in 
order to raise overall performance.  The other significant introduction was that of 
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a ‘single capital pot’:  a concentrated source of local funds intended to allow more 
flexibility to define priorities and plan for their delivery over a longer period, in a 
way that best suited local actors.   
 
Ultimately, although the 1998 White Paper was criticised for failing to offer a 
significant degree of local autonomy (Wilks-Heeg: 2009), it still offered significant 
concessions to local areas to allow them to define their priorities and spending – 
something that was considerably limited under previous schemes. 
 
In 2000, building on the recommendations of the Rogers Report (Rogers: 1999) 
the government passed the Local Government Act (HMG: 2000).  The act 
mandated each Local Authority in England to produce a strategy for “promoting 
or improving the economic, social and environmental wellbeing of their area” 
(HMG: 2000 section 4 para 1), known as a ‘Community Strategy.’  These were 
later changed to ‘Sustainable Community Strategy’ reflecting the Government’s 
sustainability agenda as outline in the 2003 Sustainable Communities Plan 
(ODPM: 2003). 
 
This strategy would be delivered by a ‘Local Strategic Partnership’ dubbed ‘The 
Partnership of Partnerships’ (Morphet: 2008).  This LSP was led by the local 
authority and  was comprised of other key actors responsible for local public 
service delivery from the public, private, community and voluntary sectors (DTLR: 
2001a).  During the LAA pilots, the LSP was to be led by a party designated by 
each LSP (with the Local Authority suggested), but Morphet (2008) pointed 
towards a distinct unease around the ambiguity of leadership, with local 
authorities feeling they should be the natural leaders – this was rectified in 2005  
with the designation of local authorities as the lead partner within the LSP 
structure (ODPM: 2005a).  
 
The role of the LSP would be expanded upon in the Urban White Paper – ‘Our 
Towns and Cities: The Future’ (ODPM: 2000).   Acknowledging the central role of 
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the new LSPs in improving urban areas, the LSPs were intended as a way of 
streamlining the processes of local governance by reducing overlap and ensuring 
a harmony of approach amongst local actors, in turn reducing the need to find a 
trade off between the various aims of local actors (Tewdwr Jones et al: 2006).  
This bore a striking similarity to some of the schemes that were present in the 
1980s, but Importantly the White Paper also noted that LSPs would not be 
another level of governance to sit on top of existing structures but instead would 
‘rationalise and co-ordinate existing partnerships’ (ODPM, 2000, p44). 
 
Developing the policy further, each LSP would require accreditation from GOR in 
order to become fully functional.  To attain this accreditation required six criteria 
to be satisfied; 
 
(1) Strategic. They are effective, representative, and capable of playing a key 
strategic role; 
(2) Inclusive. They actively involve all the key players, including the public, 
private, community and voluntary sectors; at the strategic level; more 
widely; with community and voluntary sectors; with black and ethnic 
minority communities; with the private sector;  
(3) Action-focused. They have established genuine common priorities and 
targets, and agreed actions and milestones leading to demonstrable 
improvements against measurable baselines; 
(4) Performance managed. Members (organizations) have aligned their 
performance management systems, aims and objectives, criteria and 
process to the aims and objectives of the LSP; 
(5) Efficient. They reduce, not add to, the bureaucratic burden; 
(6) Learning and developmental. They build on best practice from successful 
partnerships by drawing on experiences of local and regional structures, 




Whilst a general shift away from service management to community involvement 
was noted as a key theme of Labour policy (Painter and  Isaac-Henry: 1999), the 
early LSPs were criticised for failing to include enough members of the voluntary 
and community sectors (LGA: 2001).  Bailey (2003) anticipated the move 
towards LAAs noting the danger that the early LSPs could fail to act strategically, 
instead operating as a ‘parallel’ local authority simply distributing funds rather 
than delivering local public services in, and of, itself. 
 
Seeking to address some of the issues around centre-local relations Stoker 
(2005) identifies two models that any LSP leadership would take.  The first was 
one where the local authority would exercise strategic community leadership, 
with considerable political autonomy and representing communities within a 
wider partnership context.  The second model emphasised discretion, offered 
decentralised local government management but with central government setting 
the political agenda.  Stoker’s two models – which apply no less to the LAA as 
the delivery document - summarise the essence of this thesis, which ultimately 
intends to provide some inclination as to which of these prospects found more 
traction in the policy reality of delivery. 
 
2.6.3 Local Public Service Agreements 
One of the other significant projects to emerge during Labour’s first term in office 
– and in essence acted as a precursor to the LAA - was the Local Public Service 
Agreement (LPSA).  The similarities between the LAA that replaced it are 
striking: This was an agreement between central and local government to deliver 
specific improvements in performance and was agreed for a period of three years 
(Sullivan and Gillanders: 2005), offering financial rewards for those areas 
prepared to deliver improvements beyond those that would be normally expected 
(Martin: 2005).  This would be achieved by monitoring across some 1,200 
national indicators.  Given the number of these indicators and the fact that 
ultimately, the LPSA was designed to focus on the outcomes that a local area 
was producing as opposed to the processes of delivery itself (DTLR: 2001b) this 
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represented a significant move towards overt performance management in a way 
that had not previously been seen in UK public policy. 
 
During its implementation it was shown that there was a divergence in aims 
between  those responsible for leading the LPSA and those tasked with delivery 
meaning that changes in management could lead to significant shifts in direction 
(Sullivan and Gillanders: 2005).   
 
In assessing the LPSA Sullivan and Gillanders (2005) go on to suggest that they 
were developed in time of considerable change to centre-local relations and that 
as a result there was no definite centre-local power dynamic in the way that 
became clear during the 1980s in particular.  However, this can be contested as -
in an indication of the strength of Whitehall - the ability for the scheme to deliver 
national policy priorities at the local level, the same study reported that Whitehall 
departments found the LPSA to be an excellent way of delivering departmental 
policies.  Similarly, in an indication of the wariness around centre-local relations 
still held by local authority members, Millward (2005) indicates than initially many 
local authorities eagerly accepted the language of the LPSA (and the wider 
LGMA) in order to be seen to be on board with central priorities, whilst 
simultaneously securing themselves the breathing space to best position their 
authority and its response to the scheme. 
 
The LAA, which was introduced shortly after, was intended to be the natural 
evolution of both the LPSA and the LGMA of which it was a part.  Therefore, the 
extent to which the LAA sought to respond both to the LPSA’s policy strengths 
and weaknesses, but also to continue redefining this central-local power dynamic 






2.6.4 Strong and Prosperous Communities: Introducing LAAs 
In 2006 the Government produced another White Paper - Strong and Prosperous 
Communities – (CLG: 2006) amending some of the structures surrounding local 
governance.  It also outlined some of the measures that were being introduced to 
improve accountability as well as measures to streamline the existing LSP 
process.  This White Paper marked the introduction of the Local Area Agreement 
as the delivery document for the Sustainable Community Strategy (following on 
from the pilots undertaken in the period from 2004). 
 
Prior to the White Paper, the national indicator dataset, from which all local areas 
reported involved as many as 1,200 individual indicators of which around 80% of 
those were being reported for central purposes rather than for the benefit of the 
locality (Davies: 2008).  This was reduced to 198 national indicators, of which 
each Local Strategic Partnership/LAA was obliged to choose 35.  While they 
would still report back to central government on progress against all 198 
indicators, the locality would then be assessed on its performance against those 
targets.   
 
In order to allow measurement across all areas, the government included a 
number of compulsory targets.  However, to provide a greater degree of flexibility 
to the localities, local areas were allowed to choose their own targets from the 
dataset, based on the issues that they felt were of the most relevance to them.  
These targets would then be agreed upon with central government.  In order to 
ensure that targets were given the full attention that they required, the White 
Paper introduced the ‘Duty to Have Regard’ (CLG: 2006 p105).  This noted that 
some targets will be the sole duty of the local authority to implement (e.g. 
education) while in other cases targets will require partnership action.  While the 
White Paper noted that the ‘local authority cannot impose a target without 
showing due regard to any partner’s commitments or priorities’ (CLG: 2006, 
p105), once the targets have been agreed, the Secretary of State can direct all 
the relevant parties to show due regard to the implementation of them.  However, 
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questions remain as to how this will work in practice given that, as Davies (2008) 
points out, a partner can illustrate they have considered another partner’s 
commitments, and then dismiss it entirely. 
 
The White Paper outlines some of the accountability measures that are available 
to central government to ensure that local areas meet their obligations.  While the 
courses of action are numerous, including Statutory Improvement Action, 
Referral to the Secretary of State and Improvement Notices, details remained 
scarce at the early stage. 
 
In contrast to with the conciliatory tone of the previous White Papers, which 
made overtures of partnership, Davies highlighted a ‘moralising’ tone to this 
White Paper which exhibited ‘control freakery’ and made no guarantees that the 
LAA would avoid ‘back door centralisation’ i.e. the imposition of central control 
under the guise of greater localism (Davies: 2008, p3).  Reflecting many of the 
trends identified throughout this chapter, Davies pointed to the Lyons inquiry into 
the reform of local government which was published shortly after the 2006 White 
Paper, and his note that: 
 
‘The history of the last 30 years is marked by a series of well 
intentioned devolution initiatives, which have often evolved into subtle 
instruments of [central] control.’ 
(Lyons: 2007) 
 
This, coupled with Martin’s (2005) assertion that the sheer volume of schemes 
facing local authorities, has the potential to distract them from the business of 
delivering effective local public services.   
 
Now, the next chapter, and the rest of this research will explore the contrast 
between government rhetoric and policy reality in substantially more detail, 
focusing specifically on the Local Area Agreement and the extent to which it 
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reflected Davies’ concerns, or could seek to avoid replicating Lyons’ and Martin’s 
respective assessment of previous schemes. 
 
2.7 In Summary 
At this point, the work has outlined some of the policy history surrounding local 
public service delivery since 1945, particularly focusing on the period following 
1979.  This has drawn out several themes including the nature of centre-local 
relations and central control and the varying methods and fortunes of partnership 
working at a local scale. 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a discussion of the environment 
that led to the development of the Local Area Agreement as a performance 
management mechanism for this local public service delivery, so as to better 
understand how the LAA came about and the issues it attempted to address.  
Now that this has been outlined, the next chapter will discuss the LAA in much 
more detail, drawing out academic criticism and outlining a series of research 








The aim of this chapter is to explore in detail the issues around Local Area 
Agreements.  This will continue where chapter two left off, discussing the 
development of policy instruments designed to deliver local public services in 
England since 1945.  Chapter two built up to the introduction of the LAA as the 
latest method by which local public services would be delivered. 
 
This chapter will begin by drawing upon official government documents outlining 
the principles behind Local Area Agreement Implementation.  In doing so, the 
chapter will chart the development of the LAA, including a discussion of each 
stage of their development, the key actors and examples of similar schemes from 
outside an English context. 
 
Within this, the chapter will also draw upon and review the academic literature 
surrounding LAAs.  Academic literature provides a helpful counterbalance to the 
official LAA literature allowing for greater scrutiny of policy rhetoric and in turn 
assisting with the identification of research questions which can be used to 
analyse LAAs.  This in turn can add greater depth to the body of academic 
knowledge surrounding LAAs and their implementation and the wider subject of 
public policy and local service provision. 
 
3.2 Local Area Agreements  
Local Area Agreements were first piloted in 2004 as part of the continuing local 
government modernisation agenda, before being formally rolled out in 2006.  The 
emergence of the LAA represented one of the final stages of the LGMA outlined 
at the end of the previous chapter, indeed Downe and Martin (2006) identify 
LAAs as being part of the fourth and final stage of the LGMA (see table 2.1).   
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LAAs were introduced as a performance management technique to better deliver 
the aims of Sustainable Community Strategy (SCS).  These SCS were criticised  
from some corners as being akin to motherhood and apple pie and for using 
‘depressingly predictable’ abstract language by Pratchett and Leach (2004) that 
was ‘very vague and wishy washy and not explicit… to sort of try to keep it all 
embracing… not too explicit so somebody will take offence to it’ (Davies: 2009, 
p89). 
 
By way of addressing these concerns, and to make these SCS more quantifiable, 
the LAA was brought forward as a delivery vehicle for which the SCS was to 
serve as ‘the foundation for the aspirations that the area [would proceed to 
develop] through the LAA process’ (ODPM: 2004a, p 15). 
 
At the most basic level, a local area agreement constituted a ‘three year 
agreement setting out the priorities for a local area, agreed between central 
government... and local government’ (ODPM: 2005b, p6).   
 
In their 2004 prospectus, outlining the basic principles of the scheme, the ODPM 
described Local Area Agreements as ‘a real opportunity to improve the 
relationship between central and local government by providing a sustained and 
informed dialogue between central and local government, and its major delivery 
partners’ (ODPM: 2004a p12).  The government’s intention was for the new 
agreements to be ‘outcome’ based whereby the success or failure of an LAA was 
assessed against its ability to attain the goals that it had set itself.  The LAA was 
also intended to ‘reflect national priorities and local priorities’ (ODPM: 2004a, 
p14).  In line with these ambitions, local areas were asked to formulate their 





 Children and Young People; 
 Safer and Stronger Communities; and 
 Healthier Communities and Older People 
(ODPM; 2004) 
 
The blocks were set in place for the first round of LAA rollout indicating the main 
government priorities to be tackled through the LAA and were developed in 
supplementary guidance to the prospectus.  The blocks were aimed at 
consolidating and streamlining many of the funding streams that were already in 
place as well as complementing existing schemes such as the Public Service 
Agreement and Best Value Practice Initiative (ODPM: 2004). 
 
The Children and Young People block placed a significant emphasis on 
education provision and the lead into work.  The Safer and Stronger 
Communities block placed a mandatory responsibility on any LAA to increase 
community engagement within its area (ODPM: 2004c).  The Healthier 
Communities Block required a particularly close working relationship with the 
Primary Care Trust.  However, during stage one of the LAA process, many health 
targets would not be held accountable to the LAA, but rather internally to the 
PCT, due to the number of documents that the PCT was already committed to 
(ODPM: 2004c) 
 
In guidance for the second phase of LAA rollout in 2006, the ODPM expanded 
the number of broad policy blocks used to guide the process, adding a fourth 
‘Economic Development and Enterprise’ block to the original three (ODPM: 
2006).   
 
This expansion covered a variety of themes, designed to support the initial three 
blocks.  In particular the aim of the economic development block was to ‘improve 
the economic growth and productivity of a locality, addressing market failures 
that prevent sustainable economic development, regeneration and business 
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growth (ODPM: 2006, p23).  As part of its inclusion, the impact of economic 
development on health was also noted, indicating that the economic 
development block was designed to better support the initial three blocks.   
 
Reflecting the nature of sustainable development, there were a number of 
themes which worked across policy blocks (i.e. young people and health or 
community safety), highlighting two issues.  The first is that each block was not 
intended to stand in isolation.  Secondly, the notion of thematic crosscutting 
raised the prospect of interagency cooperation.  As each of the policy blocks 
were interrelated, there must be a significant level of cooperation between the 
agencies involved in delivering these targets.  
 
These thematic blocks and the crosscutting emerged as a clear attempt to break 
down the silo-mentality identified as being a significant governance issue at both 
a central and local level (Geddes et al: 2007, Sullivan: 2008), indicative of a 
situation where each agency operates within its own boundaries, often not 
consulting or cross-referencing work with other agencies. 
 
As well as breaking down the silo mentality of government, the design of LAAs 
was intended to counter what became known as the ‘Humpty Dumpty’ effect 
(Audit Commission: 2004) occurring when central government policies were split 
up and delivered through different departments across a multitude of schemes as 
indicated in chapter two.  Consequently, these numerous policy initiatives were 
transferred down to the locality where local partners would have to reassemble 
them as a coherent set of local policies that accurately reflected central 
government aims (Audit Commission: 2004).  By seeking to rationalise and 
streamline a fragmented policy delivery system, the Local Area Agreements were 
intended to introduce a common set of policies and courses of action to local 
partners.  This would be achieved by encouraging partners to work together 




3.3 How the LAA Works 
As stated earlier, the LAA was introduced as a performance management 
exercise to monitor the delivery of the aims set out in the Sustainable Community 
Strategy.  This monitoring was carried out using an extension of the existing 
National Indicator Dataset, utilised within the LPSA and originally consisting of 
over 2000 indicators.  This was used to monitor a multitude of schemes and 
organisations including PSAs, Primary Care Trusts and Police.  Since the LAA 
was part of the move to streamline local public service delivery, reduce 
burdensome monitoring and increase the joint working between the various 
public sector agencies, the Indicator Dataset was drastically reduced to 198 
indicators (CLG: 2008) .  This was reduced further to 188 indicators, following 
consultation in 2009 (CLG: 2009a).  These indicators related to wide ranging 
issues such as worklessness, health and education, reflecting national targets 
placed within the bounds of the four thematic blocks.   
 
This reduced National Indicator Dataset (NID) would form the basis of each LAA.  
When producing their LAA, each area was invited to identify up to 35 targets from 
the NID.  Those that were selected would closely mirror the aims and objectives 
of the SCS and thus the key priorities for the area.  To decide upon which 
indicators to incorporate the LSP conducted a detailed period of negotiation with 
all the relevant bodies involved with the LAA.   
 
Once the nature of the 35 indicators had been agreed the next step was to 
negotiate targets for improvement against each of these indicators.  These 
targets would be bespoke, informed by an evidence base of the latest data from 
the area.  The use of the evidence base was to ensure that each area set targets 
that reflected the issues they faced (and similarly to protect them from accepting 
overly ambitious targets that they could not achieve).  This also allowed for the 
setting of baseline figures for each indicator.  
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Rather than negotiating directly with Central Government, these indicators and 
targets were negotiated with the appropriate Government Office for the Region, 
acting as representatives of central government.  Progress against these agreed 
‘improvement targets’ would be monitored every six months by the GOR.  
 
To provide a wider level of monitoring progress against all 198 indicators would 
be monitored in each LAA area to assess general progress, but crucially the LAA 
would only be held accountable against the 35 indicators that they selected 
through the negotiation process. 
 
Set alongside this process, from April 2008 the selection of 35 indicators was 
widened to include 18 statutory education indicators which central government 
felt were appropriate for inclusion in every LAA.  This development was one of 
the first clear contradictions to the LAA’s aim of giving local areas a greater say 
on the issues that affected them.  The addition of over 50% more mandatory 
targets to the LAA represented a significant top-down move to deliver upon 
national policy priorities at the local level, rather than letting the areas themselves 
decide if they were the most important policy priority. 
 
One of the key tenets of the new Local Area Agreement scheme was flexibility, 
particularly in the ability to specify local priorities which may require attention 
within a particular area.   Beneath the maximum 35 national indicators, LAAs 
were also permitted to produce a number of local indicators.  These indicators 
allowed for a greater degree of local flexibility, as envisaged through the LGMA.  
Each LAA would be allowed to specify a number of improvement targets which 
further developed the national indicators, in order to tackle issues which were 
specific to their particular area.  The LSP would monitor progress of these 





3.4 The Performance Management Model: A Critique 
As hinted earlier, the indicator dataset can potentially stand counter to claims of 
independence for local areas.  The National Indicator Dataset contains 198 
priorities which central government wished to see monitored in all LAA areas.  
The very fact that the Government required monitoring of these targets indicates 
that progress against these indicators was a national priority.   Therefore, while 
the LSP would have the freedom to select relevant indicators within any theme, 
there are significant questions about this process.  Particularly, these questions 
revolve around whether indicator selection merely represented the ability to 
choose which aspect of a central government agenda was most pressing to your 
locality, as opposed to truly selecting targets that reflected the needs and 
requirements of an area.   
 
Indeed previous studies have indicated that this element of performance 
assessment does suggest tendencies towards centralisation (Stewart: 2003, 
Travers: 2004, Wilks-Heeg: 2009).  Somerville and Haines (2007) explicitly 
challenge the notion of the devolution of power to the localities noting an 
ambiguity within the entire policy agenda, implying that citizens/localities hold 
more power than the state, something they contest to be unlikely, while Johnson 
and Osborne (2003) have also highlighted their concerns about performance 
indicators, suggesting that while targets are important, they can fail to reflect the 
concerns and needs of localities and potentially seriously limit the ability to 
conduct serious community involvement.  Indeed Davies (2008) identified that 
when performance management targets were utilised, some 80% were designed 
to be reported solely upwards to the state rather than for the benefit of local 
areas (i.e. monitoring their own performance).   
 
One of the central themes of LAAs was the fact that they comprised a ‘three year 
contract between central and local government’.  However Gillanders and Ahmed 
(2006) question the extent to which this is the case, highlighting a difference in 
perception.  They note that the local authorities saw the LAA as a ‘commitment to 
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dialogue’, which allows room for flexibility and negotiation, while conversely, the 
central government perceived it increasingly as a ‘contract’ - a much more 
binding definition which commits localities to delivering their agreed targets 
(Gillanders and Ahmed; 2006, p750).   This leads to questions about how 
seriously central government took the role of LAAs in delivering a locally 
responsive policy agenda.  The use of the term ‘contract’ implies a will to bind 
local areas to action on central government agendas as opposed to granting 
freedoms to identify specific issues, which in turn leads to questions about where 
the power within an LAA lies?  Downe and Martin (2005) provide an alternative 
hypothesis for this notion, contending that the LAA provided a sense of 
ownership to local areas.  The convergence of policy initiatives as outlined earlier 
allowed the actors within the LSP to identify and take action against the issues 
which affected them, as opposed to working with a plethora of schemes.  
Naturally from here, questions can be posed as to which of these theories is 
more indicative of the reality of LAA delivery. 
 
Building on the earlier themes raised by Johnson and Osborne (2003), one telling 
statement within the LAA policy guidance is that ‘LAAs will deliver national 
outcomes in a way that reflects local priorities’ (ODPM: 2004a).  This is a key 
statement in many ways.  First, it provides scope for a limit on the abilities of 
local areas to identify and act upon the issues which affect them, while at the 
same time adding some weight to Gillanders and Ahmed’s (2006) contention 
about top-down perceptions and expectations surrounding the LAA.  By framing 
a national policy agenda at a local scale, local areas could have their time and 
resources tied up to such an extent that they would be unable to commit enough 
resources to a local issue that falls outside of this national remit.  While the LAA 
did allow for the provision of local indicators (something that will be expanded 
upon in the coming pages), it is conceivable that a smaller local authority area 
may lack the capacity to commit to a wide range of local indicators, whereas 
other areas may face a stern challenge in meeting national targets alone.  
Indeed, Darlow et al (2007) present the notion that LAAs could be seen as a 
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method for the pursuit of central government policy on a local scale.  If the LAA 
must conform within a nationally defined framework then the possibilities for 
action that are available to them become severely limited.  Questions can be 
asked as to the extent to which Darlow et al’s notions are representative of LAA 
implementation?  If this is the case it could be argued that the limitations placed 
on the ability to set the agenda for an LAA does not represent a relocation of 
power to the localities.  Instead it would indicate the opposite – i.e. that Whitehall 
retained this element of control. 
 
Pearce and Cooper (2011) touch upon this issue as part of their investigation into 
how LAAs responded to climate change.  They note the expectation (in 
compliance with the wider sustainability agenda outlined earlier) that each LAA 
would make some overture towards climate change, and that DEFRA in 
particular was keen to see at least one improvement target relating to climate 
change in each LAA.  This led to some local practitioners feeling that they were 
seeking to make the targets mandatory (ibid).  While this is a laudable aim, 
nonetheless this clearly demonstrates how an area’s allocation of targets could 
be swiftly used up by central priorities that may not necessarily be held by the 
local decision makers.  To illustrate the level of central dictation of priorities, it is 
then identified that 97% of the 150 LAAs had adopted a target of this nature 
(ibid). 
 
Following on from these two closely related arguments is the actual locus of 
power and who benefits from it.  Johnson and Osborne (2003) identify that the 
policy prescriptions around LAA implementation challenge the traditional 
gatekeeper roles surrounding local governance leading them to pose the 
question ‘who will benefit from these shifting sources of power?’ (Johnson and 
Osborne; 2003, p152) This represents a core research question.  While the 
earlier questions in this area have emphasised a potential conflict in the role of 
the local and central state in the process, it is equally as important to discover 
who the real winners and losers are from this relationship. 
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The central question to arise here is built around the negotiation process and 
who is most likely to see their agenda reflected.  Is it a question of reasoned and 
considered negotiation which sees a realistic balance between central and local 
priorities, or is it, as Pearce and Cooper (2011) put it, simply a matter of ‘who can 
shout the loudest, longest and hardest?'. 
 
3.4.1 Outside influence 
As well as the strong developing themes around paternalistic control from Central 
Government, the LAA has also shown that it can become victim to circumstances 
outside the control of the state.  This was clearly illustrated in February 2009 
CLG issued a set of guidance for a number of indicators that were explicitly 
affected by the global recession (CLG: 2009a).  This only served to show that 
both the NID and the three year timeframe of LAAs can be exposed as 
weaknesses by external factors.  The housing indicators in particular indicated 
that ambitious targets could be rendered unachievable following a recession.  
This raises questions about how the long term goals and ambitions of the SCS 
and the shorter operating window of the LAA relate to each other.  In particular 
this leads to questions about how much consideration there is for potential ‘blips’ 
in an otherwise longer term programme of delivery. 
 
3.5 The LAA as a Means to be Locally Responsive: An Initial Analysis 
Through some simple documentary analysis, it is simple to get a sense of 
whether the performance management nature of the LAA did reflect these 
concerns about centralisation and local responsiveness.  This can be achieved 
by examining a variety of published LAAs to see what indicators were adopted 
and the extent to which the indicator targets allowed local areas to focus on 
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issues of importance.  To achieve this, a 'typology' of indicators is required – in 
this case, deprivation.5   
 
In order to assess how deprived an area was, and to subsequently assess how 
they used their LAA to respond to the extent of the deprivation faced, the 
analysis utilised the 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD).  The IMD 2007 
brings together 37 indicators covering specific aspects or ‘domains’ of 
deprivation: Income, Employment, Health and Disability, Education, Skills and 
Training, Barriers to Housing and Services, Living Environment and Crime. 
These are weighted and combined to create the overall IMD2007 (CLG, 2007c).  
The IMD 2007 itself is based on the small area geography known as Lower 
(Layer) Super Output Areas (LSOAs). LSOAs have between 1,000 and 3,000 
people living in them with an average population of 1,500 people.  This unit of 
measurement is smaller than wards, thus allowing the identification of small 
pockets of deprivation. There are 32,482 LSOAs in England. The LSOA ranked 1 
by the IMD 2007 is the most deprived and that ranked 32,482 is the least 
deprived (CLG, 2007c). 
 
This analysis utilised the eight English core cities (Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds 
Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield) which represent 
the major population centres outside of London.  They have collaborated on 
issues such as economic performance but, given a past experience of industrial 
and economic decline, these areas can offer insights about responses towards 
tackling deprivation.  As such they provide a useful base from which to study the 
extent to which the National Indicator Dataset has allowed local areas to focus on 
a specific problem affecting them.  Given the importance of London on a national 
and global scale it was also considered important to provide a context of how 
these efforts to tackle deprivation were taking place in the Capital.  
                                            
5
 The subsequent section and analysis draws upon a paper first published in the Journal of Urban 
Renewal and Regeneration in 2010 (Nurse and Pemberton: 2010) (Full Paper can be found in 
Appendix III) 
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Consequently, as the most deprived authority area in London6, the Borough of 
Hackney was also included. 
 
The next stage was to consider how the LAA indicators from the suite of 198 
tallied with the 37 indicators used to measure the IMD.  Consequently, by looking 
at the uptake of these indicators, one could have an indication of how LAAs in 
deprived areas were utilising the indicators to focus on issues around 
deprivation.  In all, 33 indicators7 from the National Indicator Dataset were 
deemed to match those in the 2007 IMD, considering the caveats outlined below. 
 
1) the national indicators that were selected have an explicit, rather than 
implicit relevance to the IMD indicators (e.g. NI152 Working Age People 
on Out of Work Benefits directly relates to the IMD 2007 indicator 
measuring Adults and Children in Income-Based Job Seeker Allowance 
Households);  
2) several national indicators were included on the basis of their broader 
relevance / potential impact on the deprivation indices (for example, NI116 
Proportion of Children in Child Poverty and NI153 Working Age People 
Claiming Out of Work Benefits in the Worst Performing Neighbourhoods);  
3) a small number of national indicators were included even though they 
measured participation rather than non-participation as by proxy they 
could then highlight the latter issue – for example, NI91 Participation of 17 
year olds in Education or Training is inversely related to the IMD 2007 
indicator measuring the Proportion of Young People not staying on in 
School or Non-advanced Education above the age of 16);  
4) some national indicators were covered more than once as they apply to 
more than one deprivation indicator; and  
                                            
6
 At the time of selection, drawing upon the 2007 IMD (CLG: 2007c) 
7
 Which can be found in table 6.2 
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5) several of the national indicators were not subsequently considered as 
they were statutory education-focused targets and as such would 
therefore need to be included within every LAA. 
 
These urban areas were then analysed to consider what percentage of their 
SOAs fell within the most/least deprived SOAs on a national scale, as well as 
considering their overall national deprivation ranking (Table 3.1).  This was to 
provide an indication of the depth and scale of deprivation in each of the areas.  
What emerged was a two-fold typology which could be used to analyse how the 
LAA was used to focus on the issues of deprivation that were evident. 
 




% of SOAs that fall within 
Most deprived Least deprived 


























  25.90 39.63 86.4 13.6 0.62 0 
Bristol 64
th
  7.54 15.48 67.4 32.6 1.59 0 
Hackney 2
nd
  19.7 55.47 100 0 0 0 
Leeds 85
th
  8.40 20.17 54.2 45.8 6.72 3.15 
Liverpool 1
st
  44.33 55.67 90 10 0 0 
Manchester 4
th





  17.92 24.86 64.2 35.8 4.62 1.73 
Nottingham 13
th
  15.3 31.8 89.8 10.2 0 0 
Sheffield 63
rd
 13.27 23.89 61.1 38.9 5.90 1.77 






3.5.1 Group One: ‘Collective Game Raising’ 
The group one cities were Birmingham, Hackney, Liverpool, Manchester and 
Nottingham.  They are characterised by deprivation that is highly concentrated, 
whilst also being widespread across the urban area.  In these areas 30 per cent 
or more of the super output areas were located in the 10 per cent most deprived 
nationally, whilst a minimum of 85 per cent of super output areas fell within the 
50% most deprived in the country. 
 
Given the scale and depth of the deprivation issues facing these areas, it would 
be expected that the LAA targets that were selected would focus on ‘collective 
game raising’ i.e. the selection of indicators which would tackle deprivation 
across the board, as opposed to purely focusing on areas of the most 
concentrated deprivation, given that improvements on any level would have a 
significant impact. 
 
3.5.2 Group Two: ‘Addressing Inequalities in the Concentration and Extent of 
Deprivation 
The second group of cities consisted of Bristol, Leeds, Newcastle Upon Tyne and 
Sheffield.  Whilst these areas are ranked lower compared to the group one cities 
in terms of deprivation, and have lower overall concentrations of the most 
deprived areas, they are characterised by still having a substantial percentage of 
their SOAs ranked as the most deprived in the country.  What separates this 
group from group one is that they also have a significant number of the least 
deprived areas nationally as well.  
 
This would lead to an expectation that the LAA and its targets would attempt to 
focus on lifting the performance of the most deprived areas to reduce the 
‘deprivation gap’, whilst also seeking to improve the prospects of individuals and 




3.5.3 What the groupings show 
The next stage was to analyse which of the ‘deprivation indicators’ were selected 
by each of the cities to see how well the indicator take up matched the broad 
typologies and the extent to which they varied their approaches to deprivation.  
The ‘deprivation indicators’ that were selected by each area can be seen in table 
3.2 below. 
 
What emerges is that those in the first group (i.e. the cities involved in ‘collective 
game-raising’) have placed a significant amount of focus on a number of themes, 
notably the economy, crime, housing and health. For example, all of the group 
one areas have selected NI15 and NI16 which focus on serious violent and 
acquisitive crime respectively, indicating a high priority on reducing crime rates in 
these areas due to relationship with deprivation in the worst performing areas. 
Addressing Child Poverty (NI116), those 16-18 year olds not in Employment, 
Education and / or Training (NEETs – NI117), Mortality rates (NI120) and 
Improving the economic performance of the areas were also seen as high 
priorities, and with all five areas selecting NI151 focusing on overall employment 
rate. Housing (NI154 and NI 156 respectively) and education were (NI63) were 
also deemed to be important. 
 
However, analysis of the indicator selection within the LAAs of the second group 
(i.e. cities with both reasonable proportions of both deprived and non-deprived 
neighbourhoods) reveals some significant similarities with the first group (for 
example, the selection of NI16, NI117, NI152-155 – economic focused - and 
NI163). This starts to draw our attention to the lack of breadth / opportunities for 
local flexibility through areas having to select the same type of indicators/targets 
for improvement from the national set. However, there is a certain degree of 
variation evident, with the cities in the second group being much more likely to 
prioritise efforts to reduce assault (NI20) rather than serious violent crime (NI15) 
through their LAA, whilst at the same time being less likely to prioritise child  
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15 X X X X X    X 48 
16 X X X X X X X X X 100 
20   X   X X X X 83 
28          1 
29 X  X       3 
30 X X X X   X X  85 
32   X   X   X 79 
34          0 
47 X      X X  49 
48          3 
76        X  1 
78          9 
84          0 
91          8 
106  X       X 9 
116 X X X X     X 45 
117 X X X X X X X X X 118 
120 X X X X   X X  88 
121    X X X X   51 
122    X      6 
151 X X X X X     34 
152  X  X X X X X X 76 
153 X X X   X X  X 62 
154 X X X X X X X  X 107 
155 X X  X  X X X X 102 
156  X X X      37 
158  X   X  X  X 24 
161          18 
162          15 
163 X X X X X X X X X 97 
173          6 
187     X  X  X 41 
194          1 
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poverty (NI116), overall employment rates (NI151) and numbers in temporary 
accommodation (NI156). 
 
The nature of deprivation in the second group of cities – both deprived and less 
deprived neighbourhoods are apparent - may actually be informing this pattern of 
selection but in overall terms there is a similar level of uptake of these 
deprivation-related indicators regardless of group. Moreover, if the analysis is 
broadened out to include the LAAs that have been agreed across the rest of 
England (n=152), we can note similar patterns of selection in terms of these 
deprivation-related indices, and with only NI161 (Level 1 literacy) and NI162 
(Level 3 numeracy) being prioritised over and above those by the core cities (and 
Hackney) to any significant extent (18 and 15 instances respectively). 
 
Hence despite one of the key elements of the LAA system being the opportunity 
for local areas to select targets relating to the issues which affect them (ODPM, 
2005), the outcomes noted above indicate broadly similar choices being made, 
regardless of the levels or patterning of deprivation within urban areas. This, in 
turn, inevitably leads to questions about the ability of the national indicator 
dataset and LAAs to deliver locally responsive solutions, and to address 
concentrations of deprivation therein. Similarly, apart from NI153, which explicitly 
focuses on reducing numbers of individuals claiming out of work benefits in the 
worst performing neighbourhoods, there appears to be little opportunity for areas 
to select indices from the national set around reducing disparities in performance 
between the best and worst performing areas. 
 
3.6 Is the LAA Subject to Gamesmanship? 
Coulson (2009) has criticised the performance management style of the LAA, 
noting that a system of indicators and targets utilised by the LAA can lead to 
deviant behaviour known as ‘gaming.’  In essence this involves a manipulation of 
the system by those which have responsibility to deliver on any particular 
indicator in order to make it appear that the indicator is performing better than it 
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is in reality.  This can manifest itself in a variety of forms.  The first is focusing on 
short term ‘easy wins’ instead of long term issues that require strategic effort and 
may not yield early results.  The second revolves around the distortion of target 
definitions in order to devote resources to something that is achievable at the 
expense of more substantive efforts.  The final method would be presenting data 
in a misleading form or omitting data that would indicate failure or incur penalties. 
 
In particular, the concept of ‘easy wins’ at the expense of long term gains is one 
that should be explored at a case study level, when discussing how the LAA in 
each area was formed.  Whether an LAA was used in good faith to address the 
long term challenges facing an area, as opposed to focusing on short term gains 
is a pertinent question.  This could include the selection of indicators that an area 
knew they would meet yet might not be a policy priority, as opposed to an 
indicator which would stretch an area.  However, even when an indicator was 
selected that may challenge policy delivery, gaming still applies to the target 
setting aspect as well.  Would the area be more likely to accept a target that 
stretches their resources, but delivers long term benefits, or would they be more 
likely to push for a target that they knew was deliverable, thus avoiding any risk 
to reputation. 
 
The extent to which gaming occurred was also reliant on other actors, particularly 
the Government Office for the Regions (GOR), which held responsibility for 
signing off each LAA.  The extent to which they allowed local areas a free hand 
to set their own indicators and targets was to be central to this.  Furthermore, the 
role of some of the actors at the local level will come under scrutiny, particularly 
those with a significant number of internal targets and accountability structures 
such as health and police.  Again, the nature of these issues will be discussed in 





3.7 Implementing the LAA within structurally different local environments 
Although the format of any LAA was uniform, due to the complex nature of local 
government in the UK, and the way that local authorities are organised, there are 
two differing sets of environments in which the LAA was agreed upon and 
delivered:  the presence of either a single or two-tier local authority. 
 
3.7.1 Single-Tier 
Single tier authorities comprise Unitary and Metropolitan Boroughs.  In this 
structure, there is only one LSP.  This LSP was responsible for producing the 
SCS for that area only.  The LSP, along with statutory partners was then 
responsible for producing the LAA, again relating to that specific area only.  
Therefore, single tier local authorities have arguably the least complex task in 
defining and enacting their Local Area Agreement.  This is because the LSP has 
to produce, and conform to, one set of documents, produced by one group of 
actors, concerning only one administrative area.   
 
3.7.2 Two-Tier – County and District 
There are many local authorities in the UK which operate on a two-tier, county 
and district system.  Under these governance arrangements, the process can 
become considerably more complex. 
 
In these instances, all the district local authorities within a county council 
structure were still required to have LSP structures in place, as well as a SCS for 
the area.  In this, a two tier structure does not differ from a metropolitan or unitary 
authority.  However, the notable difference arises when producing the LAA.  
Unlike their single tier counterparts, each LSP was not required to produce an 
LAA for their individual area.  Instead a single LAA was produced covering the 
entire county council area.   This process took into consideration all the various 
community strategies produced, to make one coherent set of priorities to serve 
the entire county council area. 
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In its first advice note the ODPM acknowledged that the two-tier system could 
make the production of an LAA more complex (ODPM: 2004b, Annex 1), 
although it was felt that the process would improve dialogue between a county 
and district level.  The effectiveness of this dialogue and the way difference in 
priorities are managed is one of the main causes of complexity.  First, the act of 
consolidating several Community Strategies which have been carefully prepared 
to reflect local aspirations, into one coherent agreement representing an entire 
county area is not easy.  This must be a careful balancing act which considers all 
the needs of an area rather than simply focusing on headline challenges which 
may only affect a small part of the county. 
 
The second issue is closely linked to this - priorities.  It is plausible that the 
County Council authorities may have a different political will or agenda compared 
to some of its district counterparts.  This may mean that aims which have been 
identified at a district level as being important to an area may not be afforded the 
same consideration.  This may create resentment amongst the districts if they 
feel that their priorities are neither sufficiently represented, or that they are 
overlooked in terms of receiving support from the LAA, which, in turn, then has 
the potential to reduce their willingness to cooperate with the document and its 
goals. 
 
This process is not without its benefits.  The act of producing one LAA across 
several district authority areas has the potential to both drastically reduce, yet 
simultaneously improve the potential for involvement of key partners, particularly 
agencies such as the Police and Primary Care Trust, whose influence may cover 
the entire area in question.  If they only have to become involved with only one 
LAA, agreeing and delivering on one set of targets, albeit covering a larger 
geographical area, then they could be potentially more likely to involve 
themselves owing to a decrease in bureaucratic output and conflict with their own 
targets.   
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In the 2004 advice note, it is envisaged that the county-wide LSP would lead 
negotiations for the countywide LAA, after consulting extensively with its 
constituent district LSPs (ODPM: 2004b).  The county LSP therefore faced a 
crucial task in both effectively consulting and involving the district LSPs, 
reflecting their aims in an appropriate manner while simultaneously producing a 
document which reflects countywide aims and aspirations.   
 
3.8 LAA Rollout 
The LAA model was implemented over three stages, developing from a pilot 
stage involving a few actors before finally being adopted by every local authority 
in England by 2008 (Figure 3.1).  A fourth stage instigated by a partial 
reorganisation of local government took place in 2009, causing a few changes to 
the number of LAAs. 
 
Each stage of the rollout modified the LAA slightly, with some of the changes 
discussed earlier including the adding of the ‘Economic Development and 






Figure 3.1 - LAA Rollout by Phase 
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Stage One: Following the publication of the 
LAA prospectus in 2004 (ODPM: 2004a), 
LSPs were invited to enter into negotiations 
to produce a pilot LAA.  21 Authority areas 
took part in the pilot (see inset). 
 
Stage Two: In 2006, following the 
successfully signing off of the 20 pilot LAAs, 
DCLG produced amended guidance for 
LAAs, modifying the process based on 
lessons learnt from the pilot stage.  This 
included the expansion of the thematic blocks 
as discussed earlier.  This period saw a 
further 66 areas produce and sign off on their 
LAAs. 
 
Stage Three: The third rollout of Local Area 
Agreements saw the remaining areas sign up 
to produce an LAA, bringing total geographic coverage across England and 
resulting in 150 LAAs. 
 
Stage Four - Reorganisation (2009): On April 1st 2009 many of the two tier 
authorities were abolished, becoming unitary authorities.  In the areas that 
underwent this change, the district areas, which in turn contributed to make up 
the county merged to form one administrative unit.  In most cases the new 
authority accepted the boundary of the former county to become a unitary 
authority.  However, in two examples, the county was split into two areas which 
would function separately as two unitary authorities.  Table 3.3 below outlines 
which counties were affected by these changes, and how. 
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Table 3.3 - Local Government Reorganisation 2009 (Administrative 
Changes) 









Central Bedfordshire UA 
 
 
Cheshire County Council 
Chester 
Ellesmere Port & Neston 
Vale Royal 
 
Cheshire West & Chester 
UA 
Congleton 
Crewe and Nantwich 
Macclesfield 
 
Cheshire East UA 
 
 











































North Shropshire  
Oswestry  






Wiltshire County Council 
Kennet  





Source: CLG: 2009b  
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This process of reorganisation, including the creation of four new LAAs in 
Bedford, Central Bedfordshire, Cheshire West & Chester and Cheshire East 
resulted in the number of LAAs increasing from 150 to 152.    By consolidating 
five of the County and District style councils into Unitary Authorities, this meant 
that the process of consolidation of several SCSs into one LAA would no longer 
apply in any future LAA negotiation.  Following the reorganisation, each new 
unitary authority was subsequently charged with creating a new LSP 
representing its area and with producing a new LAA.  While this process would 
take place along the lines of existing Unitary Authorities as outlined earlier in this 
chapter, the new LSP would be responsible for producing and implementing a 
SCS and LAA that would (theoretically) adequately reflect the aims of each of the 
areas that comprise the new authority, as opposed to only one area.   
 
However, throughout this process Chisholm and Leach (2011) pointed towards 
what they perceived as ‘dishonest’ behaviour on the part of central government.  
In particular they highlighted disagreements over how different parties defined 
technical language and the methods of both reporting and dealing with 
responses to consultation which, Chisholm and Leach contended, failed to 
accurately reflect public opinion.  Ultimately they questioned the extent to which 
the reorganisation was in the best interest of the local authorities, which raises 
even more questions about the top-down control of the local government 
process. 
 
Understandably, this change in the organisational structure raises several 
important questions about the LAA process in the new authority areas.  In many 
cases these questions are similar to those that could be asked about the old two 
tier structure.  The first issue is one of compatibility: how does the SCS for a 
wider area reflect all the pertinent issues for a number of areas which may have 
widely differing situations (i.e. economic issues, health, education)?  Immediately 
linked to this, is the extent to which the LAA is capable of implementing these 
needs using a limited number of indicators? 
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There are also several questions which can be asked of each level of the various 
partner agencies within this process (local, regional and central).  At the local 
level, it can be asked as to whether this consolidation of authorities provided 
them with more scope to take action against the most relevant issues?  If it is the 
case that this reorganisation weakened the power of the localities to make 
decisions on issues that affect them, then an immediate follow up question would 
be to discover where this power went? 
 
The many statutory partners also have questions which can be asked of them as 
a result of this process.  Did being involved with one LSP, rather than multiple 
LSPs, improve or hinder their ability to deliver their main policy initiatives?  While 
the commitments to the LAA (since it remained a one area document) remain 
similar, did the reduction on responsibilities represent a reduction in local 
responsiveness and as such a shift in power towards the centre? 
 
3.9 A New Role for the Regions 
Traditionally, as chapter two has shown, policy for the delivery of local public 
services has rested on the relationship between central government and local 
government.  However, the 2004 LAA prospectus intended that GOR would be 
afforded a ‘key role in Local Area Agreements’ (ODPM: 2004a p11).  This key 
role did not advocate the advancement of a regional agenda, however.  Instead, 
the GORs were intended to act as negotiators, acting on behalf of central 
government.  The move to place a regional actor, rather than central 
government, in the negotiating role was taken citing the belief that regional 
government offices would have a greater knowledge of local areas compared to 
their central counterparts.  This would place them in a better position to assess 
and agree upon the targets put forward by the various LAA proposals, and in turn 
lead to more appropriate results. 
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GOR’s role was envisaged to support the process, encouraging LAAs to produce 
the best outcomes for their area, but also to serve a challenging role whereby 
they push for the best possible practice, rather than an LAA adopting targets that 
they would have met ordinarily.  Ultimately the GOR would have responsibility for 
signing off each LAA, after being satisfied that these procedures had been 
completed.  It was also envisaged that the government offices for the regions 
would play a significant oversight role within the LAA process, making the best 
use of their ability to sign off individual LAAs.  This feature gives some insight 
into early accountability issues surrounding LAA implementation.  As well as the 
role of negotiator, central government also delegated the ability to recommend 
the signing off of LAAs to the Government Offices for the Regions.  In the first 
guidance note it was intended that they would not recommend that any LAA be 
accepted until they were fully satisfied that all the relevant partners had been fully 
engaged with the process (ODPM: 2004b).   
 
Yet, questions remained about how the GOR would discharge its duty as the 
proxy for the central state.  In particular, there were questions about the extent to 
which the GORs would encourage local individuality, and how they were 
perceived by the localities that they worked with.  Mawson (2007) pointed 
towards a ‘lack of clarity about the roles and responsibilities’  of the regional 
structures from their inception (Mawson: 2007, p 551) while Goodwin et al (2006) 
expand these worries surrounding the placement of GOR priorities, noting that 
the majority of interviewees from GOR identify themselves more closely with 
central government and their aims rather than to the localities they are 
negotiating with.  This highlights a potential duality of purpose for the GOR.  On 
one hand they are seen by localities as being more aware of their circumstances, 
and therefore more able to negotiate bespoke solutions.  However, their own 
loyalties indicate stronger links to the state and therefore an increased 
encouragement of state policies through negotiation.  Pearce and Cooper (2011) 
gave an indication of the difficulties that could arise during this process if 
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Whitehall departments represented at regional level would refuse to cede ground 
on an indicator they were interested in, and insist on its inclusion within an LAA. 
 
There are also issues raised about GOR’s ability to negotiate fairly, compared to 
a straight negotiation with national government.  Since it is argued that each 
GOR is more attuned to local needs, consequently (and hypothetically) all LAAs 
within a region would experience a high quality, locally reflective negotiation 
period with their GOR.  However, this process could be disrupted by a number of 
factors.  The size of an area, the problems that it faces, negotiation skills and 
past experience may all be key factors in the extent to which a LAA is allowed to 
become bespoke.  Consequently, issues may arise on an intra-regional basis, 
whereby LAAs may have a differing experience in their negotiation with GOR.  
Similarly, they may find that the GOR impose the selection of particular indicators 
against the wishes of the LAA, but in line with government priorities, thus 
reducing the local selectivity that is encouraged within LAAs.   
 
Beyond this, there are also inter-regional disparities that may arise.  This could 
occur due to a particular GOR being more aligned in its outlook to central 
government, and thus more likely to impose its policies on localities.  Conversely, 
a GOR may be more distant from central government and allow LAAs a greater 
flexibility in selecting their indicators.  The extent to which these inter/intra-
regional disparities exist and the impact that this has on LAA delivery will form a 
central theme of the governance aspect of this research and one that will be 
explored in subsequent chapters. 
 
3.10 Local Actors: A Multi-Agency Policy Environment 
3.10.1 The Role of the Local Authority 
The inclusion of GOR in the LAA process creates the impression of the state 
pulling back from local governance, yet simultaneously raises questions about 
the extent to which the state is controlling the process.  Similar questions begin 
to emerge when the LAA governance procedures are examined at the local level. 
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At first glance the LAA procedures (coupled with the LSP structures behind it) 
stood to significantly improve the status of the local authority by designating it as 
the lead partner in the process.  This afforded the local authority a convening 
function, compelling the various actors to become involved (post 2007 Public 
Involvement in Health Act).  The LAA then provided a vehicle for steering 
meetings between partners.  
 
Occupying this role of lead partner raises several questions about how the Local 
Authority discharged its duty, and the extent to which the ways in which they did 
this either helped or hindered LAA delivery. 
 
The first issue surrounds the capacity of the local authority to act as lead partner, 
both in terms of the ability of those already designated as leaders (i.e. chief 
executive and officers responsible for working on the LAA) and the levels of 
resources that it can expend on LAA delivery.  Closely linked to this is the ability 
of the local authority to fulfil its duty as lead partner in an environment of well 
resourced actors who are well versed in the demands of public service delivery 
(see the 'stronger actors' section later in this chapter).  For the local authority to 
be effective, it is necessary for it to manage these groups in a decisive manner, 
and for the role of each actor in this process to be clearly defined.  If the local 
authority failed to do this, and thus lost/failed to retain the respect of the other 
actors in the process, these actors may fail to buy in as a result.  This, in turn, 
could place significant difficulties in the path of the LAA delivery. 
 
Sweeting et al (2004) neatly conceptualise this problem through their ‘Diamond 
of Leadership’ model (See Figure 3.2), illustrating the four factors which will 
impact on the effectiveness of leadership, citing institutional arrangements, the 
policy environment, personal characteristics of the leaders and their relationship 
with their followers). 
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In this model the ‘Institutional Arrangements’ that can limit the effectiveness of 
leadership are instruments of state organisation that must be dealt with, which 
within the UK context as chapters two and three have raised, are largely 
paternalistic in nature and can act as a brake on the extent and style of 
leadership.   
 
 














Source: Sweeting et al: 2004, p351 
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Closely linked to this is the ‘policy environment’ in which the leader must operate, 
which again, given the strongly centralised nature of UK public policy, is highly 
influenced by Whitehall and can restrict the style and extent of leadership within 
the institutional parameters of the LAA.  As indicated earlier in this section, this is 
also dependent on the resources that are available to the local authority to 
deploy on the LAA, either in terms of funding or manpower – both of which can 
have a significant effect not just on the LAA’s success but how the other partners 
perceive the LAA and thus how much credence they afford it. 
 
The other two aspects within this diamond i.e. ‘personal characteristics’ and 
‘relationship with followers’ present new avenues to explore in the search for 
effective leadership of the LAA delivery process.  In particular the role of personal 
characteristics is one that should be explored in more depth to ascertain the 
extent to which LAA success is due to the leadership of the local authority and 
the presence of the statutory partners or if it is actually as a result of the 
individuals who hold those jobs.  Similarly, the relationship with followers (i.e. 
those actors hierarchically beneath them within the delivery agency) and their 
ability to marshal those resources is a key factor in the success of the work of the 
LAA, to ensure that all aspects of the organisation are working towards a 
common goal. 
 
Whilst these principles of leadership mostly apply to the local authority as the 
designated leader of the LAA, nonetheless they are also relevant to the other 
actors within this process.  This is particularly true of the heads of agencies and 
how they work together through the partnership process.  Therefore Sweeting et 
al’s model (Sweeting et al: 2004) should also be considered in relation to the 
other partners involved in the LAA process. 
 
The extent to which the local authority sought to create an ethos of 
independence in its leadership of the LAA is also a key factor.  Although there is 
likely to be a very high degree of convergence between LAA activity and the 
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policy aims of the council, there will probably be a significant amount of council 
business that lies beyond the 35 performance indicators selected by the LAA.  
The extent to which the local authority could be seen to be ‘exploiting’ this 
position as lead partner to drive through discussion on activity that is external to 
the LAA could been seen as going against the spirit of the LAA itself, even if it is 
beneficial to the area. 
 
It is important to note that local authorities are led by those with the clearest 
mandate to govern, i.e. through regular elections.  In turn those councillors, as 
representatives that are elected to represent local citizens, are likely to be held 
accountable for any scheme delivered by the LAA.  This is even if, as Sullivan 
notes, an electoral mandate is not enough to consolidate leadership and must be 
augmented by support from all involved (Sullivan, 2007).  Therefore, the role that 
elected representatives play within the LAA process can be crucially important.  
Questions could be posed around the methods by which local elected 
representatives involved themselves in the LAA process, and where leadership is 
located particularly against the background of increased local power and 
involvement within the decision making process.  Investigations could also focus 
on the methods that are employed by local elected officials on behalf of their 
constituents to hold the LAA policy process and outcomes to account in an 
appropriate manner. 
 
3.10.2 Statutory Partners 
One of the key differences of the LAA system that distinguishes it from many of 
the preceding local government policy interventions is the involvement of a wide 
variety of partner agencies.  Indeed, the prospectus for the new LAAs indicated 
that the full engagement of the necessary partners in the policy process was a 
prerequisite (ODPM: 2004a, p15).  The ODPM define the police, the Primary 
Care Trust and Job Centre Plus, as well as the local authority as the key 
agencies within the LAA.  Apart from these defined actors representatives from 
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fire and rescue service, housing trusts and the voluntary sector were to be 
involved in LAAs. 
 
Given that the local authority is set up as the lead actor, they could be seen as 
de facto the strongest actor, particularly given their knowledge of the LAA 
programme and ability to set the agenda.  However it is possible that other local 
actors may in fact be the strongest actor.  This could arise due to their funding 
streams – which can often be significant – making them less reliant on the LAA 
funding of the ABG. 
 
Furthermore, in most instances these agencies will have internal policy agendas, 
as set by central government.  This could include specific priorities in reducing 
crime or health disparities.  Furthermore, as well as national priorities, 
organisations could have more locally specific initiatives, particularly on a 
regional level.  These central agendas could lead to the larger actors dominating 
the indicator selection, seeking to use the LAA as a vehicle to solely focus on 
their initiatives and goals at the expense of others.  Naturally, questions arise 
about the ability to prevent this from happening in order to achieve an indicator 
selection that represents local priorities, or whether it simply represents a way of 
delivering central policy at a local level. 
 
In some instances these policy agendas could overlap or be superseded by other 
more pressing issues.  Downe and Martin (2005) and Gillanders and Ahmed 
(2006) both note a potential, yet recurring, conflict between the central 
government departments and the localities arising where a department’s most 
pressing policy agendas were not shared by the locality.    Similarly, the statutory 
requirement of the agencies to participate could be challenged through the use of 
pooled funding.  This could occur if, for example, health service money for drug 
treatment could also be used to tackle alcohol abuse, which although related, 
would not be a specific target of the funding. 
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The relationship between policy agendas is covered within the LAA literature 
through the concept of due regard.  While the partners are expected to show due 
consideration of the policies of the LAA within their actions, the LAA is also 
expected to consider and reflect the existing policies of partner agencies when 
agreeing indicators.  This could be police targets that may be higher or lower 
than those the LAA may wish to set, or health initiatives that might fall outside of 
the focus of the LAA. This raises questions, further to those raised earlier, about 
the ability of LAAs to be locally reflexive, if they must reflect an external policy 
agenda.   
 
3.10.3 Stronger Actors and Internal Accountability 
In an article setting out key research questions surrounding central-local relations 
and local governance, Laffin (2009) touches on a central aspect of any 
successful LAA: holding the various partners to account - pointing to the added 
complexity that partnership creates in the policy process.  The LAA was 
implemented within a multi-agency policy environment with each of these actors 
already subject to complex internal relationships, often in addition to the 
relationship forged by the LSP/LAA process.  This is coupled with the fact that 
many agencies will have their own internal accountability measures to enforce, 
alongside any commitment made to the LAA.  This reflects Glasbergen et al’s 
notion, describing how, within a partnership, each partner stands for its own 
rationale, and defends its own interests (Glasbergen et al: 2007) as opposed to 
Waddell’s (2005) notion that any partnership is balanced by the various interests 
of the actors that are involved. 
 
Consequently, there are legitimate questions to be asked of the partner agencies 
within the LAA, both in terms of the mechanisms under which they are held 
accountable, and to whom?  The notion of a ‘direction’ of accountability is raised 
by Gillanders and Ahmed (2006).  Agencies can either be upwardly accountable 
to their superiors or downwardly accountable, to the citizenry.  There is also a 
third horizontal direction of accountability i.e. to actors within a partnership 
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structure.  Barnes et al (2005) observe that this direction is often upwards rather 
than sideways or downwards.  In this scenario, those central actors would show 
more affinity to their internal targets and structures – and therefore less affinity to 
others.  This could lead to an organisation which doesn’t ‘fear’ the accountability 
structures of  the LAA, which in turn could have implications for target delivery, 
particularly.  In particular these issues could arise if the LAA were ‘stretched’ 
through negotiation, and thus were more ambitious than the internal targets of 
the partner agency. 
 
This lack of ‘fear’ in the accountability system is also raised by Geddes (2007), 
who notes that, in a survey of LSP partners, 35% considered existing 
accountability measures to be ‘deficient,’ generating further questions 
surrounding LAA actors’ ability to take seriously a system which they view not to 
be working effectively. 
 
This plethora of issues raises two important questions about the governance of 
LAAs and the relationship between the centre and local.  Firstly, what are the 
implications for the implementation of a LAA if a central department’s stated 
goals are not shared or seen as a specific priority within an LAA context?  Will 
the agency concerned still continue to provide full support for the policy agenda, 
with all the resources available?  Following on from this, much is made within the 
LAA literature of the Duty to Co-operate by partner agencies (Davies: 2008).  
However, if the scope of a particular LAA does not fully align with the stated 
policy aims of a partner agency, there could be significant issues for the LAA 
itself.  In particular what are the ramifications for the success of the LAA, its 
implementation and how it is viewed by other actors if a key partner agency 
doesn’t provide a full level of support?  Will reduced support inhibit the ability to 
delivery against any particular indicator and what will be the impact of the wider 




3.10.4 Weaker Actors 
Although there is significant potential for stronger, better resourced actors (both 
institutionally and financially) to dominate proceedings, there is also a need to 
focus on those smaller actors that traditionally (see chapter two) struggled to find 
a role in the local governance process in a way the stronger actors have.  Indeed 
Matheson et al (2011) note a significant gap in the literature, which has 
previously focused on authority/community relations rather than partner relations. 
 
Apostolakis (2004) also identifies the potential for under resourced or sceptical 
partners to generate ‘pockets of resistance’ to partnership working whilst 
emphasising the need for tangible benefits for partners to secure their 
involvement.  In particular, Matheson et al (2011) go on to identify the fire and 
rescue service in particular as an agency that fits this description, often struggling 
to stretch its resources across numerous operational areas.  Matheson et al also 
highlight Crawford’s (1999) concept of the ‘criminalisation’ of social policy 
whereby social policy has shifted its rhetoric to focus on issues such as crime 
and social disorder, and thus priorities have shifted to tackling disorder (i.e. 
reducing anti-social behaviour leading to fires) rather than traditional prevention, 
forcing agencies such as the fire service to change their methods of working. 
 
The LAA offers an opportunity to explore the role of some of these agencies and 
how they impact upon this process of local public service delivery.  There are two 
key areas of interest in this regard.  This first is one of how these traditionally 
‘weaker’ actors chose to take up the opportunity presented to them and involve 
themselves in the LAA and its various initiatives as well as the relationships that 
they sought to build with other actors.   This also should consider how these 
organisations sought to ‘future proof’ themselves, by challenging and changing 
perceptions so that, should future schemes not explicitly involve them, they 
would still be held viewed favourably by other agencies. 
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The second aspect focuses on how the traditionally ‘stronger’ actors react to the 
presence of organisations that they may not be used to be working with so 
closely.  Any potential conflict arises from the fact that these newer institutions 
would be impacting on the stronger actors’ spheres of influence, but also drawing 
upon funding and resource streams.  The question is would the stronger actors 
treat them contemptuously or would they take a view that spreading resources 
across more organisations may lead to a longer term benefit for all concerned? 
 
3.11 Accountability Structures 
In many ways, the accountability structures of the LAA can help to provide 
deeper insights into how the LAA is governed and in particular, how the various 
actors interact.  There were two levels to this process: the Executive Board and 
Thematic Partnerships (see figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.3 - Structure of the LAA Boards 
 
3.11.1 Executive Boards 
One of the principal governance structures of the LAA was the executive board: a 
regular meeting of all the senior actors tasked with delivering the LAA – i.e. 
heads of service – to discuss progress.  This presents one of the key 
opportunities to provide accountability for the LAA and to change direction in 
order to assure delivery. 
LAA Executive Board 
Principal Actors from each agency – led by the leader of the 














Much has been made already of the potential power that some of the stronger 
actors could have within this process, particularly in terms of the extent to which 
their own internal accountability structures can override those of the LAA.  As a 
consequence, the executive board provided a useful opportunity to study this 
dynamic.  This especially relates to how the main stronger actors i.e. local 
authority, PCT and Police interact, and the extent to which each was held 
accountable for their respective actions.  As well as this, the extent to which the 
‘weaker’ actors engaged (or were allowed to engage) with a process that they 
may have little prior experience should be considered.  In particular, this should 
focus on if/how they chose to maximise the opportunity for their organisation to 
engage with the local service delivery process. 
 
Although the executive board was meant to enable the heads of service to meet 
regularly, the question arises as to what would happen to the legitimacy of the 
board, and consequently that of the LAA if they consistently failed to attend.  If 
these actors find that their time was being wasted/or was better spent elsewhere 
then there was the potential for them to send understudies who may lack the 
organisational clout to make meaningful decisions, thus limiting the action that 
the board was able to take.  If this was the case then there should also be a 
focus on the extent to which those running the board reflect the notion that ‘If 
nobody is coming to your meeting, then you need to change something about 
your meeting,’ i.e. what measures did they enact to make sure those partners did 
return. 
 
Further to this it has been noted that there wais a potential for “Middle Managers, 
charged with delivering [LAAs] at the coalface, typically sitting  in theme groups 
further down the partnership hierarchy’ to become disconnected from the 
executive board (Davies 2009).  As a result they are left with little say in the 
decision making process that will ultimately affect them.  Consequently questions 
arise as to how the executive board can relay and follow through on collective 
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decisions within what is a coalition of partners with different cultures and 
structures. 
 
3.11.2 Thematic Partnerships 
Earlier in the chapter the issue of silo structure was raised as one of the 
significant problems of both central and local government (Geddes et al: 2007, 
Sullivan: 2008), with the LAA model acting as one of the key proposals to stop 
this from occurring.  Despite this, the critique of LAAs in the literature and 
throughout this chapter has raised significant questions about their ability to 
achieve this policy aim. 
 
However, Davies (2009) contended that the LAAs would only be partially 
successful in achieving these aims, attaining an ‘expanded silo’ status which in 
essence only ‘replicated the silos it was intended to overcome’ (Davies: 2009, 
p86).  Indeed it is the use of the thematic partnerships that Davies contends will 
continue this silo working, which instead of breaking down the silos, creates a 
‘shallow consensus’ which ‘enabled stakeholders to proceed ‘as if’ they shared 
norms, meanings and goals but meant that silo practices remained unchallenged 
in thematic partnerships, where like minded actors reinforced them’ (Davies: 
2009, p90). 
 
Therefore whilst grouping the various actors together into similar interests, it 
reduces the amount of political manoeuvring required by the stronger actors to 
ensure that their interests are served, but this comes at the cost of renewed silo 
working.  Whilst this suits the requirements of the various partners which work 
within those themes, it can act as an impediment to those seeking to work on 
areas outside of their sphere of influence, and thus as an impediment to the 
principles of partnership working itself.  As a result, the research will focus on the 
extent to which the thematic partnerships that sit beneath the executive board do 
show signs of Davies’ expanded silo model. 
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3.11.3 Tie through between the two levels 
In practice these two levels of LAA governance are expected to work in 
conjunction with one another, with the thematic partnerships reporting back to the 
executive board, thereby providing full accountability to the partnership as a 
whole.  However there are questions raised as to how effective these processes 
are and the extent to which this happens in practice, particularly in terms of 
dealing with the side effects of the expanded silo working outlined in the previous 
section. 
 
As a result of these expanded silos, Davies (2009) foresees that each thematic 
silo, whilst operating within its field of interest at the thematic partnership level, 
may add to a fragmentation of the overall partnership without effective 
governance from the executive to make sure each thematic group delivers within 
the parameters and ethos of the partnership as a whole.    
 
Consequently, whilst the roles of both executive board and thematic partnerships 
have a significant bearing on the effectiveness of the partnership, the links 
between the two are equally important, and should be investigated as part of the 
research. 
 
3.11.4 Democratic Involvement 
As touched upon earlier in this chapter, whilst one of the stated aims of the LAA 
is to allow local areas to become more able to focus on the policy priorities of 
importance to them, of all the actors participating process, only elected 
representatives have a mandate to act on the behalf of the public.  These include 
elected representatives that operate at the local level – i.e. councillors – and 
those who operate at the national level – i.e. MPs.  Consequently the role of 




Chapter two briefly discussed how cities whose political makeup differed from 
that of central government could find themselves distanced from central 
government policy whilst also finding that their ability to set their own local 
agenda became hindered by central agendas.  Given this historical context there 
a consideration of how current local authorities work with the Whitehall 
administration and the extent to which political hue influences this. 
 
There is also the potential for authorities in England to be in a state of no overall 
control – i.e. no one political party has a sufficient majority in order to direct the 
policy of the local authority.  Earlier the chapter discussed stronger actors, 
particularly referencing the local authority as the lead partner but, given that the 
policy direction of the local authority is ostensibly politically driven, if the local 
authority does not have clear leadership, is this likely to hinder the discharging of 
the council’s duties including the LAA?  Further to this, in areas where there is no 
overall control, but also in areas where political control of the council is narrow 
(or liable to change at elections) there is the potential for this political climate to 
spill over into the LAA board or thematic partnerships.  Questions arise as to 
whether, if political control was an issue in LAA governance, how did it manifest 
itself?  Would elected members be likely to hinder work on LAA business if it 
didn’t match with their political goals, or would these political disagreements be 
played out in another arena within the local authority? 
 
Evidently, the role of elected members and particularly the outcome of elections 
has the potential to impact significantly on LAA governance and delivery, and this 
should be considered as part of this research. 
 
3.11.5 MPs 
The role of local Members of Parliament is one which is also worthy of 
exploration, especially given that these actors by their very nature operate and 
have influence at the national and local level.  Although the MPs have little to do 
in terms active governance with regards to the LAA itself i.e. they would be 
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unlikely to sit on Executive Boards, questions focus on how they work to 
reconcile their dual national/local roles.  Indeed, the role of MPs raises similar 
questions as discussed earlier in the chapter with regards to when their political 
party differs from that of central government and the issues that this raises.  
However, what is of more interest with MPs is what occurs when their political 
affiliation differs from that of the ruling majority in the local authority.  What are 
the consequences when there are two opposing viewpoints at the county-district 
levels of local governance, particularly if one level is of the party of government?  
Are the two sets of actors likely to work in the local interest of the area they have 
each been elected to represent, or will they undermine each other for political 
gain, potentially to the cost the interests of their area? 
 
3.12 Future Developments 
The development of this research was set against the backdrop of change to the 
local public service delivery mechanisms including the LAA following the General 
Election in 2010.  As such it seeks to reflect this shifting environment as clearly 
as possible, particularly noting the research’s overall brief surrounding the 
improvement of the future practice of local public service delivery.  
 
3.12.1 Pre-election Conservative Policy 
Prior to the election, the Conservatives (considered at the time to be most likely 
party to form the next government), and numerous think tanks affiliated with the 
party, produced a number of position papers outlining their programme for 
government if elected following a general election. 
 
Focusing on local public service delivery, one of the central themes of this was 
the concept of ‘Delivering More for Less’ (NLGN: 2009a) through greater 
efficiency, drawing upon the best practice of Conservative-run councils across 
England.  The party also – ironically, like Labour before it – promised to increase 
the power of local citizens by devolving power away from Whitehall to local 
areas, indicating that they, at least, believed that Labour either failed to achieve 
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this objective, or did not go far enough.  The Conservatives proposed to achieve 
this by drastically reducing the number of targets that had to be reported on, as 
well as by reducing the bureaucratic requirements placed upon local authorities 
(NLGN: 2009b). 
 
3.12.2 The 2010 General Election and Coalition Government 
In 2010 a general election was called which saw the end of 13 years of Labour 
Government.  However, a period of political uncertainty emerged as no one party 
was able to command a majority in the House of Commons and thus be invited to 
form a government by the Queen.  As a result a coalition government was 
formed between the Conservative Party (which had the largest number of seats 
in Parliament) and the Liberal Democrats (which held the third largest number of 
seats).  Combined, the two parties held enough seats to give them the required 
majority to govern. 
 
Given the nature of each party’s manifesto (with the traditional views of each 
party coming from opposite ends of the political spectrum) they would not appear 
to be natural bed-fellows in government.  In order to establish a stable policy 
platform from which to govern, the parties entered into negotiations which 
resulted in the ‘coalition agreement’ (Cabinet Office: 2010).  The idea was that 
this then would form the basis of all subsequent government policy moving 
forward. 
 
As the full Coalition programme for government is instigated, the views of 
practitioners will be helpful in considering how emerging policy responds to the 
challenges faced in their areas.  More importantly, one of the principal aims of 
this thesis is to provide recommendations for the improvement of future practice 
– particularly by identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the LAA system.  
Therefore an examination of the extent to which Coalition policy seeks to 
respond to these issues will be undertaken.  Similarly, analysis can compare 
these policies with past schemes (outlined in chapter two) to assess whether 
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there are similarities with these schemes and whether they seek to merely reflect 
past programmes, or respond to their weaknesses. 
 
3.12.3 What would Labour have done? 
Although now relegated to conjecture, the prospect of what a hypothetical fourth 
Labour term would have done is also an interesting concept to explore.  Before 
considering the changes to the system made through Coalition policy and their 
implications, it would be helpful to consider how the LAA and the institutions 
surrounding it would have been developed under a continued Labour 
administration and the potential implications this would have had for the scheme 
in general.   
 
The details and analysis of both Labour and Coalition policy will be discussed 
later on as part of a wider discussion around the strengths and weaknesses of 
LAAs. 
 
Local Public Service Delivery within an International Context 
In order to better understand how LAAs have been implemented, the policy 
rhetoric surrounding them, and the important questions arising from their 
undertaking, it is important to look closely at several examples drawing from a 
wider international context. 
 
By undertaking this study, international examples can highlight occurrences of 
best practice from around the world which can be useful in analysing the 
implementation of LAAs.  The understanding of how issues of governance and 
accountability may be addressed in international examples can aid deeper 
understanding by helping to raise or expand on the initial research questions.  
Alternatively, a closer look at these examples may raise many of the same 
research questions, particularly about how different partners work together, how 
the state locates and relinquishes its power, but also how results are delivered 
and reported and the associated accountability issues that come with this. 
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Whilst this exercise lets us focus on a wider policy context, it is important to be 
aware of Peck and Theodore’s (2001) concerns about policy transfer and the 
dangers of transferring ‘off the shelf’ policies into a context that might not 
necessarily be receptive.  Reflecting this, therefore, the idea behind this section 
is to reflect upon how international examples may approach similar issues to 
those faced by the LAA and whilst there is a consideration of how any best 
practice compares with the English context, any such attempt should be both 
considered and tentative. 
 
Therefore, the next section of this chapter will focus specifically on governance 
arrangements which have been carried forward in western countries 
summarising some of the schemes whilst exploring a selection of these in more 
detail. 
 
3.13 Shifting Power Away from Whitehall?: The United Kingdom 
Since 1997, local government is not the only aspect of the country’s political 
establishments that have undergone extensive reform and modernisation.  As 
part of the move to give areas more say in the issues which affect them a 
number of devolution projects have been undertaken, at local, regional, and 
national scales.  These attempts were met with varying degrees of success.    
 
At the local scale one scheme that has met with success and has managed to 
capture the public’s imagination is that of elected mayors.  The foremost example 
of the 13 elected mayors within the UK is the position of Mayor of London.  
Currently this position has been in place for 4 terms of 4 years.  The position of 
Mayor of London provides a significant amount of scope to govern on the issues 
relating to the city on a broad scale.   
 
However at the regional scale, these reforms were rejected.  One of the notable 
failures was the proposal to devolve a significant amount of power to the regions 
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through elected assemblies.  These plans, championed by the then Deputy 
Prime Minister John Prescott, were ultimately defeated in a referendum when 
residents of the North East region of England elected not to proceed with the 
proposed reforms (BBC News: 2004).  This referendum was a test, with the 
likelihood being that referenda would follow in other regions if the North East 
voted in favour.  However. this rejection was seen as a significant blow to the 
plans and the plans were not pursued in any other regions. 
 
 
3.14 The Devolved UK States 
The largest, and arguably most successful, experiments with devolution in the 
UK have been undertaken on a national scale.  Each of the countries that 
comprise the United Kingdom has experienced a significant rise in the powers 
that have been made available to them through the devolution process.  Wales 
and Scotland have seen their respective parliaments installed at the Senedd in 
Cardiff and Holyrood, Edinburgh, Scotland.  Similarly, Northern Ireland has seen 
its own Parliament in Stormont reinstated and going about the business of 
government following a successful political resolution to the recent troubles. 
 
These legislatures have since brought forward a raft of proposals and schemes 
which affect their areas (See table 3.4).  In many instances these policies have 
differed from those relating to England, passed by Westminster.  This includes 










Table 3.4 - Local Public Service Delivery Arrangements in the Devolved UK 
  England Wales Scotland 
Scheme Local Area Agreements Local Service Agreements Single Outcome Agreements 
Introduced 2005  2007 
Timeframe 3 Years 3 Years 3 years 
Governance - Governed by  Local 
Strategic Partnership 
- Statutory Partners 
(Police, Fire, PCT, 
Job Centre+  
- Governed by a Local 
Service Board 
- Involves the Same Key 
Partners as the LAA 
 
- Governed by a Community 
Planning Partnership 
- Similar key partners as 
England and Wales.  Job 
Centre+ not statutory but 
involved anyway, along 
with higher education. 
Negotiation - Negotiate with 
Government Office 
for the Regions 
acting on behalf of 
the state 
- Negotiate with Assembly 
Member from the 
Senedd 
- Present draft SOA to the 
Scottish Government 
which then agree on it with 
the CPP 
Funding - Combination of the 
Area Based Grant 
and mainstream 
funding 
 - Ended ring fenced local 
funding 
 - Up to 35 Indicators 
selected from a 
national indicator 
dataset 
- Select 2 or 3 key 
priorities for the area 
which action is focused 
upon 
- Emphasis on furthering 15 
national outcomes through 
delivery at the local level 
Monitoring 
Mechanism 
- Targets set against 
the 35 indicators 
  
Sources: ODPM: 2004 a,b,c. Welsh Assembly: 2007, Scottish Government: 2008 
 
3.14.1 Wales – Local Service Agreements 
In Wales, much of the political context is still broadly comparable with that of 
England.  As in England, all Local Authority Areas in Wales have a Local 
Strategic Partnership in place.  These work under the same principles as in 
England, involving the same statutory partners.  However, in the Welsh context, 
the process is not articulated through an LAA, but rather a Local Service Board.    
They still contain many of the same partners as the LSP including elected 
members and appointed officials, representation from the key public services as 
well as key local stakeholders.  Representatives from the private sector were 
also invited to take part. 
 
In many ways the role of the Local Service Board retains significant similarities to 
the LSP structure.  The main aim of the LSB is to foster an environment of 
partnership, where the key agencies work together across departmental 
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boundaries to improve upon service delivery and improve upon local leadership 
on these issues through the creation of one flagship scheme.  Like the LSP, they 
are tasked with working jointly and for ‘connecting the whole network of public 
services in an area’ (Welsh Assembly; 2008, p4).  Also, they are responsible for 
agreeing and delivering a set of priority actions, which are set out in a Local 
Service Agreement.  In a similar way to the discussions and negotiations which 
take place with GOR in England, each LSB will liaise with a representative of the 
assembly government in Cardiff.  It is envisaged that this representative will 
provide support and potentially remove barriers to development.   
 
The presence of the assembly government in Wales can be seen as two different 
forms of government serving one area.  Prior to devolution, Wales had a role 
within a UK context as one of the government regions, albeit with a minister of 
State.  However, in many ways the Senedd takes on some of the state 
responsibility from Westminster, although not in its entirety.  The conflict between 
these roles is shown in the negotiation phase of the LSA.  The LSB must 
negotiate with a representative from the Assembly, as opposed to GOR in an 
English context, and as such, must negotiate with the state and region at the 
same time. 
 
The LSB also produces annual reports on its progress, both nationally and 
locally.  The local report signifies one of the most important initial differences 
between Local Service Boards and LSP’s focus.  The LSP and LAA process 
focuses on specific areas, introducing blanket targets which apply to all areas 
within its administrative boundaries.  However, with Local Service Boards, their 
output is specifically stated as to be focused on the citizen (Welsh Assembly: 
2008).  It expressly notes that the citizen and service user’s views should have a 
big influence on guiding how services are delivered and results improved. 
 
While the LSB serves as the organisational structure, the way in which it is 
operationalised is a Local Service Agreement.  In many ways they are directly 
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comparable to the LAA. Indeed, the prospectus for the first phase of LSAs notes 
how the experience gained from the English context has directly influenced LSA 
development (Welsh Assembly: 2008). 
 
Like the LAA/LSP structure the LSB also raises questions about the locus of 
power the resulting impact on the decision making process.  While outlining the 
principles under which the priorities within the agreement are decided, it sets out 
two opposing criteria.  Priorities could be highlighted as being of local 
significance, having been  identified through the consultation process and other 
evidence driven procedures.  However, the prospectus specifically states that 
some of the priorities within the LSA could be ‘identified by the Welsh Assembly 
Government as being of national importance’ (Welsh Assembly: 2007, p5).  
While the prospectus notes that local and national concerns will be in balance 
with each other, it does raise significant questions, in a similar way to the LAA, 
about how responsive these schemes are.  If a majority of the outcomes being 
pursued by the LSA are outlined and designated as priorities by the central 
government then this severely hampers the ability of local initiatives to be locally 
responsive and limits the impact of the consultation proceedings with local 
citizens. 
 
Again, like the LAA, the LSAs are intended to run for a period of up to 3 years.  
The significant difference with this scheme, however, is the level of focus.  While 
the LAAs are charged with focusing on up to 30 national indicators, representing 
some of the most significant challenges to each respective area, the LSA is 
designed to focus on just two or three key challenges.  This reduced scope could 
lead to further questions about the role of central government, especially within a 
project of such a narrow remit.  Furthermore, questions could be raised around 
the different partner agencies and their involvement, particularly if their 




The use of indicators is not as prominent within the LSA process as it is within 
the LAAs.  While they form the basis of the LAA, the indicators do not have to 
exclusively come from the national dataset. 
 
The Local Service Board policy documents attempt to respond to several 
emerging governance issues which could arise, and relate directly to an English 
context.  Many of the partners within the LSB scheme will involve themselves 
primarily through high ranking members of their organisation, which then attend 
meetings.  As such they would occupy a leadership role within the process.  
Seeking to provide guidance for those members, the prospectus notes several 
important values and characteristics to which all its high end partners must 
aspire, including; 
 
- A willingness to transcend organisational interests in the interests of better 
delivery for citizens 
- The capacity both to lead, and to follow other’s lead 
- A willingness to contribute to work where others are in the lead 
(Welsh Assembly: 2008, p10) 
 
This echoes several of the key governance questions from the English context 
which will be explored throughout this thesis.  While these are desirable 
attributes of any partner within an organisation, the distinction between theory 
and practice could be important.  Within a Welsh context at least, these issues 
have been identified, potentially drawing from the experience of LSPs and LAAs. 
 
3.14.2 Scotland – Single Outcome Agreements 
Like Wales, the performance management mechanisms for local public service 
delivery in Scotland share some similarities to those of England, although the 
Scottish system offers an alternate vision of how similar governance structures 
can be utilised to deliver local public services. 
 
88 
The scheme is overseen by a Community Planning Partnership – a coalition of 
actors that again stands to compare with the LSP or LSB of England and Wales 
respectively.  Like the English and Welsh counterparts, the SOA is negotiated 
and delivered on a three year rolling basis.   
 
However, the Scottish system strikes a different balance to that of the LAA in 
particular.  It does this in two central ways.  Firstly, rather than being target based 
the SOA is outcome based, meaning that ‘it should clearly focus on people’s 
quality of life and opportunities’ (Scottish Government: 2008) rather than simply 
performance against any indicator.  Whilst this ostensibly makes measurement 
harder, it makes the process less abstract and requires a deeper consideration 
about each goal’s implications and how to join up working in order to improve 
delivery.  Similarly, the performance management nature of the scheme is 
potentially diluted compared to the LAA as, although continuous improvement is 
expected, the Scottish Government anticipate that outcomes will be delivered 
over a longer period of time than the three year span of the SOA. 
 
The second key way in which the SOA differs from its English counterpart is the 
number of outcomes that it sets out.  In England this number is up to 35 (plus 18 
further statutory indicators), whilst Scotland mandates only 15 outcomes that 
reflect the ‘strategic priorities’ of the area (Scottish Government: 2008).  
However, there are concerns that the outcome based model presents problems 
in terms of monitoring, in that as opposed to quantifiable targets, it is difficult to 
measure progress about general outcome statements (SSRG: 2008), in much 
the same way the initial Sustainable Community Strategies were criticised. 
 
Further to this, given that there are questions in the English context about the 
number of indicators that an LAA must work with and consequently the ability to 
really focus on the pressing issues in its area, the SOA deepens the pertinence 
of these questions, asking whether a significantly reduced number of priorities is 
more manageable or deliverable.  This does reflect concerns, however about the 
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potential for stronger actors to dominate the agenda if fewer outcomes are up for 
consideration, freezing out actors with less capacity. 
 
One of the striking similarities between the LAA and SOA is the level of top-down 
control over the agenda that local areas can set.  Not only must the 15 outcomes 
reflect national policy priorities, as set out by Holyrood, ensuring a tie through 
between national and local, but in the absence of regional government, each 
SOA must be negotiated and agreed directly with the Scottish Government.  This 
process clearly represents a limitation on the scheme to be truly bespoke and 
focus on any unique issue, and in many ways chimes with some of the research 
questions about LAA indicators. 
 
In an assessment of the first year of the SOA, Park and Kerley (2011) identify a 
number of issues corresponding to those raised by the LAA literature.  In 
particular they note the challenges presented by the rollout of the SOA and the 
timescale preventing effective relationship building between partners as well as 
the restrictive influence of central government in SOA development – albeit 
considered more ‘light touch’ than Westminster (Park and Kerley: 2011).  Thus, 
the extent to which these finds are replicated by the LAA process is of interest. 
 
In all, the Scottish example presents a much better comparison to the LAA than 
the Welsh LSA.  It offers contrasts in its structure and monitoring which act as a 
comparator to the LAA.  Furthermore the issues that it faces are similar to those 
of the LAA and thus provide can assist in the analysis of LAA working. 
 
3.15 The European Union 
Within the wider European Union there are a number of different approaches to 
local public service delivery, which reflect the differing governing arrangements in 
each country, and in particular differences in central-local relations.  A selection 
of these mechanisms are shown in Table 3.5.   
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Table 3.5 - A Selection Local Public Service Delivery Mechanisms in the 
European Union 
 Republic of Ireland Holland Germany  
Scheme Local Area Partnership ‘Local Agreement’  
Introduced ~1987-1990 (first round)   
Timeframe  2007-2011  
Governance - 38 Local Partnership 
Companies 
- Tripartite board 
consisting of social, 
public and community 
partners 
- No majority so no 
interests dominate 
- Mediated by a 





- Local areas are 
autonomous, but are 




- Local autonomy 
integral 
- Actively seeks to 
confound the state 
if local areas can do 
it themselves 
- Many mandatory 





- Some state 
mandated duties 
also conducted and 
given funding from 
the state  
Negotiation Strong role of central 
government in Ireland 
which imposes much of 
social policy 
  
Indicators? Selection from 42 
National Indicators (Now 
increased to 46) 
- Can have performance 
‘benchmarked against 
indicators which are 
selected by the Local 




 - Single Information 
Single Audit which 
covers central and local 
accountabilities, but 
only on financial issues. 
- Number of 
inspectorates to 





- Also agreed a set of 
targets to deliver that 
reflect central 
government aims 
- Monitored by VNG 
 
Notes Autonomous status due 
to weak role of local 
government 
 Largely conducted at a 
local authority level 
Sources: Turok: 2001, LGA: 2010 
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In many cases the examples from the EU (and the other international examples 
to be discussed later on) indicate lower levels of central control, supporting the 
assertion that the UK remains one of the most centrally controlled of the Western 
democracies.  The extent of this central control over UK policy is shown in 
greater clarity by glancing across the schemes from the European Union.  What 
becomes apparent is that significant periods of policy stability that can exist given 
the right conditions.  This is in stark contract to the British policy environment 
which, as illustrated in chapters two and three, has had to deal with and adapt to 
consistent change due to its centralised environment and the differing political 
philosophies 
 
3.15.1 France – Contrat De Ville 
Despite the fact that they may both operate within a European context and under 
some influence from European legislation, urban regeneration schemes in 
France and England have developed in different ways.  Green and Booth note 
that, while the context of this development does vary, both countries are 
characterised by problems which appear similar, but are rooted in a different set 
of causes (Booth and Green, 1996). 
 
Historically, the French response to urban regeneration, particularly facing 
problems in inner city areas closely mirrors that in the UK.  The 1960s was 
typified by the creation of mass housing projects, coupled with ‘Schémas 
Directeur’ and ‘zones á urbaniser en priorité’ spelling out the location of projects 
at a broad and detailed level respectively (Booth and Green, 1996).  These 
schemes could be compared to the new town schemes which were prevalent in 
the UK at the time.  However, within a French context there was a realisation that 
the level of focus was not sufficient to tackle the problems that urban areas faced 
and that a city level policy approach was likely to be the most effective way to 
tackle issues of deprivation.   
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The new policy which was brought forward was the Contrat De Ville (CDV).  Like 
the LAAs in the UK they were a programme phased in over a number of years 
with the aim of instigating joint action and formalising the relationships between 
central and local government (Mawson, 2002).  Furthermore, it has been noted 
that, like the LAA, the CDV is in many ways a method of outlining and affirming 
the responsibilities that local and central government have to their area. 
 
Booth and Green highlight a pertinent point on the concept of ‘contractualisation’ 
between a local and central government, noting that the ‘procedure of 
contractualisation may be seen as a mechanism of the state which limits the 
powers of the locality and ensures that the state retains control’ (Booth and 
Green; 1996, p26).  This is a notion which can is equally attributable to LAAs due 
to the fact that they are often presented as a contract between central and local 
government.  This also reflects many of the issues raised throughout the 
discussions about LAAs, particularly about the location of central government’s 
power.  The French example indicates that the location of power and the 
relationship between the centre and the local is pertinent, even outside the UK 
context.  Particularly important is the question as to whether this is a movement 
by the centre to appease local authorities, seemingly giving them more power 
while at the same time maintaining or even broadening the existing power base 
the state holds. 
  
3.16 Scandinavia 
There are also examples from Scandinavia (see Table 3.6) which provide useful 
examples of how local public services could be delivered.  Although they do not 
all apply to the totality of local government in the way that the LAA does, they are 
still worth considering.  
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Table 3.6 - Local Public Service Delivery Mechanisms in Scandinavia 
 Sweden Finland 
Scheme ‘Municipal Compass’ ‘Centralised Steering – Local 
Implementation’ 
Governance - Local authorities can self-
determine their own targets 
- In Sweden there is a 
culture of mutual interest in 
allowing local areas 
autonomy, which feeds into 
the wider success of the 
state 
- Government set curricula 
but local authorities are 
given the freedom to 
implement it and deal with 
school provision etc 
Funding - Raised through the levying 




- The compass focuses on 
citizen satisfaction and how 
local procedures compare 
to elements of best 
practice 
 
Notes - Element of collaboration 
with Denmark and Norway 
- Only applies to education 
Source: LGA: 2010 
 
3.16.1 Sweden – Municipal Compass 
Sweden’s ‘Municipal Compass’ scheme offers a contrasting view on how the 
state interacts with localities in order to deliver effective results.  Here, rather 
than imposing a system and a suite of targets, local areas are granted the ability 
to self-determine their own targets based on the presumption of mutual interest – 
i.e. that allowing local areas to define their own priorities makes them more 
effective, which in turn feeds into the broader success of the state (LGA: 2010).   
 
This is made possible through the way that the municipal compass is funded, i.e. 
through local taxation, as opposed to majority central funding in the UK.  This 
dual-process of self-funding and self-determination makes the Swedish local 
authorities more reliant on their own capacity to act and thus less able to blame a 
centralised culture if something goes wrong or if there is a funding gap.  
However, as part of this, rather than centralised monitoring of indicators, the local 
authorities progress is marked against citizen satisfaction, meaning that the local 
citizens sense of effectiveness and value for money for their locally based taxes 
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form the main driver behind assessment, as opposed to central assessment of 
targets that reflect a central policy agenda. 
 
In many ways the Swedish model stands in stark contrast to the LAA model of 
the management mechanisms for public service delivery, although it is also 
indicative of a system that does not place as much of an emphasis on central 
control as the UK. 
 
3.17 Canada 
Moving away from Europe, there are several further examples that can be 
compared to the LAA (see Table 3.7).  However one that particularly resonates is 
the Canadian ‘Vancouver Agreement’. 
 
Table 3.7 - Local Public Service Delivery Mechanisms in Canada 
 Canada 
Scheme Vancouver Agreement Ontario Municipal Benchmarking 
Agreement (OMBI) 
Introduced 2000 2000 
Timeframe 5 Years  
Governance - Partnership involving representatives 
from the Federal, state and local level 
- Governed by a committee of 1 
minister from state and federal offices 
and the local mayor’s office.  This 
committee is responsible for decision 
making and accountability 
- Also a management committee 
represented by each respective 
partner 
- Strong delivery role of elected mayors 
in the process 
- Operated voluntarily by 15 
municipalities  
- Share information about 
progress 
- Allows for the identification of 
best practice and the 
production of ‘emulation’ 
strategies 
Negotiation  - Covers all major functions of 
the municipality 
Funding - Funded via a mixture of public and 
private funds. 
- In 2003 the state and federal levels 
provided $10 million while the local 




No National Audit in Canada and no statutory requirement to report on data 
Status Renewed in 2005-2010  
Notes   
Source: Bradford: 2008, Vancouver Agreement: 2005 
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3.17.1 Canada – Vancouver Agreement 
Within North America, one of the most strikingly similar schemes to the LAA can 
be found in Canada.  It is a fixed term multi-agency scheme accompanied by a 
strategic implementation strategy (Bradford: 2008). 
 
The agreement was introduced in March 2000 to run for a five year period.  It 
was  extended in 2005 to run until 2010.   
 
The scope of the Vancouver Agreement is strikingly similar to much of the policy 
agenda within a UK context.   The broad remit of the agreement is for the parties 
to ‘co-operate in promoting and supporting sustainable economic, social and 
community development in the city of Vancouver’ (Vancouver Agreement: 2005, 
p1), which also form the core principles of current UK development policy.  The 
issue of sustainability is also developed.  Like the UK, with the Sustainable 
Communities plan and the Sustainable Community Strategy that the LAA 
operationalises, the Vancouver Agreement places a focus on the concept of 
Sustainable Communities.  These stated shared policy values make the 
Agreement an ideal example with which to compare methodologies on how to 
achieve these goals. 
 
The Vancouver Agreement serves as a mechanism under which the various 
parties of the state and localities can come together to formulate an appropriate 
policy response to their shared aims and ambitions.  However, Mason (2007) 
identified difficulties in getting the various levels of government to engage fully, 
largely due to scheduling, and that as a result partner co-ordination took place 
within each tier of government, rather than across them.  This reflected similar 
concerns within a UK context about how fully engaged high tiers of government 
can be with the process. 
 
These policy responses would be articulated through the production of a 
Strategic Plan which would be approved and adopted by all parties concerned.   
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In this sense it is directly comparable to the LSP/LAA structure of the English 
system, with the broad structural mechanism representing the LSP, its 
commitment to work together and shared aims, while the Strategic Plan 
represents the LAA - operationalising and providing a delivery mechanism for 
these aims.  Furthermore, like the LAA, it was felt that the Vancouver agreement 
was heavily reliant on the quality of local leadership, both to set the Agenda and 
to drive through effective partnership (Mason: 2007). 
 
3.18 International Examples: A Summary 
The various examples drawn from the devolved UK, Europe and North America 
offer some valuable insights about how other mechanisms for local public service 
delivery can influence the study of LAAs, and perhaps improve their practice.  
These schemes have demonstrated that many of the issues faced by LAAs, as 
raised by the earlier chapters, are not unique.  Indeed, many of the questions 
occur frequently, particularly around notions of top down control, target setting 
and inter-agency partnership working.  As such this section should further 
demonstrate the relevance of these questions.  It should also highlight how these 
examples can help us to better reflect on the case of LAAs.  In particular the 
extent to which wider examples were considered in UK policy development and 
perhaps a reflection on the extent to which any improvements to practice would 
move the UK closer, or further away, from any of these particular schemes. 
 
3.19 Key Research Questions 
 
By exploring the literature surrounding LAAs, it is now possible to identify a 
number of key detailed research questions to further guide the research.   
 
The ultimate aim of the research is on LAAs and their effectiveness as a tool for 
local public service delivery.  However there are two key themes with the 
research will now focus upon.  The first is one of vertical governance: particularly 
centre-local relations and the interactions that occur between the state, region 
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and locality in delivering the LAA.  The second is one of horizontal governance: 
and how the various actors interact at a local level in order to deliver a specific 
LAA.  Beyond this, the research also aims to reflect the wider theme of 
generating recommendations for the improvement of the future delivery of local 
public services. 
 
3.19.1 Vertical Governance 
 What level of control did Whitehall exert over the LAA process? 
 Did GOR act as a ‘local champion’ in LAA negotiation or purely in the 
interests of the state? 
 Was GOR effective in its role as handlers for the LAA? 
 Did the national indicator dataset provide sufficient scope to focus on a 
local area’s needs? Was the National Indicator Dataset suitable for this 
purpose? 
 Were Indicators imposed upon local areas? 
 Was the indicator system subject to ‘gamesmanship’ to benefit a local 
area? What were the implications if this was the case? 
 What effect did a two-tier system of local governance have on LAA 
delivery? 
 
3.19.2 Horizontal Governance 
 What were the implications for the implementation of a LAA if a central 
government department’s stated goals were not shared, or seen as a 
specific priority, by a local area?   
 Were there any actors that dominated the process over others?  What led 
this to occur? 
 Did an agencies’ internal agenda impact on its effectiveness in delivering 
LAA targets? 
 How did elected representatives and party politics affect the delivery of 
LAA targets? 
 Where was the locus of power within the LAA system? 
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 Who (amongst the LAA partners) was the greatest long term beneficiary 
from the shift in focus to LAAs? 
 
3.19.3 LAAs and the Future 
 What were the strengths and weaknesses of LAAs? 
 In your opinion, was the LAA project a success? 
 How can the future delivery of local public services be improved? 
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Chapter Four:  Theories and Concepts 
 
Now that the policy environment surrounding LAAs has been explored in depth, 
and a number of key research questions identified, the next step is to identify a 
theory or theories which can aid in the deeper understanding of these issues.  
Consequently, this chapter will focus on a number of theories which have 
relevance to the themes of the research.  Through the course of debate each of 
these theoretical concepts will be analysed in terms of their strengths and 
weaknesses.  Ultimately, the aim of this process is to find the most that provides 
the greatest assistance in exploring and understanding these research questions.  
As such the chapter will conclude by identifying the most appropriate theoretical 
concepts that can assist with understanding the research findings. 
 
The process of identifying the most appropriate theories to help analyse LAAs 
was not linear in nature.  It began with a general exploration of the theories 
around centre-local relations and local governance in order to find a 'best fit' for 
the research questions.  Then, following this, follow up explorations were taken to 
identify any gaps in this 'best fit' and how they might be filled by other concepts.  
What follows should shed light on that process and how, ultimately, a robust 
conceptual framework was identified. 
 
4.1 Concepts Surrounding the State 
Given the strong themes of centre-local relations raised in chapters two and 
three (and particularly referencing the fact that the LAA is defined as a three-year 
contract between central and local government), the first point of exploration 
required a consideration of the role of the state and some of the theoretical 
concepts surrounding this subject. 
 
Davies and Imbroscio (2009) assert that the State holds a number of unique 
power bases which allow it to function but note that, as the modern state 
continues to unfold, the structures which influence these power bases become 
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increasingly complicated and difficult to understand.  This in turn has implications 
for accountability, for as command chains become longer and more complex, so 
the accountability structures also become longer and more complex (Day and 
Klein: 1987).  This increasing complexity within the policy environment makes it 
difficult to assess its working precisely, corresponding to the issues raised 
around accountability, particularly with inter-agency accountability. 
 
In line with trends towards both devolution and globalisation, Kjaer (2009) also 
outlines a recent rescaling of state interests.  This also corresponds to Skelcher’s 
(2000) ‘Hollowing Out’ model whereby the traditional institutions and functions of 
the state are being removed and transferred to other organisations, both 
downwards to the localities and upwards to supra-national organisations such as 
the EU.  This links with many of the themes identified in the discussion about 
multi-level governance.  With this rescaling comes what Gerber and Kollman 
(2004) describe as an ‘authority migration’, where power is transferred away from 
the actors which, traditionally, would be seen as being in control.  However, it is 
further noted that overtures of devolution can potentially lead to a further 
increase in the power of the central state (Somerville and Haines: 2008) as in 
most cases, many of the organisations which play a key role in developing these 
policy agendas (i.e. GOR) still owe their loyalties to the state (Goodwin et al, 
2006).  The concept of power bases outlined by Davies is further developed by 
Healey (2006) who comments on the state as a strong actor, noting that even 
when power is given to local areas, they are still heavily reliant on the state and 
its resources both to act in an effective way and to obtain legitimacy.   
 
However, Peck (2001) notes that, contrary to Skelcher’s (2000) notions of 
hollowing out, the state is simply being reorganised, ‘not as some lumbering 
bureaucratic monolith but as a (political) process in motion’ (Peck: 2001, p449), 
and thus the question is not about ‘the extent to which the national state has 
somehow become ‘less’ powerful in the process, but how it has become 
differently powerful’ (Peck: 2001, p447).  In effect, devolution, contends Peck, 
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while a signifier of ‘inter-scalar shifts... may or may not add up to a real transfer 
of state power... as powers of institutional coordination and ideological control 
remain firmly located (albeit in a restructured form) at the centre’ (Peck: 2001, 
p452).  This view can particularly assist in the consideration of the research 
questions surrounding the participation of partner agencies with strong state-led 
structures (e.g. police/health) and how they interact with the LAA and its delivery. 
 
As the actions of the state cause its form to be constituted / reconstituted in order 
to meet its changing requirements, the relationship that it the state with those 
actors within its boundaries also changes.  To reflect this, a theory is required 
that provides a deeper understanding of why this happens.  Developing upon 
this, a theory emerged that met this requirement: the Strategic Relational 
Approach. 
 
4.2 Strategic Relational Approach 
As the previous chapters have indicated, the relationship between the locality 
and the state has changed over the course of many years, often resulting in 
specific policy practices aimed to either limit or increase the power of the locality 
– either implicitly or explicitly. 
 
Key to the understanding of this aspect of theory is an acceptance that the state 
is a site, generator and product of numerous strategies and as a result is in a 
constant state of flux (Jessop: 1990).  In shaping this argument, Brenner (2004) 
suggests that the concept of the state and its activities is not a fixed one, nor for 
that matter by extension is the locality.  He notes that ‘the spaces of state power 
are not simply ‘filled’ as if they were pre-determined territorial containers but 
instead, state spatiality is actively produced and transformed through regulatory 
projects and socio-political struggles articulated in diverse institutional sites and 
at a range of geographical scales’ (Brenner: 2004, p76).  By this, it is meant that 
the any concept of ‘The State’ is an ongoing project that is constantly being 
reformed and realigned through a succession of policy initiatives and 
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programmes.  This changeable role of the state and its methodology forms a 
central strand in Jessop’s Strategic Relational Approach (SRA) (Jessop, 1990). 
 
Reflecting upon some of the themes discussed around regulation theory earlier in 
the chapter, Brenner noted that these processes of state rescaling were 
animated as a result of regulatory failure (Brenner: 2009).  Jessop contends that 
the changing activities of the state, and its historic and continued influence in a 
wide variety of regulatory projects, makes it a social relation and further to this 
the stability the state enjoys only comes about as a result of these social 
relations (Jessop: 1990).   
 
Jessop’s central conclusion is that as a result of the changing focus of policy to 
meet particular needs, and largely as a result of the party political process, the 
state cannot, and does not, remain neutral, and as such cannot arbitrate policy 
decisions in a wholly neutral way.  As a result, any policy enacted by the state 
could be seen to favour one party over another through ‘strategic selectivity’ 
(Jessop, 1990) i.e. a strategic choice to favour one course of action based on its 
cumulative reward. 
 
 While Jessop is the prominent author on this issue, the concept that the state 
privileges specific parties through its allocation of policy has a somewhat longer 
history.  Offe (1984) first noted that particular actors always stood to benefit from 
state policy at the expense of others, a point expanded upon by Pemberton and 
Goodwin’s (2010) work noting that any change in scope by the state has the 
effect of changing who has access to the policy process.  As well as this, those 
that have this access will seek to maximise their opportunities whilst they are 
available (Pemberton and Goodwin: 2010).   
 
At the more local level, this notion is coupled with the ideas of Somerville and 
Haines’ work (2008) who identified a fallacy with the devolution of power, 
particularly with the contention that the citizenry holds more power than the state 
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itself.  They contended that, while the state would appear to present localities 
and other parties with power, the state would not undermine its own powerbase.  
Instead, where the state would relinquish power in one area, it would simply 
regain it, or acquire more power elsewhere.   
 
Despite the notion that the devolution of power does not significantly affect the 
state’s power base, there are nonetheless numerous benefits to those that are 
privileged by the state.  Goodwin et al (2006) note that any actor that is able to 
act with the state through these established relations can position themselves to 
maximise the opportunities and benefits they are likely to receive.  As a result 
any party that is capable of acting through, or with, the state stands to improve 
their capacity to act – and therefore deliver their policy objectives - compared to 
those which are not.  Furthermore, Healey (2006) notes a significant increase in 
the abilities of groups which are privileged by the state to decide what is in the 
public interest.   
 
This issue is reflected in several of the research questions, particularly those 
relating to the indicator/target selection aspect of the LAA and the extent to which 
locally identified indicator targets correspond to (or hinder) nationally set targets, 
as well as those set internally by an organisation.  Indeed, under the SRA, being 
a state approved actor should minimise the impact of locally-decided targets on 
the organisation’s internally set targets.  Consequently an examination of this can 
help to explore questions about whether organisations with strong internal 
agendas are privileged by the state thus granting them more freedom and power 
within the LAA process than those that are not. 
 
The notions of state privileging of particular parties and the power that they are 
subsequently granted to shape any agenda relates to a number of questions 
surrounding those that are both included and excluded by the LAA process.  In a 
move seen to add legitimacy to the governance process, the LAA involves 
several statutory partners comprising the major service delivery agents in an 
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area.  However, the SRA can aid in exploring questions about whether these 
actors are involved in legitimising a process of devolution to local areas, or 
alternatively whether the involvement of statutory partners represents an 
assertion of control by central government at the local level by ensuring an ‘on 
the ground’ representative.  In summary, the SRA would define the inclusion of 
the key partners as a move by the state in order to assert its power over the 
locality and take a direct role in shaping the agenda for LAAs.   
 
As well as the concept that the state privileges, or places at an advantage, 
certain parties through their inclusion, there is the possibility of the opposite 
effect occurring, whereby the lack of inclusion causes an agency or group to 
become disadvantaged.  This concept of disadvantaging can potentially relate to 
some of the issues raised around accountability, particularly the democratically 
elected representatives of local areas.  As chapter three outlined, the ability for 
elected members to be effective has the potential to be heavily influenced by the 
outcome of elections, but also by the extent to which local political makeup 
matches that of the state.  Consequently, there are issues about whether the 
state can theoretically unprivilege this group, thus limiting their involvement within 
a key local process and thus their ability to represent their electorate.  This 
stands at odds with two issues which are central to LAAs.  First, is the criticism 
that they are democratically unaccountable – owing to the large number of 
actors, but minimal involvement of elected representatives.  This stands against 
the fact that LAAs were designed as part of measures to improve local faith in 
public governance and consequently improve election turnout.  Consequently 
these two issues remain diametrically opposed. 
 
Goodwin et al (2006) further identify the usefulness of the SRA as a theoretical 
tool to analyse LAAs.  They state that the SRA ‘has the ability to reveal how the 
power of the social forces acting in, and through, the state, and their interplay 
with the state institutional form are dependent on sets of relations which are 
geographically constituted and contested’ (Goodwin et al: 2006, p983).   Indeed, 
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Jones (1997) takes this further, explicitly acknowledging the spatiality of state 
privileging, whereby as well as privileging specific agencies, the state also 
privileges specific spaces through its articulation of policy.  This could occur 
when a policy specifically or inadvertently favours one specific area over another.   
 
As signified throughout this discussion, the SRA provides an extremely useful 
and wide ranging theoretical concept which can assist in investigating a 
considerable number of the key research questions that have been identified in 
earlier chapters.  By doing this, the research can also help to fill a gap in the 
knowledge identified by Brenner, who points to the fact that, with few 
exceptions8, ‘references to the localities debates have been largely absent from 
contemporary discussions of state rescaling’ (Brenner: 2009, p131). 
 
Many of the issues raised through the SRA relate closely to issues around the 
LAA.  One of the central research questions is ‘who benefits from LAAs?’ -  
Approaching the issue from an SRA perspective can help to assess whether the 
LAA benefits the state and the agencies that operate on its behalf, or if the 
locality benefits in a true transition of power away from the state. 
 
Jones’ work, taken in consideration with that of Jessop, links closely with many of 
the research questions, particular around the national indicator data set, as well 
as the reorganisation of some aspects of local government.  The use of a set of 
national indicators could stand to benefit particular areas over others (through 
omission of indicators as much as inclusion).  As the NID focuses on particular 
policy issues, the indicators that areas can choose may be of greater relevance 
to certain areas, whereas other indicators may lack the ability to focus on issues 
that areas consider to be of importance.  As a result, the SRA can help to 
understand whether, by limiting choice, or predetermining outcomes, the scope 
of the NID can prevent a true reflection of a locality’s policy priorities, and thus 
privilege some areas over others.   
                                            
8
 Brenner points to the work of Kevin Cox, Mark Goodwin and Neil Smith 
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The SRA is also helpful in considering the 2009 reorganisation of local 
government, discussed in chapter three.  In particular, this can help with 
questions about whether the reorganisation actually benefited the areas it 
affected, or the partner agencies within it (e.g. by limiting the amount of 
bureaucracy they have to face).   
 
Although the SRA clearly has benefits for this research, it is also important also 
to be aware of its limitations.  Whilst identifying the gaps in knowledge discussed 
earlier, Brenner (2009) also strikes a note of caution, pointing to the Achilles Heel 
of using the SRA to analyse these issues.  He describes the danger of over-
generalisation in order to apply the SRA to a broad array of contexts, thus 
diluting the theory’s potency.  However, given that the SRA was initially 
conceived as a method of understanding British governance and the clearly 
identified trends towards central control discussed in chapters two and three, 
concept stretching should not form a major barrier here. 
 
4.2.1 The Strategic Relational Approach: A Complete Theoretical Fit? 
Although the SRA offers a lens through which to examine a significant number of 
research questions, both in terms of centre-local relations and how local actors 
interact in the governance of their area.  Much of this can help to pinpoint where 
power lies in this process and who benefits from it.  However, there are some 
gaps that would result in using the SRA. 
 
In particular, two aspects remain unclear.  The first relates to the nature of the 
LAA itself.  Whilst the SRA can help us to consider whether the LAA represents a 
form of privileging or state control, it does not offer any insights as to why the 
LAA might required to legitimise any actor i.e. why the state would have 
nominally lost control, and felt the need to assert itself. 
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Secondly, while the SRA can help to understand where power lies in local 
interactions, and who benefits from the LAA process, what it does not offer is an 
ability to analyse why partners act the way they do. 
 
Therefore, in order to fill these gaps, further theories are required which can help 
to analyse findings in relation to those areas. 
 
4.3 Regulation Theory 
Regulation theory focuses on the capitalist system, and particularly aims to 
understand how it maintains continued periods of stability ‘through a unique 
perspective on the relationship between the capitalist system and the structures 
within which it operates – i.e. society, government, institutions’ (Cocks: 2009, 
p457), thus intimating that economic growth and development are socially 
embedded. 
 
Goodwin and Painter (1996) discuss several key issues which are crucial to the 
understanding of regulation theory, the most important of which is the 
acceptance of the fact that most social systems are complex, dynamic and prone 
to contradictions.  As a result of these characteristics Goodwin and Painter 
surmise that there is a tendency towards what is known as ‘crisis’ as these social 
systems develop over time.  A crisis is defined as a moment of intense disruption 
within the system and can be classified into two main themes; a crisis in the 
system, where a particular aspect of the social system comes under threat, or a 
crisis of the system where the system in its entirety is in jeopardy (Goodwin and 
Painter 1996).  Consequently, to counter these tendencies toward crisis, 
regulation is introduced (see figure 4.1).  This regulation also serves to 
counteract some of the contradictions which may be prevalent, which can lead to 
crisis.  However, Goodwin and Painter (1995) note that this regulation is not seen 
as a permanent fix to inevitable crisis in the system, but merely a spatial or 
temporal fix, either averting the crisis for a period of time, or moving it to another 
place.  Then, over a period of time, the mode of regulation (MOR) that is 
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accepted becomes adopted as part of the system itself, and as such adopts the 
characteristics which make it predisposed to crisis.  As such the modes of 
regulation need to be constantly updated so as to avert crisis in the social 
sphere. 
 
Figure 4.1 - Modes of Regulation 
  
(From Goodwin and Painter: 1996, p.639) 
 
Regulation Theory presents a useful theoretical consideration for the analysis of 
research questions around LAAs.  In particular, this is because Painter and 
Goodwin describe local government (and by extension the tools of local public 
service delivery such as the LAA) as both ‘a target for, and an agent of’, 
regulation.  The State’s role in setting policy (or establishing modes of regulation) 
which directly affects economic growth/accumulation makes it a key agent of 
regulation.  Similarly the actors at a local governance level represent the 
instigators of modes of regulation at their own local level, whilst often working in 
tandem with modes of regulation set in place by the state.   
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The relationship between these two scales of governance, and in particular how 
the state sets up modes of regulation with consideration for those that must 
implement it, reflect some of the central-local relation themes raised throughout 
chapters two and three.  Regulation theory can help to explore some of the 
themes of centralisation and the extent to which governance in England remains 
centralised.   
 
Cocks (2009) argues that the post-fordist economic environment, which required 
constant regulation fixes accounts for the start of a period of reduction in the 
activity of state actors and the subsequent rise in multi-actor policy environments.  
In this light, regulation theory could be especially useful to explore themes 
around the extent to which the central state regulates the activities of local areas 
through policy prescriptions – i.e. partnership working and the LAA - whilst also 
considering the extent to which local areas, and the actors operating within them 
are able to enact policies which meet their ambitions for their area.   
 
However, given that regulation theory largely relates to economic development, 
care would have to be taken when considering how the theory is applied to social 
fields, which may be less responsive to ‘market forces’.  As such, regulation 
theory could be used to pose and answer questions about whether Local Area 
Agreements represent either a part of the system which needs to be regulated, or 
are an act of regulation in, and of, themselves.   
 
4.4 Urban Regime Theory 
The concept of Urban Regime Theory was introduced as a means of analysing 
how power and governance roles are affected in a multi-actor policy environment 
(Stone: 1989).  At its heart, an ‘urban regime’ is the organisation or coalition that 
is formed between local government and private organisations in order to govern 
their local area and provide co-ordination, so that their area can take action 
against the issues it faces.  Stoker and Mossberger (2000) note that within a 
modern governance environment the formation of an urban regime becomes 
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essential, owing to the fact that individual actors now occupy different key 
aspects of governance.  This can take the form of providing the legitimacy of the 
state or the financing and job creation of private enterprise.  Stone (1989) 
continues to define an urban regime as ‘an informal yet inherently stable group 
with access to institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role in 
making governance decisions’ (Stone, 1989, p4) indicating that, particularly in a 
UK environment, given its high degree of centralisation, any urban regime needs 
the endorsement of the state and its apparatus in order to operate.  
 
There are two key barriers preventing LAAs accurately and fully meeting Stone’s 
criteria of an urban regime.  The first is the notion of an urban regime being an 
informal relationship.  Defining what is meant by an informal relationship is not 
straightforward, but it is envisaged that this would be represented by participants 
taking part in a voluntary fashion.  Of course, as chapter three has illustrated, the 
LAA should be seen as more than just informal ties.  Indeed, the LAA clearly 
represents a formal set of ties between its constituent partners and much is 
made of the fact that the LAA represents a three year ‘contract’9 (a word, which 
in itself explicitly implies formality) between central and local government.  Thus, 
the extent to which LSPs (as the governance mechanism for the LAA) meet the 
criteria of being an urban regime is debatable.  In turn, such discussions could 
cast doubts about how appropriate the Urban Regime Theory concept is to 
analyse the research questions.   
 
Similarly, policy guidance relating to statutory partners placed a significant 
emphasis on the duty to co-operate with the LAA and its stated goals, but placed 
an equal emphasis on the duty of the LAA, as the lead partner, to consider all 
other parties commitments i.e. internal policy documents and statutory duties.  
Whilst this illustrates how local government can, and does, work with a host of 
other actors in order to realise objectives relating to an area (thus partly 
                                            
9
 The nature of this contract is questionable, however, given the ambiguity of accountability 
measures against non delivery, as discussed in Chapter Two. 
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satisfying the criteria for a regime), these imposed formal structures do not 
comply with Stone’s original theory.  As such, these measures demonstrate how 
LAAs may be considered unrepresentative of an informal relationship. 
 
The other significant potential element of incompatibility between Urban Regimes 
and LAAs revolves around the element of stability.  Stone (1989) describes 
stability in relation to an urban regime as the ability to span a number of 
administrations10.  This is primarily intended to describe local administrations and 
the change in local council priorities which can arise with a change in political 
control.  This could be further expanded in order to consider the impact of central 
government.  As chapter two has demonstrated, the central state can have a 
significant impact on the policy agendas and financing of projects at the local 
level, frequently changing the nature of the policy environment in which localities 
must operate, and the actors that take prominence within that environment.   
 
To this end, questions remained as to the extent to which LAAs were a stable 
entity and as such, any consideration as to whether the LSP and LAA constituted 
a stable regime could only be made with time.  Indeed, this moment came with 
the 2010 general election, which saw administration change and the consequent 
scrapping and replacing of LAAs with a new regime system.  As such the 
LSP/LAA did prove to be unstable.  However this may prove useful, as when 
there is a change in governance structures, another theoretical construct will be 
needed, given Orr and Stoker’s (1994) concession that there is a gap in the 
theory making it difficult to analyse regime change. 
 
Despite these challenges, the Urban Regime model offers some interesting 
insights into the consideration of LAAs.  In particular, two concepts around power 
and partner goals are helpful.  The first concept focuses on the power that is held 
by the urban regime.  Stone (1989) notes that theories about power often refer to 
the power of ‘control’, whereby a powerful actor can set the agenda and 
                                            
10
 In the American usage of the word. I.e. Terms of office. 
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consequently control the actions of others.  However, in the urban regime model, 
Stone notes that the goal of an urban regime is not to accumulate power but to 
‘act’ in pursuit of an identified goal.  In this sense the urban regime ultimately 
seeks to become autonomous, with its own capacity to identify the issues which 
affect it.  This is reflected in LAAs, which identified issues of importance to local 
areas and acted upon them.  Nonetheless, despite the regimes not seeking out 
this power, by attaining this ability to act within their own capacity they would thus 
gain many characteristics commonly found in the state apparatus – most notably 
the ability to confer advantages or disadvantages upon those that they worked 
with – thus presenting a new set of challenges for the localities to deal with. 
 
The second interesting concept raised by Stone is one of perspective changing.  
Stone notes that over a period of time, participating within an urban regime may 
slowly change a partner’s perspective on a number of issues as they become 
aware of a wider consideration of other members, but also the implications of any 
action upon those actors.  Through their efforts to deliver the targets of the LAA, 
the extent to which this premise was reflected in the policy reality was one that 
was worthy of exploration.   
 
Beyond these considerations, there is also a major barrier within the urban 
regime literature that could prevent it being used as an appropriate theoretical 
concept with which to analyse LAAs.  It is acknowledged by Stoker and 
Mossberger (2001) that the urban regime model is not readily applicable to other 
case studies outside of United States context in which it was originally designed.  
In particular, transferring the urban regime model to a UK context would require 
the acknowledgement of the differing governance environment that characterises 
the UK.  Differing from the centralisation that is a principal theme of UK service 
delivery, US cities have a high degree of autonomy from the state including 
policy direction and funding to a degree not experienced in the UK.  Therefore, to 
analyse LAAs through the urban regime concept would require a keen 
awareness of ‘concept stretching’ (Sartori, 1970) whereby the model is taken 
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outside of its original American context, and used to analyse a different system.  
Whilst this might not undermine the use of urban regime theory as a concept, an 
awareness of limits to its transferability is essential. 
 
4.5 Multi-Level Governance 
The complex policy environment that has developed in post-war Britain has many 
actors which operate at a multitude of levels.  The state still retains a traditional 
and central role in proceedings (arguably strengthening this role over time: see 
chapter two), with the locality also retaining its role.  Between these two levels 
there exists an intermediary level of governance, with several institutions of 
regional governance being developed in England since 199411.  Above the nation 
state, however, is a new powerful actor: the supra-national organisation, for 
example the EU.  Pierre and Peters (2000) rationalise the implications of this 
developing policy environment through their concept of Multi-Level Governance. 
 
Pierre and Peters premise their theory on the basis of an evolving central state.  
They contend that the state retains some of its unique power bases, particularly 
the regulation of physical activity within its boundaries, e.g. the planning system.  
However, despite the retention of control over these activities, the state becomes 
more reliant on other organisations and actors to fulfil its role.  This could be 
because it lacks the resources, lacks legitimacy (or is contested), or due to the 
fact it now operates in an environment, it cannot govern alone.  The move away 
from total central control over public services, beginning in the mid 1970s, as 
outlined in chapter two, is a contributing factor to this effect.   
 
This challenge to the state’s role is where the multi-level governance model can 
potentially be of use in analysing LAAs.  Its usefulness has already been 
demonstrated to some extent, with Wilson’s (2003) utilisation of the Multi-Level 
Governance theory as a lens through which to examine the LGMA.  This work 
                                            
11
 i.e. Regional Development Agencies, Regional Assemblies and Government Office For the 
Regions 
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discovered that the policy reality more closely resembled multi-level dialogue, 
rather than multi-level governance, with the amount of discussion between levels 
increasing, but with little change to the practical governance mechanisms. 
 
The application of multi-level governance to LAAs could be seen as a 
continuation of this work.  The LAA, involving a range of actors, including those 
operating outside of the control of the state, signifies that the state acting alone 
(and through its dictation of policy via local government) is no longer strong 
enough to deliver public services.   
 
The LAA process represented the latest of many policy initiatives brought forward 
which are specifically aimed at improving accountability and the feeling that local 
citizens have a voice in issues that affect them.  This leads to questions about 
whether LAAs are simply indicative of a weakened state seeking to increase (or 
reassert) its legitimacy in a increasingly diluted policy environment, or, reflecting 
the Strategic Relational Approach, to be discussed later in the chapter, which 
suggests that this process actually represents a consolidation of power on behalf 
of the state, rather than a weakening of state legitimacy. 
 
The Multi-Level Governance (MLG) approach only partly assists with the analysis 
of the research questions raised around LAAs.  This theoretical model could 
provide a broad platform for looking at the governance interactions between 
agencies of different levels.  In particular this could be used to analyse the role 
that the region plays in negotiating with local areas.  This could also be 
considered in light of Goodwin et al (2006), who note that representatives from 
GOR owe their allegiance to the state rather than the localities.  The MLG model 
could be useful in analysing this notion to assess the role that the state does play 
in the LAA process, and the extent to which individual localities and their LAA are 
fairly represented at the negotiation state.  Furthermore, MLG could be used to 
discuss questions about the involvement of partners that are sanctioned by the 
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state, although, as will be shown later, there are other, stronger theoretical 
concepts which can be used to explore this issue. 
 
4.6 New Institutionalism / Path Dependency 
So far, the theory has principally focused on analysis of the vertical aspects of 
governance.  Whilst these theories do offer opportunities to discuss the aspects 
of the horizontal governance raised through the research questions – in particular 
the interactions of individual actors – some further theoretical considerations are 
required to allow us to better understand this. 
 
The concept of institutionalism and path dependency offer some insights about 
local actors and their interactions with each other.  March and Olsen (1984) note 
that, over time, the various social, political and economic institutions have grown 
in size and evolved into formal organisations occupying a dominant role.  This 
increase in the institution’s formality and subsequent involvement in the workings 
of local public service delivery, has been identified as a continued attempt by 
central governments to add legitimacy to the process by involving experts (Meyer 
and Rowan: 1977).  Edelman (1964) also indicates that, further to adding 
legitimacy to the process, the addition/inclusion of popular symbols of the public 
sector (i.e. health professionals, fire and rescue service) with potentially 
unpopular policy decisions can help to mitigate negative reaction amongst the 
public. 
 
Whilst this may help to understand why the various institutions are included 
within the process, many of the research questions focus on their interactions 
with other institutions and the LAA itself.  To help explain this, the central 
principles of new institutionalism argue that these institutions, given their 
increasing legitimacy, must then seek to maintain this legitimacy through their 
actions.  These attempts to maintain legitimacy may help to account for the 
actions of the ‘stronger actors’ within the LAA process, particularly in any 
situation where they would be seen to dominate indicator selection.  It can also 
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help to understand how the relationship between internal and external 
organisational policy priorities plays out in practice. 
 
The notion of path dependency, in turn, contends that a changing policy 
environment may not lead to these institutions changing their modes of working – 
instead preferring to maintain existing methods.  This is because, as Powell 
notes; “common procedures … may be maintained, even in the face of 
considerable evidence that they are suboptimal, because the benefits associated 
with familiarity may easily outweigh the gains associated with flexibility” (Powell: 
1991, p192).  As well as maintaining older methods of working due to familiarity, 
Powell also suggests that this reticence to change working methods may arise 
due to the legitimisation that comes from repeated institutional patterns of 
working (Powell: 1991).  Path dependency, therefore, may also shed light on the 
actions of actors at the local level.  In particular this can focus on how partners 
altered their existing working practices in order better to cooperate with the 
requirements of the LAA.  This can also help in understanding the internal 
accountability structures of partners, which may be subject to a similar 
traditionalist view. 
 
4.7 Constructing a Conceptual Framework  
As this chapter has illustrated, there are several key theories which have some 
application to the research questions identified in chapter three, though it has to 
be recognised that many of them do not offer a full and comprehensive coverage 
of the research questions.  Indeed, many of the theories and concepts outlined 
only cater to a small segment of the questions, reflecting the fact that these 
theories are very focused on specific aspects of governance.  As such, while 
many of the theories offer useful insights, and can be drawn upon briefly 
throughout the rest of the thesis, they will not form the main thrust of the 
conceptual framework.   
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However, there are a number of theories which can help to analyse the research 
findings in more detail.  Drawing upon these theories – and utilising some of the 
smaller, more focused theories where appropriate - it is possible to produce a 
conceptual framework for the research (Figure 4.2). 
 
 
Figure 4.2 - A Conceptual Framework for the Thesis 
 
Vertical Governance Horizontal 
Governance 
Improving Public Service Delivery 
Literature Review Leading to Research 
Questions Around: 
Research objective: To analyse Local Area Agreements as a 
tool to deliver effective local public services 
Theories that help to understand those research questions 
This will draw upon the theories utilised to assess aspects of 
vertical and horizontal governance 
- Strategic Relational 
Approach 
- Regulation Theory 
- Strategic Relational 
Approach 
- New Institutionalism / 
Path Dependency 
 
Data collection methods that help to explore this conceptualisation 
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In particular, of all the theories that have been discussed, there is one which 
appears to cover the broadest number of research questions.  That is the 
strategic relational approach (SRA), outlined by Jessop (1990). This outlook 
presents the widest framework with which to analyse all of the themes raised 
through the research questions.  Indeed, it allows for the investigation of themes 
around governance and accountability, specifically by framing them in terms of 
the relationship between the state and local areas.  By doing this, questions can 
be used to investigate who benefits from such interactions and the wider reasons 
why these interactions take place. 
 
Beyond this, Regulation Theory allows for the analysis of centre-local relations 
and the extent to which the LAA represents a mode of regulation, so as to 
maintain economic growth.  New Institutionalism and Path Dependency is 
particularly helpful in analysing the questions focusing on local actor relations.  
This can assist in analysing the way that actors at the local scale act the way that 
they do, and the extent to which the institutions to which they belong influence 
these actions. 
 
Therefore, results in the chapter relating to vertical governance will be analysed 
in the context of the SRA and Regulation Theory.  In the results chapter which 
discusses horizontal governance, findings will be analysed within the context of 
the SRA and New Institutionalism/Path Dependency. 
 
4.8 Next Chapter: 
Now that the theoretical concepts have been outlined as a way of analysing the 
research questions, the next stage of the thesis will involve outlining the 
methodological considerations of the research.  The following chapter will 
consider the conceptual framework and questions raised throughout chapter four 
in order to identify an appropriate model for selecting case studies and 
participants to be contacted, so as to provide the best possible data with which to 
consider these questions in more detail. 
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Chapter Five – Methodological Considerations and Case Study 
Selection  
So far, chapter two has focussed on the changing nature of the delivery of local 
public services in England, before moving on to a detailed discussion of LAA 
policy in chapter three.  From this discussion a number of research questions 
were identified, focusing on two main aspects – vertical governance (i.e. the 
relationship between the central state and the locality) and horizontal governance 
(i.e. the relationship between the actors at the local level).  Following this, 
different theoretical avenues were investigated in chapter four to help 
conceptualise the research.  This focused on several theories, dealing with the 
concepts of governance, central-local relations and actor relationships.  Now, the 
research moves on to consider what sort of methodology is best suited to explore 
these themes in practice.   
 
The chapter is split into two main stages.  In the first of these, the methods for a 
national overview survey of LAA practitioners are outlined.  The aim of this 
process was to help inform the case study selection process, by providing 
national data, which could indicate issues or non issues around particular 
research questions.  Although, as will be discussed in the chapter, limits were 
placed on the case study ‘catchment area’ owing to how the research was 
funded, the aim was to be able to select case studies through an evidence based 
approach. 
 
Therefore, given that case study selection was heavily influenced by the national 
overview survey it is not possible to explain their selection without first discussing 
the results of the overview survey.  Therefore, there will be an analysis of the 
overview findings before outlining the case study areas, the rationale for their 




5.1 Stage One: National Overview Survey  
Chapters two and three identified a series of key themes that reflect the core 
issues in LAA implementation, while chapter four went on to identify a conceptual 
framework that can be used to analyse these questions.  In order to study these 
questions in more detail, a set of case studies exemplifying the issues at hand 
would be required.  This detailed exploration would then allow for broader 
reflections to be made around LAA delivery (Stake: 2000).   
 
However, in order to reach that point it is essential that any case study selection 
is carefully justified. This was assisted by carrying out a national overview of all 
LAAs in England.  This has several benefits.  Whilst selecting areas for detailed 
study, this process also grants the opportunity for an initial exploration of some of 
the research questions.  This would raise the possibility that some questions, 
whilst occurring in the literature review, may not turn out to be relevant to the 
practice of LAAs and thus, do not need to be taken further.  Conversely, this 
could highlight issues which warrant further investigation.  Therefore this process 
also serves as a way to further strengthen the case study work itself.      
 
5.2 Method for the National Overview 
In order to be effective, the national overview had to accurately and adequately 
reflect the experience of 152 LAA managers.  This required very careful 
consideration as to the survey’s composition.  To best reflect this, and to assist 
the further refining the research questions in a way that also ensured a sound 
basis for selecting the case studies, the method that was selected for the national 
overview was a questionnaire survey.   
 
There are several reasons why this method was the most appropriate.  
Importantly, the emphasis at this point was to encourage a high response rate, 
so as to obtain a clearer idea of how issues around LAA implementation and their 
governance were viewed at a broader scale.  Simply put, the more responses 
that were received the more reflective the findings emerging from them would be, 
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and in turn, the better the case study selections would be in their ability to 
explore these issues in more detail.  Therefore, rather than approaching only a 
small sample, in Winter 2009/10 the study approached all 152 unitary or upper-
tier local authorities (100% of the population) (Krausz and Miller: 1974).   
 
To maximise response rate, several issues were considered within the national 
overview.  The first was the length and composition of the survey itself.  The 
survey included only 10-15 questions, reflecting the broad topic areas identified 
as being important throughout the first three chapters.  This was coupled with the 
fact that a majority of these questions were to be closed answer style utilising the 
Likert scale12.  This served two purposes.  Firstly, this question style makes data 
analysis significantly simpler, thus making it easier to identify patterns in the data 
that may not readily emerge in a qualitative answer (ibid). Secondly, this 
approach should minimise the response time for the survey by reducing the need 
for participants to provide protracted qualitative answers.   
 
There were two methods of delivery of this survey that could be utilised: postal 
and online.  Ultimately, it was perceived that conducting the national overview in 
an online format would be the best course of action for two main reasons – time 
and response rate.  Firstly, the act of sending data would be quicker, with the 
ability to email each respondent individually.  Secondly, the use of an online data 
collection strategy would present significant efficiency savings, both in collating, 
and subsequently analysing the data in order to draw meaningful conclusions. 
 
After setting up a pilot interview with a LAA co-ordinator to consider which data 
collection method they would be most likely to respond to, the online method was 
shown to be popular, especially in terms of ensuring a high response rate.  One 
of the principal reasons for this was the ease of reply, which broadly reflects the 
concerns about timeframe discussed earlier. 
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The process of identifying and contacting the managers for the 152 LAAs was 
done utilising a list of such people complied by IDEA13 complemented by online 
research where the list was not up to date. 
 
5.3 The Focus of the Survey 
The survey itself was designed in order to focus on six main areas of interest, 
drawing upon the issues raised in chapters two, three and four. 
 
Phasing & Guidance: As LAAs were implemented in several phases, there were 
questions as to how this phasing affected each area’s ability to sign off and 
deliver upon an LAA.  Therefore questions in this section were designed in order 
to identify any patterns in how phasing affected a number of issues, particularly 
focusing on guidance from CLG and how this had changed. 
 
Beyond this, the overview sought to ask questions about the nature of the 
guidance itself.  This focused on how clear the guidance was, as well as 
identifying any gaps or flaws that arose.  It also questioned each locality manager 
on the extent to which the guidance from CLG allowed them to develop and 
focus upon issues which affected their individual area. 
 
Government Office for the Regions: As the representative of Central Government 
in negotiating and signing off LAAs, GOR had the potential to play a key role in 
defining the focus of any particular LAA.  Consequently, several key themes 
emerged.  Firstly, there was an exploration of how the experience of negotiating 
the LAA indicators varied across the UK regions, both to see if any particular 
region had a strong overall relationship and vice versa.  Consequently, the case 
studies could then focus on why this might be the case.  Similarly the same data 
was analysed on an intra-regional basis, to investigate the extent to which each 
GOR dealt with individual LAAs within its boundary.  This was also of interest, as 
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 available online until the abolition of LAA’s in 2010 
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detailed case studies could be selected which could allow for any differences to 
be explored. 
 
Districts and Counties: The next section of the national overview focused 
exclusively on those areas operating a two-tier district and county model.  This 
was in order to ascertain whether converting multiple SCSs – each focusing on 
an individual district’s concerns - into one county-wide LAA was an issue in 
practice.  To this end, the questions focused on the extent to which an LAA 
balanced district concerns against each other, before moving on to ask if any 
district carried any more influence in the negotiation process or not.  Any findings 
in this section were intended to assist in making the case for the 
inclusion/exclusion of a district and county model local authority area in the case 
study selection. 
 
Elected Representatives: The role of elected representatives in the LAA process 
and their accountability was also felt to be something that could influence LAA 
implementation.  In particular these concerns related to whether elected 
representatives were helpful or not in their conduct and the impact of party 
politics.  To this end, results were analysed in the context of how the council was 
comprised at the time of the survey.  This also allowed for a consideration of how 
a contrast between local political composition and the governing Labour 
administration in Whitehall may have lead to difficulties in delivering an LAA. 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses: This section of the survey sought to obtain a more 
general perspective on how LAA managers perceived the LAA.  This process 
identified some of the core features of LAA practice and asked practitioners to 
identify them as either a strength or weakness.   Then, each respondent was 
asked to rank, in order of importance, the three factors that they believed were 
most important to the effective delivery of an LAA.   
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Improving Practice: The final section tied in closely with the strengths and 
weaknesses segment but provided a more qualitative element, inviting LAA 
practitioners to share their thoughts on how they believed LAA practice could be 
improved. 
 
Reflecting these six themes the National Overview survey set out a total of 15 
questions (Table 5.1).   
 
Table 5.1 - National Overview Survey Questions 
1. In your opinion, how clear was the guidance from CLG?  
(Central Government) when you were producing your LAA? (Clear, Adequate, 
Unclear) 
2. What aspects of this guidance were a) helpful; b) unhelpful; c) absent?  
(Overview of Expectation, Stakeholder Involvement, Themes, Indicator 
Selection, Negotiation and Signing Off) 
3. In your opinion, how relevant to you feel the national indicators are in 
allowing your LAA to address the issues facing your area, within the four 
main policy blocks?  
(Relevant, Irrelevant) 
4. Of the areas where you have developed local indicators, what emphasis 
were they given compared to the national indicators set by your LAA?  
(More Emphasis, The Same, Less Emphasis) 
5. How would you rate your experience with Regional Government Office when 
negotiating the indicators for your LAA?  
(Good, Adequate, Poor) 
6. In your opinion, to what extent did the Regional Government Office balance 
issues specific to your area, compared to national policy priorities when 
negotiating your LAA?  
(High, Moderate, Low) 
7. To what extent were the priorities detailed within each Sustainable 
Community Strategy presented at a district level reflected in the overall LAA?  
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(High, Moderate, Low) 
8. Did any district(s) carry more influence than others during the LAA production 
process?  
(Yes, No) 
9. If you answered ‘Yes’ to the previous question, what was the reason for this? 
(Funding, Selection of Indicators, Size of Population, Negotiation Experience, 
Other (please specify)) 
10. Overall, to what extent are elected local members involved in the LAA 
process in your area?  
(Very Involved, Moderately Involved, Minimally Involved, Not Involved) 
11. In your opinion, to what extent do you feel the involvement of elected officials 
has helped or hindered the LAA process?  
(Helped, No Difference, Hindered) 
12. Based on your experiences, what do you feel are the overall strengths and 
weaknesses of LAAs?   
(Scope of the National Indicators, Three year timeframe of the LAA, 
Involvement of Statutory Partners, Local Authority as Lead Partner, 
Negotiation and Signing off with Regional Government Office) 
13. In order of priority, what do you feel are the three most important 
requirements for the successful implementation of an LAA? 
 (Clear Guidance, Relationship with Central Government, Relationship with 
Regional Government, Relationship with Local Authority, Good relations with 
partners, effective community engagement, active partner agencies, local 
politics, other (please specify)) 
14. In your opinion, how could future LAA practice be improved?  
15. Comments 
 
Upon the completion of the overview, the findings were analysed and used to 
help inform case study selection.  This was done in conjunction with several 
other data sources, including economic statistics.  The process of selecting the 
case study areas is outlined later in this chapter. 
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5.4 National Overview Results 
The overview survey was first sent out to all 152 LAAs in the UK in November 
2009, with a second round ‘follow up’ conducted in March 2010.  Overall, 73 
LAAs responded, providing 60 individual sets of useable data.  This represented 
39.5% of the total LAA population (Table 5.2). 
 







Round One 60 50 32.9% 
Round Two 13 10 6.6% 
Total 73 60 39.5% 
 
A minority of participants failed to provide useable data due to a failure to 
complete the survey beyond the initial identifiers.  The reasons for this are varied 
and subject to some degree of speculation.  Within the survey itself, there are 
also instances where respondents failed to register an answer for a particular 
question, while still completing the survey.  This results in fluctuations in the total 
responses to each question (in the range of 1-2 responses per question), but still 
allows for patterns to be identified.  Overall, the response rate was very positive, 
providing a representative and useful sample with which to explore the issues 
identified earlier.   
 
Coupled with the response rate, the geographical spread of responses was also 
very positive (Figure 5.1), with numerous responses from within each GOR and 
each of the models of local government structure.  Therefore, this geographical 
spread allowed for a good consideration of national issues, covering all the 
contexts within which an LAA could be placed that were of concern to the 
research.   
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When asked about the clarity of guidance received from central government 
when producing the LAA, the respondents were generally positive.  The majority 
of respondents (57%) described the guidance as ‘adequate’ with another 32% 
describing the guidance as ‘clear’.  Only 11% of respondents described the 
guidance as ‘unclear’.  The fact that 89% of respondents described the guidance 
as being at least adequate to do the job indicates that the quality of the guidance 
was not a significant dividing issue in influencing LAA production. 
 
Although respondents were largely positive about the helpfulness of the 
individual aspects of the guidance, when asked, responses around the guidance 
for indicator selection showed that over a third (34%) of respondents found the 
guidance unhelpful.  This gave a first indication that indicators may require 
deeper exploration in the case studies. 
 
When asked about the relevance of the NID in allowing local areas to address 
the specific issues facing their area, once again the respondents were largely 
positive.  However, when discussing the ‘Economic Development and Enterprise’ 
policy block, some 33% (20) of respondents described the indicators under this 
theme as irrelevant.  This indicated a degree of unease with the NID and 
strengthened the case for further detailed questions surrounding the ability of the 
NID to effectively relate to an area’s individual needs. 
 
5.4.2 Government Office for the Regions 
When asked about their experience with GOR when negotiating the indicators for 
their LAA, a majority of respondents (62% /38) described the relationship as 
‘good’ with a further 31% (19) of respondents describing the experience as 
‘adequate’.  This data, when discussed in isolation, presents a case illustrating 
that GOR has had a positive influence in the eyes of the localities.  However, if 
the results are mapped (Figure 5.2), a different pattern begins to emerge. 
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Figure 5.2 - What was your experience when dealing with GOR? 
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When these results were considered at a regional scale, although no single GOR 
emerged as being either particularly good or bad, some regions had a higher 
concentration of ‘good’ responses than the others (particularly the North East), 
whereas some had higher concentrations of ‘adequate’ (West Midlands).  This 
provides some indication of the variation across the different regions, although 
the trends were not particularly compelling and so represented a weaker case for 
influencing case study selection. 
 
However, when the data was analysed intra-regionally, a stronger trend emerged 
which significantly influenced case study selection.  When the responses were 
analysed to focus within any particular GOR they clearly demonstrated that there 
was some consistency in the responses within each region, with no one GOR 
area recording a uniform response to LAA manager impressions.  Most tellingly 
of all, four GORs (London, North West, South East and West Midlands) each 
reported the full range of responses i.e. poor, adequate and good.  This 
illustrated that there was an inconsistency with individual GORs and how they 
worked with their constituent LAA areas.  Whilst this could be reflective of the 
approach taken by GOR locality managers, this could also be indicative of the 
way various LAA managers received GOR representatives.  
 
Nonetheless, this was one of the most striking results to emerge from the 
overview.  The fact that within one GOR there could be such a wide disparity in 
satisfaction, suggests that the system was not working as intended.  Therefore, 
this became one of the strongest criteria for case study selection, in order that 
this finding could be explored in more detail within one of these regions. 
 
When asked about the extent to which GOR balanced issues of local specificity 
against those relating to national policy agendas, similar trends emerged.  The 
most popular answer was “moderate’ amassing 61% (37) of responses.  With 
‘high’ consideration gaining 28% (17) of responses, this meant that 87.5% of 
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respondents broadly felt they were able to balance local and national policy 
priorities through their LAA.   
 
However, as with the previous question, when this data is mapped and analysed 
by region, a similar trend emerges (Figure 5.3).  A ‘Low’ consideration of local 
issues amassed the fewest responses with just 11% (7) of replies, however these 
responses were given in areas (North West, West Midlands and London) where 
LAA managers provided the full range of responses in the consideration they felt 
was provided to them by GOR.  This again illustrates a clear case for 
investigating GORs on an intra-regional basis to explore why these disparities 
occur. 
 
The responses around GOR indicated several findings which warranted further 
investigation through case study.  This expressly drew attention to the intra-
regional responses. Therefore, case studies that allowed for a deeper 
investigation and understanding of the role of GOR in the LAA process were 
desirable.  Within this consideration, a case study which allowed for further 
exploration as to the limits of GOR flexibility with regards to national policy 









5.4.3 Elected Representatives 
In order to better understand how elected representatives affected LAA delivery, 
the responses were analysed to ascertain the extent to which a link existed 
between the level of political involvement and the extent to which this was 



























Figure 5.4 - Graph demonstrating the Link between Level of Involvement 
and effect on the LAA Process 
  
This analysis demonstrated a link between the high involvement of elected 
representatives and their perceived help to the LAA process, with all the 
respondents that noted that their elected members were ‘very involved’ going on 
to cite them as a help.  Furthermore, as the level of involvement decreased, the 
likelihood of representatives being seen as making no difference or even 
becoming a hindrance increased.  While it might be expected that a pattern of 
less involvement and less help would arise, the logical next step was to analyse 
the instances in which this occurred, in order to see whether these issues could 
be explored through case study.  To do this, the extent to which elected 
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members were perceived to have helped was analysed against the political party 











Conservative Labour Lib Dem NOC
Percentage
Political Party





Figure 5.5 - Impact on the LAA process by political party 
 
Interestingly, this demonstrated that there was no compelling link between the 
three main political parties and the extent to which they were perceived to help, 
with all three scoring similar results.  This refuted the notion that party-politics 
would have an adverse impact on the LAA (and its governance).  However, the 
analysis demonstrated that areas which were of ‘No Overall Control’ were 
significantly more likely to report their elected representatives making no 
difference, or to be of hindrance, than any area with outright political control.  
Therefore, the issue of interest here was not about party politics, but how political 
instability could hinder the LAA process.  Consequently, this was to be reflected 
in case study selection by seeking an area (of any political control) which viewed 
elected representatives as helpful, and contrasting this with an area of NOC 
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which had reported a hindrance.  Any subsequent examination would then 
explore the reasons why LAA managers might have provided these results. 
 
5.4.4 Two Tier Authorities 
Given that this section was intended exclusively for those LAAs operating in a 
‘county and district’ model of local government, the were less responses than for 
the other questions – though responses still covered four of the eight areas that 
experienced reorganisation in 2009.  Despite this, the answers still show some 
illuminating patterns, which significantly affect the case study selection. 
 
When asked about the extent to which the county LAA balanced the needs and 
recommendations of each district’s SCS (compared to other districts in the 
county) only one respondent said that their area was given a ‘low’ consideration 
– all others reported moderate (12) or high (7) consideration.   
 
Developing this further, the respondents were then asked whether – in their view 
- individual districts carried more influence over others when the LAA indicators 
were being agreed.  Overwhelmingly, 75% (15) of respondents answered ‘no,’ 
illustrating that the LAAs did broadly attempt to provide a balanced programme 
that reflected the wider needs of the county, as opposed to individual areas.  
There were a small number (5 areas) that felt individual areas were given more 
influence and priority over indicator selection and LAA priorities. When asked 
why, responses focused on one area’s improved ability to negotiate on its own 
behalf, whilst another district provided members of the negotiation team when the 
county LAA was being agreed with GOR (indicating once again the importance of 
the GOR in negotiation).   The final response noted that one area was granted 
more leeway due to the ‘scale of problems’ that it faced compared to other 
districts. 
 
Overall, this section demonstrated that, compared to other issues to emerge from 
the overview, the role of two-tier government did not appear to have a major 
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effect on the practice of LAA implementation.  Consequently, this theme would 
not play a decisive role in case study selection. 
 
5.4.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of LAAs 
When asked to identify which aspects of LAA practice they regarded as a 
strength or weakness, the respondents were clear.  They were polled on 6 key 
areas of LAA practice; 
 
- Scope of the National Indicator Dataset 
- Targets 
- Timeframe 
- Involvement of Statutory Partners 
- LA as lead partner 
- The Role of the GOR 
 
The final five categories were all described as a strength with, in each instance, 
well over two-thirds of respondents affirming this to be the case.  In the case of 
the involvement of statutory partners, it was universally described as a strength.  
However, despite the majority of the results in this section being overwhelmingly 
positive, the respondents did identify one significant weakness: national 
indicators.  By noting the NID as a weakness (63% / 35), respondents confirmed 
many of the concerns raised in chapter three about the ability of the LAA to focus 
on issues of relevance to their area.  Consequently a deeper exploration of why 
this was the case went on to form a central aspect of detailed questions utilised 
in the case studies. 
 
5.4.6 Most Important Requirements 
When asked what they believed was the most important requirement for the 
successful implementation of the LAA, the respondents were clear.  Having good 
relations with partner agencies was ranked as the top factor for success by half 
of those responding to the survey (30), coupled with a further 14 and 5 
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respondents that ranked it second and third respectively.  This meant that 49 of 
the 60 respondents to this question considered good partner relations to be a key 
requirement for an LAA. 
 
The importance of partnership is illustrated further with ‘active partner agencies’ 
scoring the second highest number of first priorities (17 respondents) and the 
second highest overall (40 respondents ranking it first, second or third).   
 
These two results combined confirm the importance of engaged partner agencies 
to the success of the LAA, and provide a clear justification for a further 
exploration of this theme within the case study.  This can help to better 
understand how the partners do work together and the implications of a failure to 
engage, as identified in chapter three.  
 
The final key result to emerge from this was the importance of having a good 
relationship with the higher tiers of government.  Having a good relationship with 
GOR scored 21 votes.  However when the relationship with central government - 
whom GOR represent and whom have little direct say in individual LAAs – is 
taken into account, this rises to 31 responses.  This indicates a potential 
conflation of the vertical governance and accountability structures of the LAA, but 
nonetheless shows the importance those managing LAAs place on fostering 
relationships beyond their boundaries.  However, it is interesting that many LAA 
managers believe that a relationship with central government is important, 
considering that central government has minimal direct influence on how LAAs 
were agreed and implemented.  This further highlights the key relationship that 
exists between the state and local areas and the impact that this can have on 
local public service delivery. 
  
After summarising some of the key findings to emerge from the national overview 
survey, the thesis will now move to consider the selection of detailed case 
studies, which can help to explore some of these findings at the local scale. 
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5.5 Stage Two: Methodology for the Case Study Selection and Investigation 
The second phase of the methodological considerations focuses on the case 
study selections which can assist in the detailed exploration of the research 
questions.  
  
Although the national overview survey is substantial in its own right, the aim is to 
continue to build on this work, utilising case studies to explore some of the 
overview findings in more depth.  Consequently, the case study selection 
process will draw upon evidence from the survey to help justify any resulting 
selection. 
 
However, owing to the way that the research was funded, certain limits were 
placed on the case study selections.  In particular, it was expected that case 
studies from the North West of England should be used, in order to assist the 
funder – Liverpool First – with their aim of improving their own practice.  Even 
within these limits, the justification of case study selection is possible – and thus 
it can be demonstrated that these case studies can be used to reflect themes 
that occur on a national scale, and thus be well placed to provide comment on 
their causes and the lessons that emanate from them. 
 
Therefore, the second aspect of this chapter will develop the methodology for 
conducting research at the case study level, before moving to outline and justify 
the case study selections themselves. 
 
5.6 Principal Techniques and Participants 
The principal technique that was used to conduct the research at the case study 
level was the semi structured interview. This method of interview struck a middle 
ground between the other two options – structured and unstructured interviews 
(David and Sutton: 2004).  It offered the formal structure of a set of questions, 
which could be used to consistently drive the interview forward, providing clear 
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points to return to while simultaneously allowing for the exploration of other 
issues should they arise (e.g. a point made by the interviewee that warrants 
elaboration).  This method required a duel set of skills from the interviewer in 
being able to thoroughly prepare and carry out an appropriately structured 
interview, whilst simultaneously being able to exploit avenues of enquiry should 
they arise.  Clearly, the semi-structured interview represented the best option for 
conducting the case study interviews given the freedom it provided to further 
explore pertinent issues should they arise. 
 
Given that the research focused on the three main levels of government that 
related LAAs, it was important to draw upon representatives from each tier, in 
order to gain as broad an understanding of the issues surrounding LAA practice 
as possible.  The following section will outline who was contacted for interview at 
each tier and why. 
 
Local Level: The local level formed the main focus of this research, due to the 
large number of research questions that revolved around LAA practice and 
governance at that tier.  Consequently, it involved the most intense concentration 
of interviewees, reflecting the large number of actors who played a part in LAA 
delivery as well as the need to interview actors occupying similar roles across 
multiple case study areas. 
 
The first group to be included at the local level were representatives from the 
LSP with responsibility for managing the LAA.  This reflected their core role in 
LAA delivery and their ability to comment on how the LSP guided this process.   
Acknowledging the role of the Local Authority as lead partner in delivering the 
LAA, the Leader of the Council and Chief Executive of each case study area 
were also approached for interview. 
 
Given the focus on partner relations, with research questions surrounding 
partner’s roles and conflicts between internal/external agendas; it was essential 
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that representatives from each of the statutory partners were contacted.  This 
included representatives from the police, Primary Care Trust, charitable sector 
and the fire and rescue service. 
 
Government Office for the Regions: At the regional level, the list of interviewees 
was markedly smaller than that identified at the local level, reflecting the reduced 
number of actors involved.  The main actors to be approached at this tier were 
the locality manager(s) which held responsibility for any selected case study 
area.  This would help to explore the themes around whether GOR balanced 
local priorities or central goals, as well as the wider centre-local relationship 
issues identified in chapter three. 
 
Central Government:  In order to discuss centre-local relations it was essential to 
conduct interviews at the state level.  This would involve two main groups of 
actors.     
 
The first group was the ministers who hold, or held, responsibility for 
implementation of the LAA within Communities and Local Government.  This list 
included Eric Pickles MP, Bob Neil MP (currently representing the Coalition 
Government) as well as Hazel Blears MP, John Denham MP and Ruth Kelly MP 
(who – at one time or other – all held this role under Labour).  These ministers 
would also be able to reflect on the horizontal governance issues at a Whitehall 
scale, particularly including how the various departments interacted. 
 
The second group was the civil servants within CLG who would be able to reflect 
not only on centre-local relations, but also how the LAA policy programme was 
developed over time. 
 
Furthermore, across all the tiers of government sufficient scope was allowed to 
expand the range of interviewees based on suggestions/discussions that arose 
during the course of conducting interviews with the people identified above.   
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5.7 Observational Techniques 
In several instances, participant observation was carried out.  This principally 
involved observing executive board meetings of LSPs.  The purpose of this was 
to study partner interaction and the working relationships that were required in 
order to deliver on LAA priorities.  
  
This principally involved making detailed notes, and studying responses for their 
tone, intent and meaning in order to ascertain which actors held positions of 
power both formally and reality, or otherwise, and how they chose to act within 
that position. 
 
5.8 Ethical Considerations 
Given that interviews will form a significant portion of the data collection stage 
attention must be paid to the fact that this data is collected in an ethically sound 
manner.  In particular this should ensure that the full consent of participants is 
obtained and that findings are also reported in an ethically consistent manner. 
 
Much of this work was built into the interview process from a very early stage.  
When approaching people for interview it was made clear to them that such 
interviews would be held anonymously, so as to avoid repercussions.  Given that 
all the interviews were recorded for future transcription, interviewees were also 
reminded at the beginning of interviews that their contributions would be made 
anonymous. 
  
The only exception to this was in the case were such an interviewee would be 
instantly recognisable owing to the prominence of their role.  Once such example 
would be Secretary of State for CLG (a role only held by several people), or Chief 
Executive/Leader of the Council which may have been held by only one or two 
people during the lifespan of the LAA.  In those instances, before the beginning 
of the interview an informal discussion took place about the nature of this.  By 
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way of solution, those interviewees were also told that if they wished to say 
anything 'off the record', the view would not be attributed to them in any way.  
This ability to speak in this 'off the record' fashion was also offered to all 
interviewees, if they wished. 
 
In terms of the reporting of results, interviewees were referred to only by their 
organisation in order to add context where required, or if they related a story that 
rendered their organisation easily identifiable through the course of their own 
words.  In all other instances they were referred to in the 3rd person, and in all 
instances any hint as to gender was removed. 
 
5.9 Refining the Research Questions for the Case Study 
Whilst interviewing actors at each tier is essential, in order to focus on all the 
issues of importance, it was recognised that some questions would only be of 
relevance to certain interviewees.  Thus, a suite of questions was required that 
was modified from the core research questions identified at the end of chapter 
three.   This process identified which questions would be of most relevance to 
actors at each tier as well as the generic questions that would be asked of all 
partners such as methods for improving any future system of local public service 
delivery.  The full list of questions can be found in Appendix I. 
 
5.10 Interview Data Analysis  
Ostensibly, the analysis of the individual data was analysed using N.Vivo, a 
software programme for textual analysis of documents.  Utilising N.Vivo allowed 
for segments of interview transcripts to be clustered into ‘nodes’ or themes, 
grouping together responses from interviewees on any particular topic, which in 
turn made drawing comparisons between varying viewpoints considerably less 





5.11 Secondary Data Sources 
As well as drawing extensively upon the views expressed during interview, the 
research was supplemented by the use of documentary evidence.  Specifically, 
this included the SCS and LAAs for those case study areas, as well as other 
supporting policy documents for their respective local authority areas. 
 
Other data sources included public speeches on relevant policy issues, news 
media and policy documents produced in support of new policy initiatives.  
 
5.12 Case Study Selection  
Within the limits placed upon the research by the funder, and drawing upon the 
questions identified in chapter three, the theoretical avenues raised in chapter 
four and the findings of the national overview survey, it is possible to outline the 
key criteria for case study selection and consequently, to justify any selection.  
These criteria are outlined in table 5.3 below, providing a brief summary of their 
importance to case study selection.  In order to select case studies to focus on 
















Table 5.3 – Topics and their relevance to case study selection 
 
Area Reason for Consideration Weighting to 
Case Study 
Consideration 
Location Must be within the North West of England Essential 
Relationship 
with GOR 
GOR has been shown to play a decisive role 
in LAA implementation, with significant intra-






The role of central government is 
considered to be important by many LAA 
practitioners.  Therefore a case study area 
which possesses a historical relationship 





While party politics has indicated no 
difference in the way LAAs are run, there is 
an indication that areas of NOC are likely to 





While this is not a driving factor of any case 
study selection, a comparison can be used 
to determine similarities/differences between 
case study selections. 
Low 
 
Utilising these criteria and drawing upon data from the overview survey and 
nationally available statistics, two case studies that respond to these criteria are 
Liverpool and St Helens, located in the North West of England (See Figure 5.6).   
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Figure 5.6 - Map Indicating the Location of the Case Study Areas within 
North West England 
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Reflecting the requirement to focus on the role of the GOR, the case studies are 
located in one of the government office regions showing data that indicated a 
disparity in the approach of the GOR.  More specifically, Liverpool and St Helens 
are the individual districts in the North West that provided opposing answers over 
the extent to which local priorities were balanced against national priorities.  
Therefore, the two areas provide a basis to explore why this is the case. 
 
The location of Liverpool and St Helens also offers a useful contribution to the 
deeper study of the strategic relational approach.  This arises due to the fact that 
both areas were formerly districts within the metropolitan county of Merseyside, 
within which, the controlling Labour run council of the early 1980s oversaw an 
antagonistic relationship with the Conservative government - particularly over the 
ability to raise funds for local purposes (Parkinson: 1985).  This was widely seen 
to be one of the key reasons behind the 1986 abolition of the Metropolitan 
Counties (of which Merseyside was one).  This was perceived as one of the most 
overt uses of the SRA, in a clear show of the state expressing its dominance over 
local areas (Macleod and Goodwin: 1999).  Within this context both Liverpool and 
St Helens offer a useful case study to explore how their historical relationship 
with the state affects their recent experiences of delivering the LAA.  This can 
also provide a useful angle to explore the extent to which autonomy has been 
restored to areas which publicly had it taken away from them. 
 
Socio-economically, the areas offer a useful platform from which to study.  Both 
areas have been characterised by a period of industrial decline followed by 
recent physical regeneration.  However beyond this general trend, a deeper 
understanding of the issues facing each area, such as employment and 
deprivation is crucial in drawing a comparison between each area’s approaches 
and efforts.  Firstly, utilising the 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivation14 (IMD) – 
                                            
14
 Whilst the IMD was updated in 2011, this was after case study work was completed.  Therefore 
at the time of selection, the 2007 IMD represented the most up to date data available. 
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alongside other economic performance indicators, discussed later - it can be 
clearly illustrated how the areas compare (Table 5.4).  
 









% of SOAs located nationally 
5%< 10%< 50%< >50% >10% >5% 
Liverpool 1 3 2 44.33 55.67 90 10 0 0 
St 
Helens 47 71 51 6.91 22.88 71.19 28.81 0 0 
Source: IMD 2007 (CLG: 2007c) 
 
Overall, despite the figures for Liverpool indicating that the extent of deprivation 
is worse, there are broad comparisons to be made between the two areas.  While 
Liverpool is ranked 1st (i.e. the worst performing) area in the UK, St Helens is 
ranked 47th, meaning that both areas are located within the 20% worst 
performing areas nationally (n=354).  Both areas also show similarities in the 
extent of deprivation, with over 70% of super output areas15 being located in the 
50% most deprived nationally.  This context is useful, particularly with the study 
of central-local relations, as the study of two areas which face broadly similar 
issues, yet report a difference in their ability to be locally responsive with their 
LAA against national priorities, warrants deeper investigation. 
 
Economically, Liverpool and St Helens are also broadly comparable, as can be 
seen in Table 5.5.  While both areas do have a percentage of their population of 
working age that is comparable with the national average, this is the only data 
that is similar to the national and regional averages.  The percentage of the 
population that is economically active is well below the national average in both 
areas.  Similarly both areas have an employment (and accompanying 
unemployment) rate that compares unfavourably the national average.  Liverpool 
is consistently the worst performing, but St Helens displays similarly poor 
                                            
15
 A unit of geography containing a population of approx 1500 people 
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performing characteristics when both are compared within the region and 
nationally.   
 
Table 5.5 - Economic Activity in Liverpool and St Helens 
 Liverpool St Helens Average 
   Regional UK 
Population 434,900 177,500 - - 
% of Population at Working Age 65.5 61.1 61.6 62 
% of Population Economically 
Active 
67.5 73.9 76.8 78.9 
% of Population in Employment 60.8 67.5 70.8 73.9 
% of Population Unemployed 10.5 7.7 7.6 6.9 
Source: ONS Mid Population Estimates and ONS annual population survey via 
NOMIS, April 2010. 
 
As with the analysis of deprivation, the employment figures indicate that both St 
Helens and Liverpool face a similar set of economic issues.  Once again this 
affirms that the case study selections can assist in exploring differing perceptions 
of local responsiveness, and the general differences in LAA approach within 
each area. 
 
Politically, the two areas also offer helpful aspects from which to explore the 
research questions.  The national overview indicated that while there was no 
discernible difference between the political party in control of the local council 
and perceived help given to the LAA process, there was an indication that 
councils of No Overall Control (NOC) would be more likely to hinder the process.  
The two case study selections help to explore these findings as Liverpool has 
outright political control, coupled with a response from the national overview 
survey that elected representatives helped the LAA process, whereas St Helens, 
was a council of no overall control16 (reporting that the involvement of elected 
                                            
16
 At the time of completing the survey – under Labour Control since May 2010 
149 
members acted as a hindrance to the LAA process.  Therefore, the two case 
studies are well placed to explore the extent to which political involvement and a 
stable political base can help with the effective delivery of local public services 
through the LAA. 
 
Consequently, the case study areas of St Helens and Liverpool satisfactorily met 
the criteria identified for case study selection and allow for the detailed 
exploration of the research questions and the themes that were further 
developed through the national overview survey. 
 
5.13 The Case Study Areas in Context 
Before moving on to discussing the findings in more detail, a deeper 
understanding of the two case study areas is required.  The purpose of this is to 
allow the outside observer, who might not be familiar with the areas, to better 
understand their context and background. 
 
This will cover the general characteristics of each area, the political history, the 
key figures in the LSP/LAA process and the nature of its governance 
arrangements (particularly during the period covering the LAA). 
 
5.13.1 Liverpool 
With a population of 466,000 at the 2011 Census, Liverpool is the 5th largest UK 
city outside of London (ONS: 2012).  Liverpool is also included as one of the 
eight UK core cities - noted for their size and economic performance. 
 
Located on the River Mersey, historically, Liverpool's economy has been built 
around the river.  In particular the city's docks and accompanying industries (e.g. 
docks, sugar, tobacco) were amongst the main employers in the city.  As part of 
this, the city also had a central role in the slave trade (after which several 
locations in the city are still named), yet Liverpool was also the birthplace of one 
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of the key figures who ended the Britain's involvement in the slave trade - William 
Gladstone. 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, owing in part to globalisation, a shift in focus from 
the Atlantic to the European Union and changes to the shipping industry 
Liverpool went into swift and sharp decline experiencing high unemployment 
figures. 
 
During the late 1990s and 2000s the city began to regenerate itself, drawing 
upon European Objective One funding to deliver significant improvements to the 
City's infrastructure and the city centre in particular.  It could be argued that this 
process culminated in 2008 when the city celebrated being the European Union's 
'Capital of Culture' - owing to its musical, artistic and sporting heritage. 
 
5.13.2 Political History 
Between 1974 and 1986 Liverpool was part of the wider Merseyside Borough 
Council structure.  During this period Liverpool also operated as a district council.  
From 1986 to the present day Liverpool has held unitary authority status. 
 
Although the Conservative Party did enjoy some support, in the period following 
1974 the party has never held political control of the city.  Instead political control 
has swung between the Labour Party and Liberals/Liberal Democrats.  In the 
past this has presented a particular challenge as, besides the period 1997-98, 
Liverpool has never been controlled by the same party as that of national 
government.  This has meant that the city has been forced to work with its 
political opponents in order to secure progress against any initiatives requiring 
national backing. 
 
Much of New Labour's LGMA was overseen in Liverpool by a Liberal Democrat 
administration led by Mike Storey between 1998 and 2005, and then Warren 
Bradley between 2005 and 2010.  Throughout this period, the Chief Executive of 
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the City Council was Colin Hilton.  The chief executive in all councils is a full time 
employee of the council who acts in an apolitical capacity.  The 2010 local 
elections saw Joe Anderson become leader of the City Council for the Labour 
Party.  During this period Colin Hilton also stood down from his post, being 
replaced by Ged Fitzgerald. 
  
5.13.3 Liverpool's LSP and LAA 
There were two models that councils could draw upon when establishing their 
LSP - arm's length, or council-led.  Liverpool opted to create an arm's length 
LSP, whereby the LSP would be, in effect, a separate organisation from the 
council itself.  To this end Liverpool's LSP was known as 'Liverpool First'. 
 
In reality, all LSP employees remained council employees, but Liverpool First's 
premises were located away from the main council offices, and the LSP had its 
own organisational structure.  Liverpool First was run by Carol Perry, who served 
as chief executive. 
 
With regards to the executive board17 and LSP structure, Carol Perry held the 
strategic lead of the LSP, alongside the leader of the council and Colin Hilton.  
They were supported by the numerous statutory partners that comprised the 
LSP, as outlined in chapter three.   
 
Beneath the executive board the LSP split into five thematic partnerships, 
broadly reflecting the policy blocks that comprise the LAA itself (see chapter 
three).  Those five partnerships were: 
 
 Health and Wellbeing 
 Housing 
 Safer and Stronger Communities 
                                            
17
 A full list of LSP Executive Board members can be viewed in Appendix IV 
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 Children and Young People 
 Economic Growth 
(Source: Liverpool First: 2009) 
  
Liverpool opted to wait until phase three of LAA rollout in 2008 until it established 
its LAA18.  This made Liverpool one of the last 61 local areas to adopt an LAA. 
 
5.13.4 St Helens 
With a population of 175,000 at the 2011 census (ONS: 2012), and located some 
15 miles to the west of Liverpool, St Helens is a medium sized town which forms 
part of the wider Merseyside region. 
 
Like Liverpool, St Helens' economic traditions lie in industry.  The glass industry 
in particular was one of the principle economic drivers of the area, coupled with 
collieries and the chemical industry that bloomed in the area in the 20th century.  
St Helens also suffered a period of economic decline following the scaling back 
and closure of its core industries, however unlike its neighbour, there has been 
no cultural renaissance to act as a driver for change.  
 
5.13.5 Political History 
Like Liverpool, St Helens has experienced a changing political landscape over 
the years, albeit which markedly less regularity.  Operating as a unitary authority 
since the disbanding of Merseyside Borough council in 1986, the Labour party 
have  consistently been the most successful political party throughout, providing 
the area's MPs and the largest number of councillors.  This allowed them to 
control the council from St Helens Borough Council's conception in 1974 until 
2006.   
 
However, the number of Liberal Democrat and Conservative councillors has, at 
times, been sufficient to create a coalition which has run the council.  This 
                                            
18
 A full version of Liverpool's LAA can be found in Appendix IV 
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happened between 2006 and 2010.  Following the 2008 local council elections 
the council was hung, although the Lib Dem/Conservative coalition held on to 
control. During this period the council was led by Brian Spencer.  In 2010 control 
of the council returned to the Labour party, with Marie Rimmer returning as 
leader.  Throughout, the chief executive of St Helens Council was Carole 
Hudson. 
 
Although not as extreme, the political makeup of St Helens offers some parallels 
to Liverpool.  In particular, during the period of the LAA St Helens political 
composition differed from that of central government.  Thus the ability for the 
area to work with a different political party to achieve local outcomes could be 
scrutinised and compared with its neighbour. 
 
5.13.6 St Helens' LSP and LAA 
Unlike Liverpool, St Helens opted to have its LSP integrated within the structures 
of the council.  The LSP was known as 'St Helens Together' but was operated 
principally by council employees, operating out of the town hall. 
 
Meetings of the executive board19 were chaired by the leader of the council, with 
the support of the chief executive. Beneath the executive board, St Helens split 
its working into four thematic partnerships, eschewing the explicit focus on 
housing that Liverpool opted to take. 
 
 Economic Development and Enterprise 
 Health and Wellbeing 
 Children and Young People 
 Community Safety 
 
(Source: St Helens Together 2012) 
  
                                            
19
 A full list of executive board members can be found in Appendix VI 
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St Helens' LAA20 was introduced as part of the second phase of LAA rollout in 
2007, making St Helens one of the 66 areas to participate in this phase. 
 
5.13.7 Liverpool and St Helens' LAA:  A brief analysis. 
Developing on the socio-economic analysis undertaken earlier, which helped to 
justify the case study selection, a side-by-side analysis of the two respective 
LAAs from each area can help provide further understanding of the two areas 
and the kinds of issues they face. 
 
Table 5.6 highlights which indicators21 were adopted by each respective area, as 
well as indicating which indicators were adopted by both areas. 
 
Table 5.6 Indicator uptake in Liverpool & St Helens and side-by-side 
comparison 
Liverpool St Helens Shared Indicators 
1, 4, 15, 16, 19, 20, 29, 
30, 32, 39, 53, 56, 62, 
115, 116, 117, 120, 124, 
151, 153, 154, 156, 163, 
165, 167, 171, 172, 175, 
195 
5, 6, 15, 16, 21, 30, 32, 
39, 40, 47, 53a, 53b, 55, 
63, 79, 111, 112, 115, 
117, 120a, 120b, 123, 
130, 135, 136, 141, 151, 
153, 154, 163, 166, 171, 
176, 187a, 187b, 192, 
195a, 195b 
15, 16, 30, 32, 39, 53, 
115, 117, 120, 151, 153, 
154, 163, 171, 195 
N=29 N=34 N=15  
Sources: Liverpool First: 2008, St Helens Together: 2008 
 
Although areas had the option to select up to 35 improvement indicators neither 
area opted to do this.  St Helens selected 34 improvement indicators, whilst 
                                            
20
 A full version of St Helens' LAA can be found in Appendix V 
21
 A full list of indicators can be found in Appendix VI 
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Liverpool adopted only 29.  This figure does not include the statutory education 
indicators present in both sets of LAAs. 
  
When the LAAs are compared to see which indicators were adopted by areas, it 
is apparent that there are 15 indicators that are jointly held.  They principally 
relate to crime, health (particularly mortality), drug abuse and employment 
(including youth employment).   
 
This reflects the analysis conducted in chapter three around the homogeneity of 
indicators and their selection.  Indeed, many of the jointly held indicators are 
those covered in that analysis.  Given that the socio-economic composition of St 
Helens and Liverpool has been shown to be broadly similar, the fact that roughly 
half of the LAA has included the same targets demonstrates the ability to 
produce bespoke solutions to local issues may somewhat limited.   
 
However despite this, there are still some differences in approach.  Even though 
St Helens socio-economic and deprivation performances are nominally better 
than those of Liverpool, the area has opted to select more indicators.  More 
tellingly than this, however, is the fact that St Helens opted for less ‘satisfaction’ 
style indicators than Liverpool, instead opting for more ‘hard-nosed’ practical 
indicators.  This would run counter to expectations that an area experiencing 
poorer performance, might opt to select indicators more likely to deliver a 
practical outcome. 
 
Another approach that St Helens has taken, which Liverpool has not, is to split a 
performance indicator into component parts – allowing for measurement on a 
number of things.  One example of this is NI187, which focuses on households 
receiving income benefits.  St Helens has opted to split this into high and low 
energy homes, allowing for an explicit focus on those in fuel poverty. 
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Beyond this, here are differences in how each area opts to present its LAA, 
although it is accepted that they might be purely aesthetic in nature.  Liverpool 
appears to set out its LAA as if telling a story, with indicators grouped 
thematically including local indicators, whereas St Helens opts to produce a list of 
indicators, running in sequential order, with local indicators at the very end. 
 
Although this makes little difference, the presentational issues show that areas 
can opt to present their priorities differently, even if in the case of Liverpool and 
St Helens the substance is similar. 
 
Now that the case studies have been outlined in more detail, including a 
discussion of their background, the following chapters will explore the in depth 
findings that emerged from them.  This will draw upon issues of vertical and 
horizontal governance, and involve interviews with key practitioners within each 
area’s LSP/LAA structures. 
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Chapter Six – Vertical Governance and Central-Local Relations  
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to explore the findings related to the research questions raised 
in chapter three that focus on aspects of vertical governance i.e. the interactions 
between the state and the localities.   
 
In doing so, the chapter will provide an account of the extent to which local areas 
were able to use the LAA to truly respond to pressing local issues, focusing 
particularly on the selection of the 35 national indicators and the setting of the 
performance targets in relation to all of these.  In this, the chapter will consider 
the extent to which national policy priorities were imposed upon local areas.  In 
doing so, the chapter will seek to draw out whether the national indicator dataset 
itself allows sufficient scope for local responsiveness, or whether it simply 
replicates national policy priorities at a local scale.  This will be achieved by using 
deprivation in England’s major urban areas as a lens to focus on variations in 
NID take up based on an area’s characteristics.  The chapter will then focus on 
the methods utilised by Whitehall throughout the negotiation process, including 
the involvement of central departments. 
 
Finally, the chapter will focus on the lower tier of vertical governance – the 
regions.  This will seek to appraise the role of local actors in the aforementioned 
discussions, particularly around the indicator selection/ target negotiation phase 
of the LAA.  Moving beyond that, it will seek to assess the reality behind Goodwin 
et al’s (2006) model of attitudes towards regional negotiation (i.e. local champion 







6.2 The National Indicator Dataset and Indicator Negotiation 
Given that one of the central principles of the LAA was that local areas were to 
be allowed to designate the issues that were of importance to them, one of the 
aims of this research was to ascertain the extent to which that was allowed to 
happen in practice.  Against this, the research also considered whether the LAA 
could also serve as a vehicle for delivering national policy priorities at a local 
scale. 
 
The spine of the LAA was the selection of up to 35 indicators from a suite of 198 
national indicators.  Given that one of the research questions placed an 
emphasis on the extent to which local areas can focus on the issues that are of 
importance to them, an exploration of the extent to which this suite of 198 
indicators did provide sufficient scope for local expression of priorities was of 
relevance. 
 
The results from the national overview survey also gave cause for further and 
deeper exploration of this issue.  When asked whether they believed the scope of 
the national indicator dataset was either a strength or a weakness of the LAA 
system, 64% (50) of LAA managers felt that it was a weakness, providing an 
early indication that the national indicator dataset may not be entirely suitable to 
allow areas to focus on issues of local importance. 
 
6.3 Homogeneity of targets 
In chapter three, analysis of LAAs from the core cities indicated that there was a 
significant degree of homogeneity over indicator uptake focusing on issues of 
deprivation.  In particular this analysis highlighted that as levels of deprivation 
increased, the likelihood on an area's LAAs containing a large proportion of the 
same indicators also increased - drawing into question whether an LAA 
represented an opportunity for a local area to create a bespoke solution to the 
issues it faced. 
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The detailed case studies then provided the opportunity to probe this 
homogeneity and lack of scope within the National Indicator Dataset in more 
depth.  There was little surprise expressed by participants any level about these 
findings, although further comment does provide further enlightenment about the 
LAA’s ability to be locally responsive as opposed to delivering national policy 
agendas. 
 
One interviewee from a PCT noted that ‘the health problems [in our area] are so 
significant that they’re likely to align with national drivers anyway.  So you don’t 
feel necessarily that they were imposed, they were things that you wanted to do 
in any case”. c22  
 
Former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government Hazel Blears 
likened the situation to Maslow’s ‘Hierarchy of Needs’ (Maslow: 1943) saying that 
areas need to be able to focus on the necessities of survival before focusing on 
things generally not see as an immediate priority, and the LAA indicators 
provided a mechanism for them to do that.  This was a sentiment that was also 
held by the civil servants at CLG with responsibility for LAAs.   However this view 
misses a central point in that if this were the case then being deprived would 
essentially limit an LAA’s ability to be locally responsive only giving the pretence 
of a choice, as the targets would be picked before the process even began.  This 
is a view that is held by a former senior civil servant who helped negotiate some 
of the initial pilot LAAs, who described what felt like a ‘phoney dance’ over the 







                                            
22
 All letters correspond to the list of interviewees, which can be found in Appendix II 
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6.4 Top Down Targets 
By looking at the variation in LAA responses to deprivation, it has been illustrated 
that in some cases, the indicators that are selected as part of an area’s LAA are 
essentially pre-defined based on the depth and scale of the issues that an area 
faces.   
 
However chapter three identified the potential for the centre to prescribe 
indicators arbitrarily during the negotiation process.  As will become clear, within 
both case studies top down pressure from both Whitehall and the GOR 
representatives was reported, with regards to specific targets being included 
within the LAA.   
 
As discussed in chapter three, the most obvious manifestation of this was 
through the mandatory education indicators included in every LAA.  However it 
was estimated by the partners that the statutory education indicators only formed 
a small part of the legal obligations of an area that were funded out of the ABG.  
Indeed one partner from Liverpool’s Chamber of Commerce estimated that as 
little as 15% of the ABG would be left over, once the statutory issues had 
received their funding, which then prompted significant-fighting among partners 
over the remaining resources (the details of which will be covered in more depth 
in the next chapter on local governance).  This reality for local choice is 
confirmed by a senior member of St Helens’ PCT who estimated that only about 
20% of the local freedoms and flexibilities sought by St Helens were actually 
granted.   
 
Moving beyond the mandatory requirements of the LAA, which indicate 
significant top-down restriction on its function; interviewees also spoke of 
Whitehall departments seeking to ensure that their targets would be included 
within their area’s LAA.  This first became apparent through the national overview 
survey with one LAA manager complaining of ‘too many central government 
steers’ on indicators/targets. 
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When exploring this at a case study level, this top-down pressure was principally 
viewed as coming from the Department of Health and the Home Office in 
particular.     Within the broader LSP structure, partners spoke of letters sent 
from Whitehall departments suggesting which targets an LAA might wish to 
include.  This led one representative from the voluntary sector to remonstrate 
against this, believing that it ceased to become a ‘local’ area agreement as a 
result. 
 
However, this top-down process is revealed in more detail by representatives 
from the PCT and police which were - by most accounts – responsible for, and 
(internally) subject to, the most top-down pressure.  Although they avoided giving 
details on specific indicators/targets, officials from the PCT spoke of ‘steers to go 
for certain targets’ coming from above whilst the police spoke of the need to 
select crime indicators that aligned with targets set internally by the Home Office.  
 
6.4.1 Civil servants also felt that this top-down pressure led to the LAA becoming 
the stage for Whitehall infighting, so that if the ‘Home Office wanted a particular 
priority in Northamptonshire, well they may not get it without the Department for 
Education backing down on one of its targets.’  This statement in itself sums up 
the extent of the top-down pressure, in that in this scenario, it was not local 
responsiveness that was being sacrificed to a Whitehall department, but another 
Whitewall department ceding to another.  Consequently, in some cases the LAA 
would descend into a horse trading exercise between Whitehall departments 
pursuing their goals over the heads of the local area.  This top down pressure 
and infighting was acknowledged at the Whitehall level with Secretary of State 
Hazel Blears expressing frustration that “other government departments wanted 
to push their own agenda, not always to the benefit of the collective agreement 
around Whitehall.  For example the Home Office would want their crime targets 
[included] come what may.” e 
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This illustrates that within Whitehall there were departments that did see the LAA 
as a way of furthering their own agenda whilst delivering action in local areas  
This was opposed to the vision set out by CLG in that local areas could define 
their own priorities. 
 
 
6.4.2 Commitment to central targets i.e. congestion (NI167) 
Beyond the wider top-down pressure from Whitehall to adopt particular 
indicators/targets, another issue emerged from the case studies whereby areas 
were pressured into adopting an indicator in their LAA in order to illustrate their 
commitment towards a policy area for which it received funding23.    
 
In St Helens and Liverpool, partners discussed how this manifested itself via 
NI167 relating to road congestion.  This provided a concrete example that 
Whitehall was prepared to manipulate an LAA in order to see its own priorities 
included on a wider scale.  Senior civil servants were aware of this happening, 
and in the case of NI167 noted a long standing unease within the Department for 
Transport about local areas accepting central funding and then not showing – 
what they felt to be - sufficient commitment in local policy towards the project.  
There was also suspicion amongst many of the partners at the local level that 
they were pressured into adopting NI167 in order to bring in a congestion 
charging scheme, despite strong misgivings locally about its appropriateness for 
Merseyside. 
 
In the case of Liverpool, former chief executive of the city council Colin Hilton 
identified the congestion targets as ‘an up and coming issue, [but] it wasn’t one 
that should be in the 35’ and included at the expense of other local priorities.  
This view that the indicator wasn’t a priority for the Liverpool was also shared by 
current and former representatives of GOR, but they noted that this was not the 
                                            
23
 Partners indicated that this commitment was additional to that shown under the terms of any 
original funding agreement 
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only reason why they did not want the indicator for Liverpool.  They also felt that 
to effect real change on this issue required changes in legislation which the 
authority was not empowered to make (i.e. control of public transport operators24) 
and so they viewed adoption of this indicator as not being appropriate.  This 
notion of indicators that are difficult to deliver against, or have unintended 
consequences will be expanded upon later in this chapter. 
 
6.4.3 Peer Pressure 
Beyond the instances of top-down Whitehall departmental pressure, one council 
officer who was involved with the LAA in St Helens complained that peer 
pressure was being applied to them during the negotiation process, in order to 
encourage St Helens to adopt NI167.  The situation arose due to St Helens 
seeking to resist the inclusion of NI167 in favour of other indicators.  After doing 
this, it was indicated to the St Helens negotiating team that they would be the 
only council in the Merseyside area (Knowsley, Liverpool, Sefton, Wirral and St 
Helens) which would not be selecting NI167 as part of their LAA.  While this point 
was being made, the council officer felt it was intimated that if St Helens were the 
only area in Merseyside that was not taking up this target, this would make it 
harder to create cross-authority/regional policy on the issue.  
 
The case of NI167 is a clear example of where top-down pressure was applied to 
LAAs, conflicting against the ability of an LAA to respond to local needs.  Indeed, 
it is testament to the strength of central government power that the indicator 
ended up in both Liverpool and St Helens’ LAA (Liverpool First: 2009, St Helens 
Together: 2008), meaning that each area ultimately accepted an indicator in the 
LAA that it did not believe was a priority.  
 
This provides a strong indication as to why some local areas felt they were given 
little autonomy in identifying the issues of local importance. 
                                            
24
 Public transport in the UK is principally operated by private companies who are responsible for 
deciding aspects of service provision. 
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6.4.4 Acceptance of Top Down Control 
Despite this top down pressure contradicting many of the central principles of the 
LAA over local responsiveness, there is wide reaching evidence that many of the 
actors accepted this element of top down control, seeing it as a practical reality of 
the centre-local relationship. 
 
One partner in Liverpool felt that framing targets through a national perspective 
was a logical method of doing things as this would mean that certain 
indicators/targets would be natural/obvious choices for an area to select, 
specifically if they were performing particularly poorly on a national scale, or 
compared to similar areas.  Senior police officers also spoke about how this 
process was already in place within the police force, as police authorities were 
already grouped with other police authorities with similar profiles25 for 
performance management purposes so as to better compare responses.   
 
However, much of the acceptance of this stemmed from partners realising that 
due to the significant amount of central funding received by local areas through 
the ABG, it would be unrealistic for them to expect to be able to do as they 
pleased.  One representative from the voluntary sector in St Helens felt that 
purely from an accountability perspective “as a voter and a taxpayer, you would 
expect government to say it’s not acceptable to not have some of the very key 
things in [the LAA], wouldn’t you?... if an area said we’re not really bothered 
about whether people get jobs, where there’s massive levels of unemployment, 
you would expect national government to [demand the area respond to those 
issues].” d 
 
                                            
25
 Rather than being grouped with surrounding areas which may present different characteristics 
(and thus crime of a different nature), forces would be grouped into ‘families’ based on a number 
of demographic issues, including deprivation and employment.  For example, St Helens was 
grouped with Swansea and Middlesbrough. 
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Indeed, many actors, at each level, confirmed the view that it is impractical for 
the state to let go.  Instead, Hazel Blears suggested that the LAA system, with its 
local flexibilities, was actually an attempt to attain more of a middle ground 
between central and local priorities.  By doing so this served to increase local 
involvement as opposed to delivering fully devolved decision making.   
 
6.5 A ‘bureaucracy of control’? 
However, not all the partners felt that top down control of the LAA represented a 
flaw in the system, but instead, there was a perspective which held that instead, 
this was simply reflective of state control and the privileging of a state agenda as 
outlined by Jessop (1990).  This centred on the notion that England, in terms of 
its modes of governance, is very centralised (reflecting something referenced 
consistently throughout the literature review) and the LAA simply represented a 
continuation of this process. 
 
Indeed one former senior civil servant was of the view that the LAA was simply a 
furthering of the ‘bureaucracy of control’ created by successive Whitehall 
governments which believe that they know best, even when that is not directly 
articulated through formal policy.  As a result of this control, the negotiation 
process represented a method through which Whitehall controlled the makeup of 
what each LAA did.  In turn this would mean that each local area would have to 
seek permission from central government in order to work on any particular 
target that was outside of the interests of Whitehall. 
 
This discussion about whether indicator selection displays cynical characteristics 
when considering national policy priorities raises significant issues with the 
contention that the LAA is a locally responsive document.  Whichever is the case, 
it appears that there is significant central control which is either willingly accepted 
by partners – many of whom are accustomed to working in a centralised policy 
environment – or cynically foisted on to areas which might have other priorities.  
However, to a large degree the situation is understandable due to the extent of 
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funding provided by central government which wishes to see a return on its 
funding investment and thus wants to influence which indicators and targets are 
selected. 
 
6.6 35 Indicators – What about Target Setting? 
So far, much of this chapter has focused on the suite of national indicators - of 
which LAAs select up to 35 - and the impact that they have had on central-local 
relations.  Now the chapter will move on to discuss the performance 
management aspect of these indicators i.e. the targets that are set against them 
and consequently the extent to which they affect the same issues of local 
responsiveness. 
 
As will become clear as the section unfolds, this is driven by partners at all levels 
pointing out that while the indicator selection was important for an area, it was in 
fact the targets that were set against those indicators that often proved to be 
more contentious. 
 
6.7 Unachievable targets: 
The first indication that the target setting process could be an issue in practice as 
well as theory came through the national overview survey data.  When asked to 
make general comments on their perception of the LAA system, one area in the 
North West said “[our area] was coerced into accepting targets we knew we 
would not hit simply because they were a government priority. Whilst they were 
also a priority for [our area] - the targets were simply disaggregated from national 
targets and were too high for [our area].”  The fact the area in question accepted 
that the general inclusion of the performance indicator reflected the priorities of 
the area, yet felt aggrieved at the nature of the target is telling.  However, most 
telling of all, is the allegation that targets were simply reproduced from national 
attainment targets (which may be difficult to reach for areas facing concentrated 
levels of any issue (I.e. crime, deprivation).  This viewpoint illustrated that whilst 
an area could be happy with the 35 indicators that it selected, they could still end 
167 
up with targets that were inappropriate or unachievable for their area, thus 
making the LAA ineffective.  Although no evidence surfaced that it happened in 
practice, this also created the potential for a theoretical ‘double whammy’ 
whereby an area was forced into accepting an indicator that they did not want, 
coupled with an indicator target that was simply unachievable. 
 
When exploring this issue at the case study level, within St Helens, it became 
clear that the issue of unachievable targets was a significant issue.  In particular 
this centred on the target for reducing teenage pregnancy.  Although reducing 
the teenage pregnancy rate in St Helens was widely accepted amongst partners 
as a major problem with the area, partners were largely agreed that the manner 
in which they were expected to deal with it through the LAA was unreasonable.  
This was due to two connected issues.  The first was as a result of GOR seeking 
to be ambitious in the setting of the target so as to stretch the area, although one 
partner in St Helens described the level of the target as ‘harsh’ in that it would be 
very difficult to achieve.  Secondly however, and more importantly, it was felt 
amongst some partners that GOR failed to understand the nuance of the target 
itself and how improvements would be achieved. With one partner pointing out 
that there are “things [referring to Teenage Pregnancy] which you only have so 
much control over if you’re realistic”.  In seeking to explain the nature of these 
nuances, another partner noted that even if all appropriate means were put in 
place (i.e. sex education, sexual health services) it could still prove ineffective 
due to the inefficiencies of acting against an issue which does not have a simple 
technical solution, rooted in one cause.   
 
Partners were also critical of GOR when seeking to mitigate these discrepancies 
between target and delivery, feeling that GOR were largely unsympathetic to 
local concerns.  Discussing this, one partner related that during the negotiation 
there were “occasions where we got into situations where GOR officials would 
say ‘well that’s the target so tough’” further confirming that in some cases there 
was little flexibility to reflect justified local concerns. 
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It was also felt by partners that economic issues fell into the same category, in 
that the indicators/targets could fail to reflect the multi-faceted task of developing 
an economy.  These concerns related to targets which particularly failed to 
consider issues outside of the local authority’s control (e.g. a company relocating 
etc) that could have a significant negative impact, despite best intentions and 
actions. 
 
This underlines that there were occasions where significant top-down pressure 
was applied to local areas in order to enforce LAA targets that local practitioners 
did not feel were achievable, with little consideration for local characteristics, 
indicating once again that the LAA model could prove deficient in reflecting local 
considerations, even when they were expressly made. 
 
However, John Denham contended that the process of unachievable targets 
would still serve to stretch LAAs in order to attain results that they might not if 
they were set a comfortably achievable target.  As an example of what he meant, 
he described a discussion with a senior Accident and Emergency consultant in 
relation to the four hour maximum waiting time in hospitals; 
 
“The idea of a four hour waiting time is nonsense.  The other thing that 
you need to know is that the only way I manage to get this hospital to 
take my patients seriously is the four hour waiting time.  I cannot 
defend it as a clinical measure, but until the hospital as a whole was 
forced to confront the problems we had, I couldn’t get them to 
change…” l 
 
Therefore, in John Denham’s view, the stretching of LAA targets could be 
construed as a way of forcing local areas to abandon complacent practices and 
reach further than they might not otherwise.  What became clear, however, was 
that the art in this was to stretch the areas by just enough.   
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6.8 Perverse Targets  
Earlier in the chapter, it was briefly discussed that some of the national indicators 
– including those forced upon local areas – may have lead to perverse outcomes 
i.e. they measured the wrong thing or were impossible to implement.  Within the 
case studies three distinct examples of ineffective or perverse targets emerged, 
that allows us to explore this further. 
 
NI167 – Traffic Congestion: The first, as discussed earlier in the chapter is NI167 
and congestion.  In the view of several respondents, NI167 proved to be 
ineffective due to the fact that it required changes in primary legislation in order 
to deliver it.  One respondent summed up the legislation changes required noting 
that one of the principal ways of alleviating congestion requires “a decent public 
transport system.  And you can’t have a decent public transport system unless 
you’ve got control of the private operators.  And you can’t do that because 
legislation forbids it except for London26’.  This was a view shared by many of the 
interviewees on this issue, feeling strongly that primary legislation covering the 
delivery of public transport needed to be changed in order to make this a 
worthwhile exercise.  Consequently, areas were left with a national indicator in 
their LAA that they didn’t want, and felt that they had little practical recourse in 
order to deliver against it. 
 
NI32 – Domestic Violence:  One example that was raised by senior police 
officers as delivering perverse outcomes was NI:32 – ‘repeat incidents of 
domestic violence’ - even though the same officers felt strongly that the indicator 
itself was appropriate for inclusion within the LAA.   
 
The difficulty with NI:32 revolved around a difference in what it intended to 
measure and what it actually measured.  This is because, instead of measuring 
instances of domestic violence, the indicator measured the number of calls that 
                                            
26
 Transport for London is operated by the London authority, rather than by private companies. 
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were received by police for domestic violence.  Senior police officers felt that was 
“absolutely contrary to what is required” and that instead, the measurement 
should have placed a focus on;  
 
“reducing incidents of domestic assault.  So therefore has there been 
a domestic assault, not has someone rung us up [sic].  Because if 
somebody rings us up and says my husband has come home drunk 
and I think he’s going to assault me, we can [intervene], we can give 
some advice, we can warn somebody off.  That should not be 
something we should be penalised for.  That’s core business about 
preventing harm.” j 
 
Consequently, they felt that the target – if measured the way it was intended - 
would appear to reflect poorly on the area even though a higher figure could in 
fact indicate positive impacts, both in the short and longer term.  The same 
senior police officer quoted above felt that this target measurement came as a 
result of Whitehall having little idea of practical policing and was poorly thought 
through, leading them to describe whoever wrote the target as “a clown” who 
lacked policing experience. 
 
NI28 – Knife Crime:  The other indicator which had the potential to produce 
perverse results was NI:28 relating to serious knife crime.  The reason for this 
was similar to NI:32, coupled with an issue of perception.  It was noted that if 
somebody was arrested and found with a knife on their person then this would 
class as a knife crime.  Going further, partners pointed out that if a gang was 
stopped, then this could generate several knife crimes in one instance.  However, 
in the public perception knife crime is closely related to people being injured by 
knives.  Therefore, a preventative measure by the police (i.e. arresting somebody 
in possession of a knife), would be perceived as pointing towards rising knife 
crime in a local area, as opposed to something which in fact contributed towards 
a lower crime rate. 
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In both of the latter examples it shows that poor central understanding of 
performance management when defining the National Indicator Dataset led to 
the creation of indicators which, while on the surface focused on important 
issues, created unhelpful outcomes.  This, coupled with the homogeneity of the 
indicator dataset led to many areas, particularly those facing significant issues 
deprivation, stuck with indicators in their LAA that were not entirely helpful to 
improving their area.  This also raises further questions as to the extent to which 
the nature of the indicators and their measurement was properly consulted upon, 
in order to ensure that perverse outcomes did not occur. 
 
6.9 A Failure to Engage in Whitehall? 
While the evidence indicates that some Whitehall departments took a strong role 
in dictating which indicators should be included within an LAA, either through a 
continued process of empire building (characteristics descriptive of the Home 
Office and Department for Health) or by seeking to ensure a local area showed 
commitment for funding that it received from Whitehall (characteristics descriptive 
of the Department for Transport). 
 
There is also evidence that some Whitehall departments failed to engage with 
this process entirely.  As indicated in both chapters two and three, much of the 
reason behind the engagement failure can be put down to a historical culture of 
silo working across Whitehall, which was transposed to the localities.  This also 
reflected the fact that traditionally, many departments’ work would have little 
reason to bring them into contact with the workings and instruments of local 
government. 
 
When discussing this with Hazel Blears, John Denham and senior civil servants 
within CLG, they indicated that the response across Whitehall varied when it 
came to engaging with the LAA.  However, they concurred on which departments 
were most likely to suffer from engagement failure.  When prompted as to which 
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Whitehall department’s culture was least likely to lend itself to the LAA, the 
Department for Work and Pensions was mentioned frequently, for many of the 
reasons outlined above.   
 
John Denham – who prior to being Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government held the office of Secretary of State for Education and Skills – spoke 
first hand of how when he became Skills Secretary he felt that the department 
had failed to engage with the LAA agenda, thus meaning that many LAAs did not 
have skills targets that were appropriate to their area and that the department 
was missing out on a vital way of delivering its remit.   
 
This failure to explicitly engage with the LAA has two potential impacts.  Firstly it 
could lead to a situation were local actors wished to have an indicator included 
within their LAA, yet could fail to achieve this due to a lack of interest/support.  
Secondly, given the evidence of top-down control from other departments, this 
failure to engage could also leave gaps in a particular LAA which could then be 
exploited by the more eager Whitehall departments, thus further compounding 
their dominance. 
 
6.10 CLG: A strong force in Whitehall? 
The failure to engage amongst the Whitehall departments highlights the issue of 
strong and pro-active central actors, which could see their priorities dominate an 
LAA, particular due to a lack of buy-in by other partners. Both of these issues can 
lead to questions about the role of CLG in Whitehall.   
 
While John Denham did not explicitly suggest that CLG was a weaker actor, he 
felt that CLG’s position in Whitehall and the way that it interpreted its role could 
see it perceived in this manner.  He felt that while the other departments had 
their own, often clear and widely understood remits, CLG did not.  Instead CLG 
opted to mediate and ‘hold the ring’ to reflect other departments’ needs and 
wishes across Whitehall when it was developing its own policies.  This presents a 
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further indication of the extent to which central policy influenced the creation of 
local policy, with CLG acting as a ‘filter’ to funnel wider Whitehall goals into local 
policy. 
 
6.11 Whose Local Area Agreement is it? 
These issues of top-down control have created significant barriers to the ability 
for a LAA to be suitably responsive to a local area’s requirements.  In turn, this 
has led local practitioners to question the extent to which they have control over 
their LAA, with more than one practitioner directly asking “whose local area 
agreement is it?”  The fact that people working within the LAA felt the need to 
question the extent to which their LAA was truly local, in conjunction with the 
evidence presented throughout this chapter so far, adds further weight to the 
argument that LAAs did not deliver the local freedom that they were envisaged to 
do.  Moreover, the evidence suggests that the LAA gave local areas some 
freedom, albeit attached with strong central government caveats which could 
often amount to severe restrictions on the ability to be locally flexible.  However, 
this could be attributed to unrealistic expectations on the part of local actors, but 
leads to further questions as to whether Whitehall was correct in its seeming 
unwillingness to give local areas complete freedom. 
 
6.12 The Role of GOR 
So far, this chapter has focused on the aspects of vertical governance that affect 
LAAs, emphasising the relationship between local areas and Whitehall.  
However, as the literature review has pointed out this is not the only aspect of 
vertical governance to affect LAAs.  Government Offices (for the Regions) stand 
as a third, and no less crucial actor in this process. 
 
The tripartite relationship between centre and local, with the regions in the middle 
forms one of the crucial vertical governance arrangements affecting LAAs, with 
several questions emerging from the literature review.  In particular the questions 
revolve around GOR’s role and the extent to which they balanced local views 
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against central policy priorities during the negotiation process, but also during the 
subsequent delivery of the LAA.   
 
So far, GOR and their role in the negotiation process (instead of direct 
negotiation with ministers) has arisen several times, particularly in relation to how 
the negotiation phase had, in some cases, forced national policy priorities into 
LAAs.  The next section will take a look at the role of GOR, placing emphasis on 
how it undertook its role in the process, how those within GOR perceived this role 
and the perceptions of the other local actors.   
 
The results of the National Overview Survey, while seeking to explore the role of 
GOR and their loyalties, highlighted clear intra-regional disparities in the GOR 
approach, with areas under the same GOR providing differing responses in the 
way they felt GOR handled their LAA negotiation.  Through discussing these 
results with interviewees, two competing ideas emerged which could help to 
explain why this would be the case. 
 
6.13 Idea One: GOR: Local Champions or the ‘End of a Long Corridor?’ 
The first idea sought to explore and better understand Goodwin et al’s (2006) 
discussion about the potential confusion surrounding GOR and their role.  Thus it 
considered partner’s expectations of GOR and whether GOR were to act as local 
champions or on behalf of the state in a more top-down manner, thus limiting 
local responsiveness. 
 
In the early stages of the LAA, it was widely accepted that top-down control was 
more widespread, particularly during the pilot LAAs.  Indeed, one GOR 
representative b openly admits that in the early stages the LAA was ‘more or less 
the mouthpiece for central departments’, who ‘if the Home Office said “actually 
we want indicators a, b, c, d, e, f and g in”, then the government office just went 
along and said, “the home office wants indicators a, b, c, d, e, f and g in and 
these are the targets that they want”.  However, this strict top-down enforcement 
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of government priorities was only short lived, with central government becoming 
less prescriptive following the 2007 spending review.  This was something the 
GOR representatives welcomed, feeling that it gave them a far stronger and 
more prominent role within the negotiation process, affording them the discretion 
to negotiate what they viewed as a more realistic agreement. 
 
However, the feeling of top down control remained, with John Denham noting 
that many local authorities still didn’t “find the government offices engaged in a 
real process of two way negotiation, both with Whitehall and the local authority 
and too much of it appeared to be inflexible and with a desire to deliver a target” 
l. Further to this, despite these changes, civil servants (based both regionally and 
centrally) acknowledge that there was a problem driven by the ambiguity of the 
role of GOR in the initial LAA documentation (OPDM: 2004a).  They conceded 
that “[GOR’s] status was always ambiguous.  Were they government in the 
region and acting as if a government department were directly engaged in 
negotiations?  Or were they a friend for a local area, representing them in talking 
to Whitehall?”  This was a sentiment confirmed by representatives for GOR, 
noting that one of the common criticisms they received on the LAA was that local 
areas thought “[GOR] know what our problems are like, but you don’t stand up 
for us” b.  Yet GOR representatives were keen to clarify their own role in the 
process to avoid this happening, pointing out that some of this confusion was 
likely to have been caused through the misuse of terminology.  This included a 
tendency to conflate Government Office for the Region with ‘regional 
government’ of which no such institutions exist in England.  Indeed this conflation 
can be further understood by noting the presence of other quasi-governmental 
organisations operating at the regional scale including the Regional Development 
Agencies and regional assemblies. 
 
The case study where the strength of feeling about the role of GOR was most 
evident was St Helens, where they reported a low degree of local 
responsiveness on the part of GOR.  One member of the LSP board who was 
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present for the negotiation process felt that “It was always a bit unclear quite how 
much authority they did have [to negotiate].” 
 
However the GOR representatives were clear that the role of GOR was to 
represent Central Government in each of the English regions, pointing out that in 
many cases the senior civil servants tasked with negotiating the LAAs were 
contracted directly to CLG in Whitehall effectively making their role “Whitehall in 
the region at the end of a very long corridor”.  So consequently, when addressing 
the notion that these intra-regional discrepancies could be attributed to the 
dissatisfaction of local areas, GOR representatives noted that “that’s not our role, 
our role is to represent central government, not the local areas” b. 
 
Whilst emphatically rejecting the concept that they were ‘local champions’, GOR 
representatives instead felt that they held some flexibility to provide discretion in 
local issues of importance.  The resulting question, given the views of local 
actors discussed earlier in the chapter, is ‘how much discretion?’ This serves as 
a critical blow to the LAA and its claims of localism, illustrating that one of its 
principal features – that of local negotiation – was still fundamentally driven by 
central loyalties. 
 
6.13.1 Top-Down control is a Good thing. 
However, the issue of GOR locality managers representing a more centrally 
orientated policy outlook is not necessarily seen as a negative thing by all 
partners.  Indeed one local interviewee in Liverpool suggested that a locality 
manager that purely looks at things form the local perspective is not necessarily 
what is best for the local area.  Instead, echoing sentiments expressed earlier in 
the chapter over indicator selection, they suggest that if GOR is to live up to its 
role as an ‘honest broker’ in the negotiation of the LAA, then they need to look at 
each area, taking into consideration the national context in order to suggest what 
aspects the area performing badly in, and  to suggest which indicators might be 
beneficial in order to remedy this. 
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This raises interesting questions about the GOR locality managers acting as an 
honest broker through the negotiation process, tempering the need to tell local 
areas what they need to hear, whilst curbing any desire to proscribe targets 
unilaterally that an area may does not want.  Whilst there was evidence that the 
situation envisaged by Hazel Blears, whereby GOR principals could be “robust 
enough to say to [the Secretary of State], we’ve done as much as we can on this, 
but actually [the local areas] have got a point” e did occur to some degree, there 
was a stronger indication, particularly in the case of St Helens where this did not 
happen. 
 
6.13.2 Analysis: Idea One as Suitable Model to Understand GOR Variation 
Whilst numerous actors, particularly at the central and regional level concede 
that Goodwin at al’s model is mirrored to some degree in reality, there is not 
strong evidence to support an assertion that expectations of GOR’s role is the 
sole explanation for the regional disparities.   
 
Whilst GOR representatives were clear about their loyalties, it appears that 
partners became more likely to criticise GOR for failing to act in local interests 
whenever they came up against a strong central line in a particular aspect of 
negotiation, rather than a general sense of being hard done by.   
 
Therefore, a second model was required in order to better explore and 
understand why these disparities might occur. 
 
6.14 Idea Two: Regional base 
The second theory is one that began to emerge during the course of the 
interviews as an alternative hypothesis of GOR’s role in LAA negotiation – 
although support for this theory varied, depending at which tier of government the 
question was asked.  In essence this theory suggests that the varying degrees of 
local responsiveness, as well as the general relationship with GOR could be 
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accounted for through a combination of 1) the physical location of the GOR office 
and 2) the personal characteristics of the GOR locality manager. 
 
During the period in which the interviews took place, Government Office North 
West had two operating bases within the North West of England: Liverpool and 
Manchester. Liverpool’s locality manager was based in the Liverpool Office while 
St Helens’ locality manager was based in Manchester. 
 
In Liverpool – which reported a strong amount of local responsiveness and a 
good overall relationship with GOR – partners spoke of how they felt having a 
locality manager who was based in the city left them better placed to work on the 
LAA.  In particular they emphasised the working knowledge that the locality 
managers would have from working in the city on a daily basis and the positive 
role this could bring to the LAA process.  However, this could still be explained by 




In part, some of this relates back to the earlier discussion about the role of GOR 
and whose interests they represent in the LAA negotiation, but this also reflects 
on the day to day implementation of LAA targets.  Several partners spoke of how 
working in the city provided the locality manager with a greater perception of the 
issues facing Liverpool, the understanding of which was then reflected in the 
negotiation process.  Members from across Liverpool’s LSP spoke of how this 
understanding of local issues could increase the sense of realism on the part of 
the locality managers, both in preventing partners from entering into 
gamesmanship over targets, but also reducing the likelihood that GOR would 
insist on the setting of unachievable targets.   
 
The former Chief Executive of Liverpool City Council summed this position up in 
the most cogent fashion, saying that “we were fortunate in Liverpool, we had two 
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people in particular, who I think understood the locality, understood what was 
trying to be achieved, but were also quite clear in delivering that central message 
as well.  I think there’s a big difference with working in that setting, with people 
you think are empathetic and understand the position, even if they don’t agree 
with you [as opposed to working] with people who just march in” k. Importantly, 
this illustrates an understanding that the GOR representatives are not purely 
there to act as ‘local champions’ sidestepping the confusion that could arise 
through a misunderstanding of this position (and in part indicating why Liverpool 
experienced a good relationship with GOR), but instead illustrating that a balance 
of understanding between local issues and central priorities is key. 
 
Whilst partners spoke of an increased sense of realism that could be gained 
through increased local knowledge, they were aware of the pitfalls that could 
arise, particularly if a locality manager was seen to have ‘gone native’ whereby 
they begin to go against the role of central representative (as discussed in the 
previous section) and instead started taking on a local role.  One partner spoke 
of the conflict between central priorities and the fact that “in order [for GOR] to do 
its job properly in terms of delivering a meaningful LAA, then it has to buy into 
some of the priorities and understand the issues from the perspective of the local 
authority and the local companies to have any credibility” f.  Once again, however 
this conflict illustrates that GOR representatives ultimately represented central 
interests.  The same partner said that whilst “by and large [GOR] navigated the 
whole thing remarkably well and brought some real quality, but as soon as push 
came to shove they crossed sides again” f. Consequently, what this illustrated is 
that whilst the first theory discussing whose side GOR represents rings true -to a 
point - a locality manager who can depart from this to understand local issues 
(albeit temporarily) can help to improve the ‘localness’ of the LAA. 
 
It was also suggested that one of the reasons for this disparity occurring was the 
fact that the LAA was essentially a ‘snapshot’ of an area at the time of the 
negotiation and that, as one representative of GOR put it - “Liverpool are perhaps 
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lucky at that ‘snapshot’ in time they had [the representative] as their person on 
the GOR side.  They could equally have had somebody who was based in 
Manchester, who has only been doing the job for 6 weeks who would quite 
understandably would go in saying ‘well actually, this is what I’ve been told 
government wants to achieve here’” b. This further highlights the importance of 
relationship building in the negotiation of a LAA that can carry the regard of the 
local partners who are tasked with delivering it, and that despite GOR being 
explicit in the fact that they are not ‘local champions’, having an understanding of 
local issues as opposed to just national priorities is a core factor of success. 
 
As indicated earlier, in St Helens partners were less enthusiastic about GOR and 
the ability to be locally responsive.  Whilst the lack of local responsiveness can 
be attributed to top-down pressure over targets i.e. teenage pregnancy, partners 
were on the whole not as clear (compared to Liverpool) as to the reasons behind 
the disparity, indicating that, to paraphrase Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina; ‘successful 
areas are all alike, but unsuccessful areas are all unsuccessful in their own way’.  
Whilst much of the discussion did centre on the amount of local knowledge that 
GOR held, the reasons and explanations varied. 
 
One partner hinted at a sense of parochialism and a ‘frustration’ about 
Government Office being located in Manchester.  As a result, in their view, the 
perception was that GOR were ‘Manchester centric’ in their dealings, which as a 
result left partners feeling as if they “on occasion, weren’t on the radar in terms of 
support from GONW” j.   
 
However, the more prevalent view on this subject didn’t focus on the fact that the 
GOR locality manager was located in Manchester, but instead centred on the fact 
that they seemed to lack local knowledge, which in turn led them to wrongly 
diagnose how wider issues would affect the area, and consequently lost the trust 
of the partners.  One of the clearest manifestations of this was through 
discussions about the 2008 banking crisis and subsequent recession.  There 
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were complaints amongst the partners that the GOR representative failed to 
understand the implications for the area, with one actor describing it as a 
‘revelation to Government Office that [the recession] might actually affect the 
North eventually” i.   
 
The first main complaint was a lack of understanding at how the recession would 
affect St Helens economically, with one partner from the Chamber of Commerce 
pointing out that “people will buy cars, those windscreens are made here, or they 
won’t buy a car and sooner or later...[there will be less demand for windscreens, 
impacting on jobs etc]” i.  Secondly, the same partner discussed “a big debate 
with government office about whether the recession affected teenage pregnancy 
rates [which were already a contentious issue in St Helens, as discussed earlier] 
and [GOR] just couldn’t understand why that would have an impact.  To try and 
explain that fewer people were employed, they haven’t got aspirations.  That 
does have an impact on it.”  Consequently, this lack of understanding of an issue 
that was already adding pressure to the actors within St Helens only increased 
the perception that local partners were not the ones driving their local area. 
 
Although it is a subjective view that is difficult to measure, respondents in 
Liverpool also spoke of the ‘human element’ that arose from having their locality 
manager based in their local area.  This human aspect emphasised the fact that 
GOR’s presence made it easier to conduct business that would favour the city.  
For example they felt that that the locality manager was able to attend more 
meetings with partners, particularly those later in the afternoon without worrying 
about travelling or family commitments which might preclude travelling from 
distance.  Although similarly difficult to quantify, partners also spoke of the 
benefit of informal meetings with the locality manager that could arise, for 





6.14.2 Personal Attributes 
However, whilst there is a clear case that the location/base of the Locality 
Managers is a factor in the performance discrepancies on the intra-regional 
scale, there is a strong indication that the personal attributes of the individual 
locality manager was also a key factor in this finding. 
 
This was a view that was strongly held by Civil Servants in particular, who 
believed that personal attributes and relationships held more importance, given 
that there would be higher proportion of LAAs who would not have a locally 
based locality manager.  Instead, they accounted for the areas reporting a poor 
relationship as having a locality manager “who, for whatever reason, took a fairly 
strong line in terms of what his instructions were” linking back, once more, to the 
issue of whose side the GOR were on and the perceptions about this.   
 
This need for good relationships and the personal attributes of the locality 
manager was something that was felt at a ministerial level, although here it was 
considered – in the view of John Denham - that being of sufficient calibre was 
essential to “earn the respect of the chief executives in terms of their talent, their 
ability” l, before noting that, “too often local authorities found themselves meeting 
people who weren’t operating, and would never operate at that level” l.  However 
this view doesn’t really reflect the need for a locality manager to satisfy the needs 
of actors across the partnership beyond the chief executive/local authority in 
order to create a workable LAA.  This broader view was – not unexpectedly – 
something that found wide acceptance and strong support amongst both of the 
case study areas.  One partner in Liverpool enthused about how GOR would 
take soundings from different stakeholders and attend the various meetings to 
ascertain the local feeling in order to do their job better, giving the stakeholders a 
sense that their views (and consequently local views) were being represented. 
 
Most pertinently, the locality managers themselves felt that success in their role 
was reliant on good relationships.  In particular the locality manager for Liverpool 
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attributed the survey responses to “really good working relationships with people 
in Liverpool.  We can have a really open discussion about what’s important [and] 
what’s not important they understand what I’ve got to deliver, I understand what 
they’ve got to deliver and as a consequence, negotiating the LAA was a relatively 
straightforward process” b.  Unlike the Civil Servants based in Whitehall, 
Liverpool’s locality manager was keen to reflect that there was a combination of 
personal attributes, relationship building and local knowledge at work, pointing 
out that in his view, “the key to a successful LAA from my point of view is about 
understanding the evidence, understanding the area and then having the right 
relationships.  But that takes time” b.  
 
One partner in Liverpool confirmed the practical reality of this approach, feeling 
that because “[we] know these people, they’re not going to sit at a meeting and 
embarrass you” g.  Another partner felt that GOR representatives sought to 
understand “the culture, they understood the organisations, they understood in 
essence what would work in communities” n and although, as stated before, their 
loyalties lay elsewhere, they utilised this working knowledge to engage with the 
partners effectively. 
   
One former senior civil servant also contended that, further to not embarrassing 
partners in meetings, these good working relationships led to a more realistic 
working environment where a development of trust allowed GOR representatives 
to give frank feedback during negotiation, i.e. indicating what was likely to be 
signed off.  Although this still amounted to assisting local partners in engaging in 
gamesmanship with a centrally loaded system, it illustrated (to some extent) that 
GOR representatives were prepared to act locally using their discretion. 
 
To emphasise the point about how developing good working relationships with 
partners led to better outcomes from the negotiation process, one senior actor 
within Liverpool drew a comparison with the Comprehensive Area Assessment 
(CAA) process undertaken by the Audit Commission, feeling that the Audit 
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Commission representatives had “low empathy and low/little understanding of the 
issues [in Liverpool]” k which created a difficult working environment.  This was a 
view that was widely felt amongst interviewees and highlights how low empathy 
and understanding of local issues and concerns leads to a poor working 
relationship and mistrust. 
 
6.14.3 Which Model Best Represents the Situation? 
The evidence suggested through the interviews indicates that one of these 
factors in isolation is not sufficient to explain the divergence in intra-regional 
approaches.  Yet the two models complement each other and when combined 
can help to explain why Liverpool, in particular, felt that they had a better 
relationship with GOR and in turn felt like they were able to be more locally 
responsive with their LAA. 
 
However, of the two, the concept of local understanding and personal attributes 
finds a significant amount of traction with local partners, with many indicating that 
a locality manager who is based in, and familiar with, the local area and the 
issues it faces is more likely to assist in the negotiation of an LAA that is 
generally welcomed by the locality. 
 
6.15 Were GORs a ‘force for good’? 
Within the discussion about how GOR undertook their role and the reasons why 
disparities in approach occurred, there were two clear viewpoints amongst the 
interviewees about GOR’s role in the LAA process.  Those viewpoints discussed 
whether GOR were a helpful presence, which acted as a ‘force for good’, or 
whether their presence was even needed in the process at all.  Whilst this issue 
will be discussed and analysed here, this will also be picked up again in chapter 
eight, which focuses explicitly on improving future practice, given that the role of 
GOR (or to be more precise, its absence given their abolition) would significantly 
change the way that local public services are agreed upon and delivered. 
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There were a number of local actors that praised the GOR locality managers for 
providing “a very professional analysis to both government policy and local 
action, they challenged us, they asked if we were avoiding some of the issues 
and should be doing something a bit more” r. Indeed, even amongst partners who 
had misgivings about the wider role of GOR, it was difficult to find partners who 
would directly criticise the professionalism of those locality managers. 
 
However, whilst some partners made the case that GOR’s were a force for good 
in the delivery of local public services, others questioned the need for GOR at all, 
instead suggesting that Central Government could undertake that role directly.  
The most critical view of the GOR came from a senior member of the LSP who, 
while at pains to emphasise that their effect was in no way negative, felt that 
GOR offered little to no added value through conducting their role.  Consequently 
they questioned “whether or not there is a need for that structure to sit in the 
middle between central government and local delivery bodies?” before 
suggesting that now “we’ve all got computers now haven’t we, it doesn’t take 
long to send stuff along,” j intimating that this process could be done more 
efficiently, with reduced central bureaucracy.  
 
Ultimately, there is a wry irony surrounding the involvement of GOR in the LAA 
process.  This reflects the fact that they were involved in the LAA process 
specifically in order to allow LAAs to be more responsive and free from central 
government diktat, yet, by experiencing this involvement, many local partners 
have questioned why Central Government could not do this directly, thus seeking 
to replicate what came before it. 
 
6.16 Which relationship matters most? – CLG or GOR 
Given the results of the national overview survey, in which numerous partners felt 
that a relationship with a higher tier of government/governance was important to 
the success of the LAA, it is now pertinent to explore which is more important 
and why.  This will be considered within the context of the findings outlined 
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throughout this chapter. 
 
When asked to reflect on why some partners considered maintaining a good 
relationship with CLG to be essential to the LAA process, despite the fact that in 
a normal LAA central government would have little direct involvement, the 
response from those in central government was divided.  Hazel Blears, did not 
accept that CLG were not centrally involved in the process, in a way confirming 
the strong central involvement indicated earlier in the chapter, particularly 
throughout the indicator selection process.  However John Denham was aware of 
the contradiction of this view, speculating that LAA managers who said that the 
relationship with CLG was more important than GOR ‘don’t know what they’re 
talking about’  l.  
 
John Denham also rejected the notion that – in light of the evidence that GOR 
acted on behalf of central government and not as local champions – LAA 
managers might conflate the two higher tiers of governance in their answer.  
However, regardless of this, these findings clearly indicate the importance of 
good vertical governance relations in order to deliver an effective LAA.  This once 
again demonstrates the strong influence of central government on local public 
service delivery, chiming with many of the themes outlined throughout this 
chapter. 
 
As a final note on this section, there is also the potential for partners – noting the 
highly centralised nature of UK governance – to cite relationship building as a 
key factor not just for the importance of LAA delivery, but as an act of 
gamesmanship.  This would be with the intent that in the future, a positive 
relationship with central government would serve as a significant benefit when 





6.17 Chapter Six: Theoretical Reflections 
Referring back to the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Four, there were 
two key theories that were identified as helping to analyse and understand the 
findings surrounding central-local relations: the Strategic Relational Approach 
and Regulation Theory.  Given that the present chapter has pointed towards 
strong central control over the LAA process, particularly over indicator and target 
selection, a consideration of how this reflects the theories is now possible. 
 
Regulation Theory is particularly applicable to the LAA in these circumstances.  
Based on these findings, it can be argued that the indicator/target process does 
indeed represent a mode of regulation by the state, through which the state 
attempts to influence the direction of policy in local areas.  Consequently, by 
influencing the direction of service delivery at the local level, it implies that this 
will influence the area’s economic development through job creation, public 
health, education and so on.  The extent to which this method of regulating 
growth was a success could reasonably be expected to vary from area to area, 
but a full study of LAA indicator/target achievement – lasting until their abolition in 
2010 – could reveal this in significant detail. 
 
In terms of the SRA, the central question was whether the machinery of the LAA 
privileged any particular group of actors over another.  Given that the findings 
presented in this chapter point to a strengthening/retaining of the power of central 
government – despite indications that the opposite would be the case – there is 
evidence that such privileging has taken place.  So far, the findings show that the 
groups that have been privileged are the Whitehall departments, which have 
been given a greater ability to see their department’s particular policies 
implemented in local areas, even if the local area itself did not see it as a priority.  
This points to a re-accumulation and (re)assertion of the state’s power, and a 








The aim of this chapter is to shift the emphasis away from the vertical aspects of 
governance discussed earlier and to focus on the horizontal governance issues 
that affect LAAs.  The nature of this means a move away from the actors in 
Whitehall (although they will still make a contribution), to focus on the local 
partners involved in the two case study areas and their interactions.  Drawing 
upon interviews taken with local partners across two LAA case studies in St 
Helens and Liverpool, the chapter will focus on which, amongst those local 
partners, stood to benefit from the LAA process.  On a similar note, the chapter 
will discuss which has been actively engaged throughout the process as well as 
partners that have not.  It will investigate how an organisation’s internal cultures 
either helped or hindered their work within the LAA and their subsequent impact 
on public service delivery.  Finally the chapter will look at the organisational 
structure of the LAA itself in order to consider how effective it was as a vehicle for 
facilitating the work of the partner agencies in delivering effective local public 
services. 
 
7.2 Negotiation of the LAA 
The first process that the local actors would have to navigate - and thus their first 
governance test - was the negotiation of the LAA targets and indicators.   
 
Focusing specifically on the issues of horizontal governance, partners were 
broadly positive about the negotiation process, with no partners noting any strong 
animosity arising at this point.  However, there was criticism that the process was 
more suited to certain actors than others – most notably the local authority, which 
had previous experience of working with central government on similar schemes. 
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The main issue to arise was that the negotiation process favoured those 
organisations that were used to dealing with bureaucracy and the workings of 
local government, as they could quickly adapt to the process.  Consequently, 
other organisations that traditionally had less experience of these processes 
were perceived to struggle. 
 
Closely linked to this, the second issue to arise was that of the timescale in which 
the LAA had to be produced.  This was seen to favour certain organisations over 
others because of their structures.  In particular, the timescale process was felt to 
disadvantage the voluntary sector as, in the words of one partner “the voluntary 
sector, understandably liked to be able to communicate with all the constituent 
members, so they have to go out, collect the data, feed it back, and there just 
wasn’t the time to do that.”  This meant that certain organisations, whilst 
engaging with the process, felt cut out before the actual implementation of 
targets had even begun. 
 
7.3 Stronger Local Actors 
One of the central criticisms to emerge from the literature around LAAs was 
about the presence of stronger actors and the distorting impact that they could 
have on the entire process (Gillanders and Ahmed: 2006, Glasbergen: 2007).  In 
particular this focused on how either the LAA agenda suited their way of working 
over other actors, or how they were naturally positioned, through resources or 
experience, to benefit more than others.  For instance, actors such as the police 
and PCT have a long history of working on local public service delivery initiatives 
and thus were more likely to already be familiar with the nature of the policy 
process, as well as have developed interpersonal relations with other key actors. 
 
During the case study interviews, every partner was asked to relate which, in 
their view, was the strongest actor operating at the local level within the LAA.  
From these questions two trends emerged.  The first was that the Local Authority 
was identified by most partners as being the strongest actor.  This could be 
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considered unsurprising given that the Local Authority acts as the lead partner for 
the LAA, takes on the convening role and carries much of the ultimate 
accountability.  Indeed many partners’ testimonies cite these reasons for their 
answer.  However, the more interesting trend emerged when partners were 
asked to name which they believed was the strongest actor at the local level, 
discounting the local authority.  In this new context, a sizeable number of 
partners across both case studies identified the PCT as being the strongest 
actor.  However (perhaps tellingly) those representatives from the PCT - while 
speaking elsewhere about the strength of the negotiating position that health held 
– did not name themselves as the strongest partner and instead continued to 
name the local authority.   
 
This view amongst partners that the PCT/Health Representatives were the 
strongest partner within the LAA is significant.  This would lead to the perception 
that competing for LAA priorities could prove to be difficult, making actors less 
likely to want to do so and as a consequence, result in a situation where more 
time and resources were being allocated to health priorities.  That is not to say 
that those health priorities would not, in fact, be the most pressing and needing of 
those resources, but this perceived strength could stifle debate about those 
allocations and potentially lead to organisations missing out. 
 
Indeed there is an indication of this domination happening in both LAA case 
studies, not only from health partners, but other partners which were perceived 
as strong in the literature review due to significant central linkages – in particular 
the police27. 
 
The fear – as raised in chapter three – of the development and presence of 
stronger actors within the LAA is that they would then use their position in order 
to further their own agenda or attempt to have resources allocated to them.  
Whilst there is little evidence to show that this happened on a large scale, 
                                            
27
 Whose accountability structures run directly to the Home Office, in Whitehall 
191 
partners from the agencies identified as the stronger actors have discussed 
utilising these tactics. 
 
The actor that affirmed that they did use this kind of approach was the police 
force, which admitted to ‘negotiating hard’ but as a result faced accusations of 
‘bullying their way through [negotiation]’.  However, police officers attempted to 
justify this by saying that “people have a tendency, in my experience to listen to 
the police.  If the police are saying that [indicator] has got to go in because it’s so 
critical, you can tend to get your own way quite a lot of the time” g.  The same 
officer also spoke favourably of how this process ensured that several crime 
indicators were included in the LAA, that might not have been otherwise.  
 
What became clear is that some partners, through familiarity with the process or 
previous working relationships, were able to exploit the LAA process and their 
organisation in a way that others couldn’t, in order to ensure their agenda was 
considered over that of other agencies. 
 
7.4 Weaker Local Actors 
In the same vein, there were also a number of actors that emerged that were not 
able to have this effect, thus rendering them less able to make an impact in the 
process.  Throughout the interview process, the partners related stories both of 
how the LAA process and structures didn’t suit a particular organisation’s way of 
working, thus compromising their ability to work fully on the LAA, but also of 
instances where that organisational culture was a factor in limiting LAA working.  
They are two distinct issues and will be discussed in turn. 
 
The first instance occurred when an organisation wanted to engage more deeply 
with the process, yet its own internal structures prevented this from happening.  
The most prominent instance where this occurred – already briefly discussed in 
the negotiation section earlier - involved the voluntary sector and was a by-
product of the way that voluntary sector representation was structured.  Although 
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the voluntary sector was represented on the LAA board through the Council for 
Voluntary Services (CVS), they were acting only as an umbrella for the views of 
all the various charitable organisations acting within the area.  The issue of lack 
of engagement came about as a result of the timescale within which the LAA had 
to be produced, which gave the CVS insufficient opportunity to engage with all of 
their members and relay back their views in a manner representative of ‘the 
voluntary sector’ as a whole.   
 
Ironically, however, whilst other partners were critical of the short timeframe in 
which the LAAs were produced (something that will be covered in significantly 
more detail in the following chapter) actors from within the voluntary sector were 
not amongst those vocal critics.  Instead, they were pleased that the LAA allowed 
them to participate at the ‘top table’ of local decision making, and therefore any 
involvement, however limited, was a significant improvement on their ability to 
engage with the policy making process.  This reflected some of the discussions 
about earlier methods of public service delivery where voluntary sector views 
were not present, but this gratitude at being allowed to participate in a flawed 
process that didn’t favour them only added seemed to confirm that the voluntary 
sector was one of this group of weaker actors. 
 
Commenting from a central government perspective, John Denham felt that “the 
one [actor] that was slowest to the party was probably schools” l, which 
presented a challenge particularly due to the fact that they held the largest 
number of targets organisationally within any LAA.  In Mr Denham’s view, this 
was due to a “huge part of the schools budget [being] closed to local authorities 
and wasn’t really available for flexible working” l.  Thus, while they had the largest 
slice of the LAA, those working in education had limited scope through which to 
act in a locally independent way. 
 
The second group of actors that failed to engage with the LAA system were as a 
result of organisational scepticism towards the process.  Actors gave varying 
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accounts of the extent to which this was the case, but a senior manager for the 
LAA in Liverpool felt that there were no examples of “a partner point blank 
refusing to engage” a with any aspect of the process.  Instead, in cases where an 
actor did fail to fully engage, it was more subtle than an outright refusal.  Most of 
the instances where a partner failed to fully involve themselves arose out of a 
situation where, in the view of the partner agency, the work of the LAA was 
viewed as ‘peripheral’ to that of their own, or they failed to see the cross-benefits.  
One prominent organisation that embodied this view was the Chamber of 
Commerce which, as the LAA developed had, in the view of partners, little to take 
from the process and consequently “got more and more frustrated, thinking 
‘what’s this all about?’” g, which in turn led to them disengaging.  Indeed one 
partner related a story of the Chamber withdrawing resources and funding from 
the LAA in the period when it became clear that the LAA was about to be 
scrapped/replaced, indicating that at that point they had little confidence in the 
structures moving forward and no longer wanted to participate. 
 
There were also instances of those actors previously identified as being 
‘stronger’ through their ability to influence the LAA process, as failing to engage 
for similar reasons i.e. seeing the LAA as peripheral to their internal work.  One 
of the groups that received mixed reviews about their involvement was the police.  
Whilst they were widely praised across the partners for their work on the 
Community Safety Partnership they were criticised as being one dimensional in 
their work, spending little time on thematic partnerships which did not focus 
primarily on crime reduction.  Much of this can be attributed to some of the earlier 
discussions about the work of the police, where they didn’t see the value to their 
organisation of any type of working that did not directly help them reduce crime 
figures in the short term. 
 
Similarly, although many people were careful to avoid naming organisations 
directly when discussing them in a negative light, reference was made to 
‘sleeping partners’ within the LAA.  This was a reference to partners which, whilst 
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attending the requisite board meetings and meeting their other obligations were 
less keen to participate than others.  While this was seen as a source of 
frustration to those active partners, it was acknowledged that some of this 
involvement was due to “capacity and capability”, which was not always under 
the control of those partners e.g. their funding/resource allocation. 
 
7.5 Actors missing out? 
Up to now, the discussion has focused on those actors that chose to actively 
involve themselves with the LAA process and those that either failed or struggled 
to engage.  However there is another group of local actors to consider – those 
that missed out on the opportunity to engage. 
 
The most significant local actor that missed out on the process was identified as 
being the universities and higher education institutions within the Merseyside 
area (Most prominently: The University of Liverpool, Liverpool John Moores and 
Liverpool Hope), although they were included towards the end of the process.  
Colin Hilton, the former Chief Executive of Liverpool City Council acknowledged 
this and expressed regret that they had not been included, putting it down “to the 
fact that the universities weren’t properly recognised for the contribution they 
could make until relatively late – 2008-09” k. While initially this may seem 
surprising, in that an organisation like a university would play a core role in the 
education process and subsequent entrants into the job market, as well as being 
a significant local employer, when considered against the 35 indicators of 
Liverpool’s LAA, this oversight becomes more understandable – up to a point.  
Given the scale and depth of deprivation, as well as the social and economic 
issues facing Liverpool, the indicators that were selected principally focused on 
improved public health and reducing crime, as well as the statutory indicators 
covering basic education up to the age of 16.  As such it is difficult to find 
indicators that the University may lead on – i.e. students going into higher 
education – in an area facing more pressing issues.  However, the fact that the 
universities were not involved on any level at the early stages of LAA negotiation 
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is alarming, given the ability to contribute – through expertise and resources – to 
progress against many indicators, without having to act as a lead partner. 
 
This oversight is not exclusive to the Merseyside area, however, and is 
something that was recognised by John Denham who, prior to becoming 
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, served as the 
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, a role which covered 
higher education.  Indeed John Denham felt that he made a significant 
engagement with the LAA process while at BIS, after becoming “aware that very 
few local authorities were engaging with the skills agenda, and [BIS] as an 
organisation was not engaging the LAA process.”  What followed was a wider 
departmental movement to encourage BIS actors working at a GOR level to 
actively engage with the LAA process in order to develop a stronger skills 
agenda, including the role of higher education.  Consequently the higher 
education sector was acknowledged, separately at a local and central level, to be 
an actor that was overlooked by the initial LAA process. 
 
Beyond this, partners made little mention of actors that were missing from the 
LAA process that might have been able to make a significant contribution to the 
delivery of more effective local public services.  However, there are actors 
operating at the local level that may have missed the opportunity to participate – 
most notably community groups. 
 
7.6 Differences in Operational Approach 
The fact that the LAA is the delivery document for a partnership of actors should 
lead to an expectation that each actor may approach issues in a different way.  
Much of this can be attributed to the internal structures and cultures of each 
organisation and the way that these structures contribute to each actor’s 
particular operational approach.  Indeed most actors spoke at length at how this 
was the case and how particular aspects of their agency’s operational approach 
could help or hinder their work on the LAA.  Many of these differences can be 
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grouped into two broad categories based on the organisation’s working methods 
(see table 7.1).  The first focuses on short term orientated organisations (i.e. 
operationally over a few days or weeks), and the second refers to actors which 
act more strategically over a longer period (i.e. operationally over years). 
 
Table 7.1 - Differing Operational Approaches of Local Partners 
Short Term Focused Long Term Focused 
 Fire and rescue service 
 Police 
 Local authority 
 Primary Care Trust 
 
7.6.1 Short Term Focused 
The most prominent actors in this category are the police and fire and rescue 
service.  They are actors that work on a day to day basis, as the situation 
requires i.e. responding to individual instances of crime/fires.  As a result, while 
they do have longer term strategies for incident reduction, they place less 
emphasis on long term planning, or as one senior fire officer put it “you never see 
the skeleton of a cat left up a tree.  We’ve always got the cat down, but what 
we’ve never done is plan how the cat is going to stop ever getting up there again” 
h. 
 
The police also noted that, unlike other office based actors, they and the fire 
service are “a genuine 24/7 service.  A lot of people claim to be, we genuinely 
are.  We have people here [at the station] all the time, we don’t have to turn them 
out of bed. I can change the direction of this policing division three times in every 
24 hours.  So my tactical teams, the people the public don’t see, they are briefed 
every 8 hours and we can send them this way or that way” j. In this light the 
police cited the case of social care workers, who were technically a 24/7 service 
due to their overnight on-call work, but were limited in the amount of resources 
they had, hampering police efforts to deal with instances of domestic violence 
and other issues due to a lack of readily accessible case workers.   
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The actors in this group were also the most likely to express frustration with LAA 
working as a result of this operational outlook.  As these organisations go out on 
a daily basis to resolve a set problem, they were less likely to relate to the long 
term strategic planning of the LAA and what they perceived as short-term 
inaction that would stem from meetings which focused on long term strategic 
planning.  As a result several of those actors were considerably more likely to 
criticise or even dismiss the partnership meetings as “talking shops” which held 
little relevance to their own work. 
 
7.6.2 Long Term Focused 
In the longer term category, the most prominent actors are the PCT and local 
authority, but private sector business can also be found here.  These actors are 
typified by the use of longer term strategy documents to define the goals of their 
organisation and how they will be achieved, as opposed to the short term 
intervention based activity utilised by the fire and police services.  This response 
is characterised by the nature of the issues that these organisations face.  
Comparing their work to the police, one partner noted wryly that it’s not possible 
to “send a hit squad to stop people being obese” r. 
 
This stance was elaborated upon by several other actors, focusing particularly on 
the role of the PCT, which epitomised this grouping of actors.  One senior 
representative from the private sector commented on the long-term nature of 
health work in general, which has “massive targets against it and the health 
service were being harangued about what are you going to do to make people 
live longer” i when the time frames required to monitor such progress were not 
the three years of the LAA, but closer to the 20 year life of the SCS.     
 
Further to this, one partner felt that the PCT’s work didn’t compare well with 
actors such as the fire and rescue service because of the nature of their work.  
They went on to describe the Health Service as the ‘Ill Health Service’ by virtue 
of the fact what the PCT primarily deals with is spending time/resources on 
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influencing public behaviour in order to improve health conditions.  In the actor’s 
view this would be akin to saying that “the police are simply there to advise 
people on self defence and how to safeguard their property and how to be nice 
people and how to deal with anger” r and that this approach wouldn’t see a quick 
(positive) change in crime statistics. 
 
Even within these groups operating on a longer time horizon, actors highlighted 
how a difference in operational approach and the way that their results were 
measured contributed to a range of perceptions as to how they were performing.  
Again, citing the example of health as a comparator, a senior official from the St 
Helens’ PCT felt that “getting people to die less of various diseases is quite a 
complicated issue, whereas starting up 10 new businesses is a little bit more 
tangible.”  This aspect of the LAA target system made comparison between 
different actors difficult.  As a result, one of the main criticisms of the larger, long-
term orientated organisations was that their organisational structure and 
bureaucracy likened them to an oil tanker, in that it was difficult for them to 
change direction in a similar way to organisations such as the police.  
 
Another critique of the organisational structures came about when two partners 
of differing size were required to work jointly as part of the delivery of an LAA 
outcome.  This was particularly highlighted when one of the partners was one 
identified as having a more bureaucratic structure i.e. the PCT or Local Authority.  
When these groups were working with smaller organisations such as the 
chamber of commerce or voluntary sector, partners discussed difficulties over 
arranging meetings which involved people at an appropriate decision making 
level.  One partner commented that some organisations were “so huge, that 
everybody senior enough isn’t going to be interested in what we want to do with 
them and then you get too junior and you can’t make anything change” i.  When 
discussing these organisations using the ‘oil tanker’ analogy the same partner felt 
that some of these organisations were so large that it was difficult to “even find 
the door” i in terms of who to work with, let alone deliver outcomes.  Thus, while 
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joint working was essential to delivering LAA targets and, as indicated earlier, the 
sign of an effective partnership, the sheer size and structure of some 
organisations could often be seen to frustrate work and limit action.   
 
Overall, what became evident was that the organisational structure of the 
individual partners within the LAA played a central part in how effective they were 
at the local level.  Although it is fair to say that the LAA introduced an extra level 
of bureaucracy to local government and local public service delivery, this did not 
strictly suit those organisations that are traditionally bureaucratic in nature – i.e. 
PCT, local authority.  This, in part, can be attributed to the fact that these 
organisations often operate on much longer time horizons (i.e. on the scale of a 
decade) as opposed to the 3 year timeframe of the LAA.  This shortened 
timeframe can make it difficult for them to plan and mobilise in the way in which 
they are accustomed to working and indeed on the scale that may be required to 
both deliver and monitor effective outcomes.  Indeed, converse to original 
expectations those organisations that suffer less from institutional bureaucracy 
and operate on shorter time horizons are far more likely to be considered to have 
flourished under the LAA.  The outcome based characteristics of organisations 
such as the fire and rescue service have enabled them to work quickly and 
effectively to deliver against their targets.  This is coupled with the fact that the 
short time horizon of the LAA is more suited to the issues that they face, which 
do not strictly require long term planning and action in order to achieve the most 
effective results. 
 
7.7 Taking a Long Term View – Invest v Spend 
One of the starkest ways that variations in partner outlook became clear was 
through the concept of investing or spending.  In essence this revolved around 
whether a partner was more likely to view action on the LAA in the shorter term 
as a concept of ‘spending’ money, or the same action in the longer term as a 
concept of ‘investing’ money for longer term benefit.  While many partners 
discussed this viewpoint throughout the interview process, a representative from 
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the PCT in Liverpool described it most cogently as acting out of “enlightened self 
interest” n and when this happened it was the point where the partnership 
working became most effective. 
 
One of the clearest examples of a partner taking the longer term view of 
investment was that of the fire and rescue service, which were praised by the 
partners across both case studies for consistently working in areas that were not 
considered to be their core business.  This occurred as the fire and rescue 
service representatives were aware that harm and deaths resulting from fire 
were, in their own words ‘not the biggest threat’ to the area.  However they 
pointed to statistics stating that over 80% of the people that die in fires have 
health issues such as heart disease, coupled with high instances of ‘chip pan 
fires’ and fires caused by cigarettes.  They felt these qualified as ‘lifestyle issues’ 
and therefore by working with other LAA partners on themes like health to reduce 
activities such as smoking amongst the general population, they could reduce the 
instances of fires and fire deaths because, as one senior fire officer put it, ‘their 
statistics today are mine tomorrow.’  This long term strategic view of ‘less fires – 
less responses’ is one that was singled out for praise by a senior police officer as 
‘bringing something to the party, despite not being a ‘natural fit’.  The same police 
officer went on to compare this style of working embodied by the fire and rescue 
service as akin to the lifeboat service whose work focuses on a preventative 
aspect to reduce call-outs.  This fire and rescue service approach also led to the 
awarding of ‘beacon status’ – created by the LGA and the Improvement and 
Development Agency (IDeA) and awarded to instances of good partnership 
working that is exemplar to other institutions (Martin: 2005) – giving some 
indication of how successful this policy stance was. 
 
However, this willingness for a partner organisation to act outside of its core 
business was not readily accepted by all LSP partners.  Fire officers spoke of 
being questioned “why are you here?” h at partnership meetings and during the 
interviews one partner dismissed the fire service as a group which should “just 
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put out fires,” although this was an isolated voice in this regard.  This highlighted 
that taking a long term strategic view was a process that took time to establish, 
with the “maturing of the partnership from a group of partners to a partnership 
where there was a realisation that we could contribute to other people’s priorities” 
using “just a little bit of imagination and forethought.”  This developing of the 
partnership and the trust issues arising from successfully working with other 
partners, proved to be a central aspect of the governance of the LAAs and is 
something that will be expanded upon later in the chapter. 
 
Yet, despite encouraging evidence of true partnership working taking place, there 
were also occurrences of a high degree of scepticism about cross partner 
working and short term action for long term saving.  While the development of 
partners taking a longer term investment view was something that was 
encouraged by Government Ministers, Hazel Blears admitted that despite 
improvements, by and large the issue “never got to the point where I wanted to 
get [it] to” e.   Indeed the former secretary of state felt that the issue was still one 
that needed developing to the point where partners would be willing to share 
resources and work outside their core business for long term benefit. 
 
One detailed example of partners grappling with the nature of longer term 
strategic action within the LAA arose between the police and PCT in relation to 
violent crime, as a senior police officer outlines; 
 
“We’ve reduced violence by 40%, but if you want a pub fight, [St 
Helens is] still not a bad place to come, because you’ll find one.  We 
get people coming in with black eyes, broken noses, victims of crime, 
victims of assault, very often catch the offenders, we’re up in that 70-
80% detection rate for violent crime. We will take a statement of 
somebody who says yeah that person thumped me, we’ve got that 
person in custody. It is a legal requirement to have medical evidence 
to say what the extent of the injury is.  We were waiting months for 
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medical evidence.  So this means that offenders were being bailed 
back into the community, they’re not being charged and in a lot of 
cases that has no detrimental effect other than the victim gets 
frustrated because apparently nothing is being done.  But in some 
cases, these are violent people who will go on to assault other 
people, and other people, and other people and if you have that 
medical evidence they can be charged and they can be put into 
prison on remand or what have you.” j 
 
The senior officer saw it as a point of immense frustration that, even after writing 
to each doctor in the area and raising the issue with senior members within the 
PCT, it proved difficult to get them to change their methods of working due to the 
bureaucratic inertia of the PCT itself.  This was despite the police officer pointing 
out their belief that providing the medical evidence the police required could also 
contribute to reduced workload for the doctors themselves.  The same officer had 
some sympathy for the PCT’s position however, noting the systematic and robust 
inspection regimes that they already faced could often leave them feeling 
inundated, even before considering external LAA business.  The partner went on 
to say that, in order to ensure buy in from an already busy organisation, 
sometimes partners required a clear demonstration of the benefits. j 
 
Another striking example was another senior police officer discussing attending a 
health seminar where child rearing methods were being linked to crime rates; 
 
“You can send as many professors as you want to give us talks 
about how babies that are breastfed create less crime, it is of no 
interest to senior police officers because that aint going to be 
making a difference[sic]  [over a short time frame]”  g 
 
This view can be considered a reflection of the short term nature of targets faced 
by the police, yet it still reflects an unwillingness to take action in the longer term 
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– something that the LAA should aim to do, as the delivery document for the 
SCS.  However this outlook was one which was challenged by other partners, 
with one representative from the local authority questioning why the police officer 
even attended such a meeting, given that they would know its subject and thus 
be aware of the usefulness or otherwise that the meeting would hold for them. 
 
The difficulty of taking a broader view was a perspective which was understood, 
although not supported, by senior civil servants from CLG.  They acknowledged 
that it was “very difficult for departments to understand why they should be 
interested in helping DEFRA, when what they’re interested in is anti-social 
behaviour”.  This highlights a failure of the LAA process, particularly in the initial 
negotiation phase, in that raising the awareness of partners in relation to the 
cross-boundary impacts of each other’s work could lead to significant delivery 
improvements. 
 
What is abundantly clear, is that those organisations that took a long term view of 
the LAA, working and engaging with other partners in joint action which might not 
yield immediate results, were essential to good partnership working.  By 
appropriately deploying resources partners could, to an extent, mitigate the 
impact of future policy problems thus allowing better and more efficient use of 
their resources across both timescales. 
 
7.7.1 Funding 
Throughout the process it became evident that much of the power in the LAA 
rested with those actors that had access to significant funding but, moreover, 
significant trust issues developed where it became difficult for them to cede 
funding to other partners due to accountability fears.  Indeed senior civil servants 
viewed the surrendering of ‘sovereignty over funding’ as a barometer of how 
much partners believed in the partnership o. 
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However, it was contended by several participants in the process that the LAA 
only worked because it served as the venue through which the actors could 
access the Area Based Grant.  As a result people engaged with the process.  
One actor put this in its most simple terms: ‘people follow the money’.  This 
attitude came sharply into contrast when it became clear amongst the partners 
that the LAA was in the process of being phased out in late 2009, but particularly 
after the 2010 general election when LAAs were abandoned altogether.  As 
partners grew more aware of the fact the LAA did not have a future – and 
therefore funding attached was drying up – people spoke of how attendance at 
meetings would decrease and support for projects would reduce.  This indicated, 
that for some agencies, the LAA remained on only a vehicle for furthering their 
own agenda whilst being compelled to be involved, rather than remaining 
supportive of the broader principles of local partnership. 
 
7.8 Internal Accountability – Which Accountability Structure Takes Primacy? 
So far, the chapter has investigated the issues that can arise from having a 
partnership made up of organisations with differing operational cultures.  
However, there is another theme identified in the research questions that also 
impacts upon the horizontal governance of LAAs: the internal structure of each 
agency.  Whilst having their own internal culture, each individual partner will have 
accountability structures that are unique to their organisation28.  This will mean 
that each partner which sits on the board will have somebody that they are 
upwardly accountable to, and in the cases of the PCT and police in particular, 
this accountability chain will ultimately extend to Whitehall.  Therefore, there are 
issues as to how these differing accountability structures align themselves with 
those of the targets within the LAA and ultimately, which takes primacy over the 
other.  This, in turn, has significant implications for the legitimacy of the LAA 
itself, and how it is governed. 
 
                                            
28
 For example, a Police Chief-Superintendant will report to the Chief Constable (who has 
responsibility for the policing of the whole area in question, who in turn will report to the Home 
Secretary. 
205 
The most striking example of the prioritisation of internal accountability structures 
came when talking to senior police officers.  They described how the police 
authority targets, set by their Chief Constables, operate on a yearly basis - 
compared to the three years of the LAA.  Like the LAA, they are monitored on 
their performance against these targets.  Yet, when asked which of the targets 
would take priority, senior officers in both areas were emphatic in their view that 
those set by the police authority would take priority.  Indeed one officer 
suggested that this view would be universal within the police, saying that “I doubt 
you would ever get an area commander who would say anything different.  If you 
do, they don’t understand what their job is” j. Another senior officer said that in a 
situation where a target set by the police authority was lower than the LAA target, 
they would still consider themselves satisfied, providing that the police authority 
target was met.  Thus, the police were more influenced by their own internal 
targets and the accountability structures that can have a more significant impact 
on their job (i.e. through disciplinary measures) than those of the LAA.  This 
raises further questions about how effectively those that are delivering the LAA 
can be held to account for their actions by the LSP structures. 
 
The timeframe issue raised by police officers proved to be a sticking point for 
other partners too, with one partner discussing how difficulties arose in getting 
partners to buy into indicators/targets because of the timeframe the 
indicator/target operated across.  This – coupled with the views of the police 
officers – confirms some of the earlier discussions about how an organisation’s 
bureaucracy and structure can act as an impediment to LAA working, particularly 
when noting that significant changes can take place within the 3 year time frame 
of the LAA.  
 
Whereas some partners evidently struggled to draw together the two domains of 
accountability, one partner took a novel approach to this problem.  The Chamber 
of Commerce in St Helens ran what they termed a ‘two-strand’ approach to the 
issue.  They acknowledged that there was a gulf in technical language/ 
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understanding between the Chamber members that operated in the private 
sector and those public sector actors within the LAA.  Furthermore, they were 
well aware that the use of technical language and bureaucracy could turn their 
members away within a short time frame.  Therefore, the private sector opted to 
keep the groups separate and instead, in the words of a Chamber representative, 
“had an almost entirely private sector board where they can use their own 
language and put their own views and nobody will put them right or put them 
down and then we will try and translate that into a partners group.” This would 
then aim to reflect the views of business leaders in a manner that would be 
suitable for those familiar with policy work. 
 
The Chamber leaders in St Helens found this to be effective, ensuring that they 
maintained the full engagement of private sector business which had the 
opportunity to express their concerns, in turn allowing the Chamber to fully 
represent the business sector in LAA meetings, thus balancing their internal and 
external organisational cultures. 
 
7.9 Trust of Resources 
The development of trust amongst the partners was one of the issues that was 
identified as being essential for the effective delivery of the LAA.  Trust, 
(particularly over the sharing of resources and the subsequent accountability for 
those resources) whilst having the potential to undermine LAA working, was also 
subject to a feedback loop.  This meant that partners were required to display 
trust in one another in the first instance to share resources, and the positive 
results and generation of trust between the partners could allow this practice to 
continue and spread.  This issue is closely linked to the concept of ‘invest to 
save’ discussed earlier, in that much of this trust involves ceding funding and 
working with partners across accountability structures in order to work on areas 
of common interest.   
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Many of the partners agreed that trust, and the development of trust, was a core 
issue that impacted on LAA success.  What varied, however, was the extent to 
which partners felt that these trust relations were able to develop.  As part of this, 
partners cited several examples showing how trust, or the lack of it, could affect 
partnership working. 
 
One of the principal issues of where a lack of trust hindered the LAA was cited by 
the fire service, and came in the form of data sharing.  They discussed a 
programme whereby the fire service could identify those at a high risk of death or 
injury from house fires and visit those citizens, in order to help reduce that risk.  
However, due to a fear of litigation based on how the data was used which led to, 
in the words of one fire officer, “this [bad] feeling in the back of my stomach, so 
I’m not going to do anything, because I don’t know what you’re going to do with 
the data” h.  This fear of litigation led to organisations not releasing data and, in 
turn, giving “money up at the end of the year because they hadn’t spent it” rather 
than risk funding a scheme with another partner that may have long term 
beneficial impacts.   
 
This lack of trust was also, in the view of one partner – and reflecting the earlier 
discussion about internal accountability – symptomatic of a failure to take a 
‘whole partnership’ view, saying that partners became ‘blinkered’ to any LAA 
target that did not directly impact on work for which they had responsibility for. 
Thus, these ‘blinkered’ partners passed up the opportunity for joint working that 
could have far reaching benefits. 
 
7.10 Personal Relationships 
Although the partnership is a coalition of actors working together towards a 
common purpose, often much can be placed on the role of the individual within 
any specific organisation who is charged with interacting with that partnership.  
This development of personal relationships has already been touched upon in 
the previous chapter, when discussing the role of GOR representatives and the 
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vertical governance arrangements for LAAs.  However, the evidence clearly 
demonstrates that these personal relationships are just as important for 
horizontal governance.  Indeed, it was almost universally agreed amongst the 
local actors that personal relationships were essential to successful delivery. 
 
One partner felt that in this regard, the LAA was comparable to any other aspect 
of their organisation’s business in that “you put people who you know will deliver 
the outcomes that you want to deliver.  You don’t put people around you who 
you’re unsure of, or don’t deliver, because why would you?” q  They then 
continued to define what they viewed as good characteristics for a partner 
stating, a good partner would be “willing to engage in a discussion, to take 
seriously what are the issues and to answer and deal with things appropriately” q. 
In outlining these criteria, the same partner stated that in their view, “all business 
is people business and people don’t do business with people that they don’t like”.  
Therefore an absence of those core qualities may serve as a barrier to 
partnership working. 
 
However, one partner described this process as not something that happens 
instantly, but rather a “journey over years to build that trust and that relationship” 
(reflecting some of the issues of trust in the previous section).  As partners 
realise that “the personal relationship is reflective of the organisational 
relationship, they recognise that everyone within that organisation is driven” q and 
thus they want to work with each other in the future.  Commenting further, one 
former senior civil servant felt that developing personal relationships could lead 
to a state of ‘shared understanding’ which in turn would lead to more efficiency 
for example:  
 
“if you’ve got people doing neighbourhood policing, as part of what 
they do, could they be observant about other things?  It could be 
identifying problems around the maintenance of the estate, but they’d 
know exactly who to alert.  So rather than saying it’s nothing to do with 
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me, they could say, I sat in a planning meeting with people, I know 
these people, I know they’re good people, I’ll just get on the phone to 
them and say by the way there’s a few problems.” m 
 
Good personal and working relationships were also viewed as being core to the 
effective delivery of LAAs by those working in Whitehall.  One senior civil servant 
at CLG compared the LAA to a marriage certificate, in that “It’s a contract.  
People sign up to it..  But it’s no good unless the marriage is strong behind it, 
right?” o.  Consequently if one aspect of the marriage of the partners – to 
continue the metaphor – isn’t working, then it is likely to break down and 
ultimately prove unsuccessful.  In terms of improving those relationships between 
the various local actors, the same civil servant felt that “the LAAs have brought 
us a long way” towards achieving that harmony, although he did accept this was 
not the case in every instance. 
 
Partners also spoke of the dangers that could arise when it came to delivering 
LAA on a day to day basis, where working tended to devolve downwards to a 
more appropriate level for effective working.  As indicated earlier in the chapter, if 
the organisation was too large (i.e. the PCT), then this could often limit the ability 
to achieve practical outcomes, as the actor conducting the work might lack the 
capacity to effect change.  Hazel Blears acknowledged that “if you don’t trust 
people and you send junior staff, then you get nothing done” d.  The fact that 
organisations had, in Blears’ view, become ‘risk averse’ meant that this was more 
likely to happen, as partners were keen to cover their own internal bases in a 
manner discussed earlier. 
 
Ultimately, whilst there partners were effusive about how good personal 
relationships from individual actors were essential to the delivery of the LAA, 
there was recognition that this was not always an easy process and often it 
required considerable effort.  One senior representative from the PCT described 
the process as being “like lining ducks up”, meaning that “success in anything 
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doesn’t rely on one factor, it relies on a series of things being lined up and if one 
of those is out of whack and the partnership doesn’t correct it then you’re not 
going to get there” n . 
 
7.10.1 Good Leaders 
Whilst it was evident that the partners felt that good interpersonal relationships 
with the other partners were essential to working, it also became clear that 
having a chair that embodied these values, and thus created the appropriate 
working environment, was also a core feature during this process.  Indeed, 
partners in both areas were full of praise for their leaders throughout this 
process, particularly Carol Perry (Chief Executive of Liverpool First) and Carole 
Hudson (Chief Executive of St Helens Council) who were able to make this 
happen.  One sentiment that embodied this way of working was that a good 
leader was: 
 
“somebody that will just say, well let’s just try it, let’s do it, let’s give it a 
go.  And if it goes wrong they might kick you, but you know that you 
can have a sensible conversation on what works and doesn’t work and 
take sensible risks, not daft risks but try new things out and she also 
lets people take responsibility… Now they keep a close eye on us, 
they audit us, they tell us if they’re not happy with it, which is fine.  But 
on the whole they trust us” m. 
 
At the central level it was also felt that a high quality of local leadership was 
essential for the LAA project to be a success.  John Denham compared a good 
leader to his experience of the schools system and how they adopt the national 
curriculum;  
 
“You can go into a really strongly led school and the head teacher will 
say ‘of course we deliver the national curriculum, it’s amongst the 
things we do’ and you can go into a poorly led school and the head 
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teacher will say ‘well we’re so constrained by the national curriculum 
that we can’t teach the way we want to’. 
 
I think you would go to some local authorities where the LAA was 
simply a part of telling the story about what the local authority was 
trying to achieve.  It sits comfortably with it, but they would have 
wider objectives and a broader picture, and they found it helpful in 
defining their role.  If you go to another place where they say well 
we’ve got this LAA but we’d rather be doing something else, then you 
say, well why don’t you do the other things as well?  Or they’d say 
this is what we’re trying to do, oh, and we’ve also got this LAA over 
there”.  l 
 
He identified that those leaders which actively worked the LAA into their area’s 
wider structures and projects were far more likely to achieve success than those 
that simply viewed the LAA as an extra level of bureaucracy above the work that 
they were undertaking anyway.  It became evident that Liverpool and St Helens - 
and the style of leadership that they had – embodied these values of using the 
LAA to augment their working.  This also transferred down to the agency level, 
with those agencies that viewed the LAA targets as simply being burdensome 
being less likely to gain under that system (see the debate about long term v 
short term).  Conversely, those organisations that actively embraced the LAA as 
a way to innovate their modus operandi (i.e. the fire service) were widely seen to 
flourish. 
 
Within this discussion of personal relationships, there is a question of serendipity 
i.e. can an area have all the people in each role that have the characteristics 
necessary to work successfully in partnership?  Of course, it could also equally 
illustrate good promotion and hiring strategies for those organisations to have the 
people involved and in those roles.  Most partners felt that the latter was the 
case, with one representative from the private sector saying that “you anticipate 
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having a respect and a regard for these people because they’re successful 
professional people and you meet them always, I was going to say almost 
always, but no, always it’s the case you go away thinking these guys have got 
where they are because they know what they’re doing” f. Thus, the element of 
professional respect that the senior actors delivering the LAA targets have for 
each other is also key.  It is assumed that to attain such a position within an 
organisation, an actor must have a reputation for good working and delivering 
against targets, which is a skill they would be expected to bring to the LAA.  
Therefore, these two aspects of professional respect and the general attitude 
cultivated through joint working with partners are closely linked and core to 
successful LAA delivery.  
 
Partners were also keenly aware that this state of good partnership could be 
fleeting, and depended heavily on the need for effective promotion to perpetuate 
this state, especially in organisations with a high operational turnover (i.e. the 
police, whose senior staff regularly moved roles).  As well as this, the ability for 
these relationships to continue in a post LAA environment was also recognised.   
 
The former Chief Executive of Liverpool City Council noted that, while the LAA 
was “always slightly susceptible to rotation of people … generally there was not 
sufficient turbulence to make that fracture,” although he did wonder if the post 
LAA restructuring of local government and subsequent staff loss/rotation would 
generate that turbulence and make such a fracture more likely.  When asked if 
they felt that the relationships that were built through working on the LAA would 
remain in place following its demise, one partner in St Helens felt that whilst “the 
personal relationship that we’ve built up will be there [it will] only be for a certain 
amount of time” h, implying once more that the subsequent staff rotation, as well 




The link between LAA success, personal relationships, trust and good leadership 
was summed up by Hazel Blears who said that: 
 
“the LAA frameworks were about relationships and if you’ve got good 
relationships you trust people and if you get the right people around 
the table who can make the decisions, then things will happen” 
 
7.11 Thematic Partnership v LAA Board 
The two-tier structure of the LSP (see figure 4.2), comprised of an LSP Executive 
Board containing all the key actors, as well as smaller thematic boards (focusing 
on strategic issues such as community safety and housing) provided a 
microcosm of some of the central questions about the governance and 
accountability of the LAA model.  In particular, questions revolved around how 
well partners would work together to hold each other to account and the 
dynamics of such a relationship.  Furthermore, it gave an indication of how well 
the partnership working on the LAA would break down the silo mentality that 
prevailed in both central and local government (Sullivan: 2006), or whether the 
smaller thematic groups would result in an ‘expanded silo’ of core actors to the 
exclusion of others (Davies: 2009). 
 
7.11.1 Executive Board 
The image that partners presented with regards to the executive board was 
mixed.  Fears that junior partners would be sent to those meetings, thus 
undermining their ability to achieve any particular stated aims, proved to be 
unfounded, with partners unanimous in their belief that the executive board of the 
LSP was a place where the key (high ranking) actors met on a regular basis.  
Where partners couldn’t attend, it was felt that they sent appropriate 
replacements (i.e. with the necessary authority) to act on their behalf.  However 
instances where this happened were rare.   
 
Similarly, partners praised the forum which they had to hold each other to 
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account, citing the ability to raise issues with those senior members directly.  
However, rather than engaging in public dressing downs, many of the senior 
members themselves alluded to the fact that often, they conducted their 
conversations discreetly on the fringes of the meeting.  Although stronger actors 
did emerge throughout the process, this did not mean that they became immune 
from scrutiny at the board meetings, with one partner described seeing “a couple 
of heads of service have a slap at those meetings on occasion, if they needed it” 
g, while another described how the chief executive would take partners to task 
over their contribution to various targets they might be able to impact upon.  
However, partners, particularly in St Helens, were at pains to point out what they 
described as the ‘maturity’ of these conversations in that they could have robust 
and open discussions with senior partners without, as one senior police officer 
put it, resorting to fits of pique and “taking their teddies home” j.  This links back 
to the earlier discussion of how personal relationships tended to shine through, 
often proving to be one of the lynchpins of effective working.  The fact that the 
each partner respected the other enough to accept what could amount to a public 
rebuke is key to the success of the executive board, as if this was not the case, 
the partnership would be rendered ineffective within only a few meetings. 
 
Partners were also keen to discuss the usefulness of the executive board to 
obtain external opinions on their internal business, particularly about how various 
actor’s agendas and outcomes might cross over.  One example cited by a 
business leader in St Helens was a discussion around improving health and how 
contributing towards those targets would in turn lead to a stronger business 
sector and economy.  What this highlighted was that partners did not go into 
these meetings purely to pursue in their own agendas, but instead there were 
instances where they were keen to participate and work with other partners. 
 
However, some partners were critical of the LSP executive board meetings and 
how the meetings linked through to partnership working.  One senior partner 
related a story of how, during one executive board meeting, the chair “didn’t talk 
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about anything to do with the LSP.  It was all council business and the council 
want this to happen and the council want this to happen.  So, it isn’t [distinct 
from] the council.”  This strongly links back to the concept of stronger actors once 
again, illustrating that a local authority does have the potential to dominate 
proceedings.  Again, as discussed earlier, this stems from the local authority’s 
convening powers and the resultant ability to both set and circulate the agenda 
prior to the meeting.  However it is understandable that other partners, 
particularly those which have less links to the council and its business, would find 
this frustrating and even regard it as a waste of their time. 
 
By observing the interactions of the partners at the executive level, and by 
discussing these observations with the partners individually, an interesting theme 
began to emerge with regards to their perceptions and their expectations of 
others.  Those partners which were identified earlier as being the ‘stronger 
actors’ (i.e. local authority, police and health) had a higher degree of expectation 
placed on them, compared to those newer or weaker actors.  As an illustration of 
this, during executive board meetings, the response that was given to the work 
that the ‘stronger actors’  were doing was one that could be seen to be bordering 
on complacency.  Much of this can be put down to expectation due to the 
experience that these partners have in their respective fields, but the process 
gave the impression that these actors were in fact the lynchpin of the entire LAA 
process.   
 
In contrast those smaller partners, which were not identified as being ‘stronger’ 
were treated with far more reverence in terms of their contribution to 
proceedings, almost like a child reaching a first milestone in their life - such as 
learning to walk.  However it was unclear whether this was because the partners 
wished to further encourage such behaviour, were genuinely impressed, or some 




7.11.2 Thematic Partnership 
The working groups that operated beneath the executive board – thematic 
partnerships – were widely praised as being the venue where much of the 
decisions about the delivery of the LAA targets were made.  One senior 
representative from Liverpool’s local authority put it down to the fact that they 
were much more issue based, with a higher level of detail.  As a result, in the 
view of the same partner, “the people that were actually driving performance 
were sat on those sub groups”. k 
 
Indeed, this issue based outlook meant that those present on the partnership 
could attempt to get beneath certain problems, to the extent that a monthly two 
hour executive board meeting would not necessarily allow.  One way that this 
presented itself was the ability to invite experts into a meeting format, reflecting 
parliamentary select committees, where partners could ask a number detailed 
questions about performance or delivery without facing the limitations of a multi-
purpose meeting agenda.   
 
However, this praise was not universal and, like the broader executive group 
itself, there was frustration amongst the partners about the varying quality of the 
work being done through the thematic partnerships.  Yet, this can at least in part 
be attributed to the actors within each group and their style of working (see: 
earlier discussion about long term v short term based organisations).  Those 
groups which were widely seen to be successful were those which had a short-
term action based outlook.  In particular the Crime and Community Safety 
Partnership in both areas was considered to be the most successful thematic 
partnerships, with one partner in particular citing the involvement of only a few 
key actors as a main reason (the over-population of partnerships being seen as a 
downside – something that will be discussed later) which made working towards 
common goals easier. 
 
Indeed one partner who sat on the Community Safety Partnership was of the 
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view that this was more effective than the LAA and LSP board structures in 
reducing crime in the area, citing examples of joint working to reduce violent 
crime and drug use that was undertaken through the thematic partnership.  
However, this is something of a short sighted view, overlooking whether or not 
the various partners would turn up to a ‘community safety partnership’ were they 
not compelled to by the LAA structures.   
 
Again, reflecting trends discussed earlier, the thematic partnerships that were 
perceived as being less successful were those involving long-term strategy 
oriented partners, where there was more of a risk of them becoming ‘talking 
shops’ – a derogatory phrase referring to a meeting where lots of discussion took 
place, but resulted in little action as a result.  Confirming this, partners discussed 
how the thematic partnerships, particularly surrounding public health, became 
forums for reporting progress – much like the executive board – as opposed to 
forums for deciding action.  One actor who became disillusioned with this 
discussed how they were not convinced that these groups were responsible for 
instigating action on LAA targets, but instead that “people would go out and 
[deliver LAA priorities separately] within their own organisation”.  As a result, the 
partner felt that the thematic partnership groups were about ensuring all partners 
shared the same set of priorities, which they would then take back to their 
organisation to deliver. 
 
This practice can also be better understood by considering the membership of 
groups where one partner is clearly stronger in the delivery aspect and so is 
likely to dominate the partnership and its action against its targets.  Indeed, 
another partner r confirmed that in their view, some partnerships became a venue 
for reporting progress, particularly if a target was not being achieved.  Developing 
further, the same partner said that if any target was not being achieved, the 
question would not be ‘“what are we doing about it as a group?”  Instead the 
partner with responsibility would discuss their response, with the emphasis not 
being placed on a collective decision to change approach.     
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Again the difference in organisational approach and the danger of ‘talking shops’ 
came to the fore with one partner h noting their view that everybody attended with 
‘best intentions’ yet they ‘couldn’t understand why or how we could talk for 6 or 7 
months around a problem and not have fixed it’.  Indeed for the partner it was 
one of the dawning moments of how the partnership required working with actors 
whose institutions moved at different paces, providing them with a realisation and 
that it would require a significant culture change in order to effect meaningful 
delivery in that environment. 
  
As well as dominant partners, which drove the partnership from within their own 
organisational structures, there was also the allusion to ‘sleeping partners’ which, 
whilst present on the various partnerships, did little to contribute.  This was a 
source of significant frustration for some of the more action orientated partners.  
While partners involving themselves in, and contributing to, a wide range of LAA 
business was cited as being amongst the top examples of best practice to 
emerge from the local governance of LAAs, when partners only wanted the 
perception of involvement, this drew strong criticism.  One partner i discussed 
how ‘you still get some people who feel they want to be on groups because it’s 
there’ whilst offering little to further joint working.  The same partner also alluded 
to the fact that the groups which had made efforts to curtail this kind of practice, 
either by actively involving the partner, or limiting the attendance of the thematic 
partnerships to those that would contribute, were more likely to be those 
achieving success. 
 
Despite this, there was muted criticism amongst partners for some groups which 
sought to limit membership, even when partners felt they may have had 
something useful to offer.  One such example was the housing thematic 
partnership, which sat with the relevant bodies in the area relating to housing 
provision (i.e. registered social landlords) only.  This was cited as being due to 
them discussing market sensitive issues.  This led to criticism, not only of the fact 
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that it prevented good joint working across the partnership in the vein of cross-
sector working discussed earlier, but also that it showed a lack of trust that has 
identified as being essential for effective partner relationships.  
 
As discussed throughout this chapter, one partner touched on the fact that the 
LAA was the delivery document for a partnership of distinct organisations which 
required being able to respond to “different cultures and that could be down to 
even an operational level in a particular area of the city.”  This reflected the 
thoughts of another partner n on the subject who noted that “culture is very 
important inside organisations; leadership and culture … supported by action”.  
The same partner then summed up the key ingredients for success in a thematic 
partnership in that partners should share a common vision without it feeling like it 
was “pushing water uphill”.   
 
What became clear was that effective thematic groups (and by extension the 
partnership itself) became about regulating each organisation’s involvement, 
being seen to act as a useful partner without being over or under involved.  The 
challenge of hitting this Goldilocks zone of being ‘just right’ was one which few 
partners achieved in the eyes of their peers, even when being praised universally 
for other aspects of their work.  The danger of falling outside of this zone was 
summed up by a respondent from the fire and rescue service who said that “if 
nobody turns up to your meeting, then there’s something wrong with your 
meeting” but given that, broadly speaking, this did not occur, the executive board 
and thematic partnership aspects of the LAA can be considered a success. 
 
7.11.3 A Comment on Davies’ Expanded Silo Theory 
One of the main reasons behind introducing partnership working, delivered 
through the LAA, was an attempt to break down the silo mentality that ran 
through both central and local government (Sullivan: 2007).  Davies (2009) 
contended that contrary to achieving this, partnership working would maintain the 
silos, albeit slightly expanded to cover actors with similar interests, as different 
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groups broke away to pursue their own relevant goals/targets. 
 
After considering the responses of partners, Davies’ expanded silo theory 
appears to closely resemble the reality of LAA delivery.   This is given that the 
thematic partnerships proved to be the real driving force behind the effective 
aspects of the LAA, coupled with the fact that those effective thematic 
partnerships attained this due to an exclusivity of membership.  The most 
effective partnership in the eyes of the partners (community safety) contains two 
examples that amply illustrate this point.  The first is the fact that while the police 
were the key movers on this partnership – despite being strongly criticised as 
being ‘one dimensional’ elsewhere (i.e. outside of their silo) - as well as the fact 
that limiting membership of the partnership to only the key stakeholders was 
perceived as key to its success. 
 
Ultimately, in this regard the LAAs failed to assist in the breakdown of the silo 
culture, either at a central level or more pertinently at the local level, but instead 
helped to foster a new sense of silo working, albeit within an expanded context.  
However, testimony from the partners has largely shown that despite this, these 
expanded silo groups can still be amongst the most effective methods of 
attaining delivery, as opposed to a wide ranging, multi actor partnership. 
 
7.12 Local Politics 
One of the main avenues of investigation at the national overview stage was 
whether party politics – particularly in areas where control of the council was in 
opposition to that of central government – played a role in the effectiveness of 
the LAA.  The overview survey clearly demonstrated that party politics had no 




However, when exploring this in the case studies, partners broadly reported that 
party politics had little impact on the implementation of the LAA29.  One partner in 
St Helens reported that party politics was kept out of the LAA process, citing their 
belief that this took place in other, more appropriate forums.  Indeed across both 
case studies, the view that the LAA delivery remained broadly apolitical was 
widely held. 
 
However, partners did comment on councillors and their perceived level of 
helpfulness.  This was largely attributed to the difference between what the 
council and the electorate believe to be ‘core-business’.  The former Chief 
Executive of Liverpool City Council spoke about the dynamic between ‘visible 
core’ and ‘invisible core’ business;  “Visible core is what the public perception 
often is, so it’s bins, streets, potholes, street lights, parks, dog fouling, parking.  
But there’s a huge invisible core which is actually more expensive, which is care 
for the elderly, child protection, things that people don’t see but actually can sap 
a huge amount of money.”   Confirming this, one partner in St Helens spoke of 
how the Leader of St Helens Council, Marie Rimmer, would say “her biggest 
mailbox issue as the leader of the labour party [in St Helens], and now the leader 
of the council, is dog fouling.  Now we were sat [in a] group meeting, and we 
were talking about, I’m interested in education and employment, as a voter, and 
the case of employment and where these people go and what we do with them, 
and health and she said “but all I get is letters about dog fouling”” h.   
 
In seeking to understand why councillors were like this, one partner in St Helens 
discussed a rationale where it’s important to “never forget, the councillors main 
aim is to get re-elected.  That’s all they’re interested in, how do I get re-elected? 
And they will not do anything to jeopardise that, and therefore if you keep that in 
mind you’ll always know where they’re coming from” h.  Thus, while the visible 
aspect of council core-business might not tally with the strategic aims of the LAA, 
                                            
29
 Even in St Helens which was of no overall control and reported that elected representatives 
were of little help 
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councillors are duty-bound to represent their constituents and their concerns in 
order to be seen to be effective in their jobs.  
 
Although there is little evidence from the overview or the interviews that party 
politics amongst councillors had any impact on the ability to deliver the LAA, 
there was a hint that the same was not always true when the local area’s 
members of parliament were considered.  In Liverpool (an area which has only 
had one year of government that has matched the political affiliation of Whitehall 
since 1979), one partner commented that “cities which had the same political 
affiliation had much stronger political politician to politician relationships with 
ministers” and where this was not the case in Liverpool “you almost got to a 
position at times where your own local MPs of a different party would undermine 
your position with their own ministers [in government] and I think it did not supply 
the advantage that certain cities have had”. 
 
The fact that Whitehall politics could be seen to have a significant impact on LAA 
delivery links back to a significant number of the findings detailed in the previous 
chapter on vertical relations.  While partners did not feel that local politics was an 
issue, with many people acting for the good of the area, the cultivation of good 
links at the central level could lead to the undermining of a scheme that could 
benefit a politician’s local area.  This illustrates once again the importance that 
vertical relations hold in the implementation of a local public service delivery 
scheme and the danger that can arise from actors which – in theory at least – are 









7.13 Chapter Seven: Theoretical Reflections 
Referring back to the theoretical framework in Chapter Four, and building on the 
theoretical reflections at the end of Chapter Six, the significant theoretical 
considerations with regards to this chapter were the Strategic Relational 
Approach and New Institutionalism/Path Dependency. 
  
Chapter six allowed us to consider the application of the SRA to centre-local 
relations in order to consider which actors (if any) were privileged by the LAA 
process.  Now, following the discussions in this chapter, we can consider 
whether any actor(s) at the local level were privileged by the LAA.  Compared to 
the national level there are no clear beneficiaries from this process.  However, it 
is clear that some actors were better suited to participate in the LAA than others.  
In particular the police and Primary Care Trust were consistently discussed as 
actors to whom the LAA process suited.  This was due to their funding levels in 
particular, but also their past experience of dealing with local authority work.  It is 
no coincidence that these actors are same ones which have direct accountability 
ties to central government.  Indeed, this should be seen in conjunction with the 
findings presented in Chapter Six, which point to central actors (and central 
priorities) being able to dominate the local decision making process. 
  
However, the emergence of a group of actors which sought to maximise their 
opportunity to work at a strategic level through the LAA (most notably the fire and 
rescue service) indicate that, at the local level, this privileging was not as clear.  
Given that these actors forged a strong role for themselves in an environment to 
which they were not accustomed, whilst also winning the respect of other 
partners, it indicates that in some cases, the LAA had particular success in 
delivering a more effective partnership of local actors, rather than a pure delivery 
of central priorities at a local level.  However, this also reflects Goodwin and 
Pemberton’s earlier work on the SRA, in that actors sought to maximise their 
opportunities to work within a system for the benefit of their organisation, 
whenever such an opportunity arose (Goodwin and Pemberton: 2010).  However, 
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in the case of the fire and rescue service especially, this did appear to be for 
more altruistic reasons than selfishness. 
 
A consideration of path dependency allows us to reflect on how actor’s behaviour 
influenced the LAA.  In short, this theory contends that actors act the way they do 
based upon past behaviour and working practices which are applied to new 
situations despite the fact that they may be inefficient.  Several actors in 
particular embody this, most notably the police.  The police’s reluctance 
(bordering on refusal) to embrace measures which – while having a long term 
effect on their statistics – did not immediately help to reduce crime figures is an 
example of this.   
 
The other prominent example of this is how partners could not adapt to either 
short or long term working, based on their organisation’s original preference.  
The fire and rescue service in particular struggled to adapt to long term strategy 
meetings, deriding them as ‘talking shops, while organisations such as the PCT 
struggled with short term action.    This inability to adapt was one of the most 
prominent indications that an actor’s prior methods of working (which they 
deemed to be effective) could limit their ability to work with other actors, even 
when this may have been beneficial. 
 
In all, studying the LAA at a local case study has shown that there is strong 
evidence to support the notion of path dependency in terms of local actors and 
the way that they act.  Any further study could explore how these paths might be 
broken in order to deliver greater efficiencies and better partnership working. 
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Chapter Eight – Policy Lessons and Improving Future Practice 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Whereas the previous two chapters have looked at how LAAs were implemented 
– both vertically and horizontally – the aim of this chapter is to provide more of a 
forward looking perspective.  With this in mind, the chapter aims to establish 
whether the LAA project was a success, drawing on partner’s views to identify 
the significant policy failures and successes. 
 
Following on from this, the chapter will firstly discuss how the Labour 
Government envisaged the LAAs developing under a hypothetical fourth term in 
office, before moving on to evaluate the Coalition Government’s proposals for 
local public service delivery.  This exercise will attempt to provide an analysis of 
the extent to which the policy failings/successes identified in the first part of the 
chapter might be remedied in future schemes. 
 
8.2 Were LAAs a success? 
During the interview process every participant was given the opportunity to hold 
forth on whether they believed the LAA project was a success or not in terms of 
facilitating good partnership working, local governance and most importantly 
effective local governance.  As became apparent during the previous chapters, 
there is a spectrum of views, yet despite this a broad thread emerges which 
tends to reflect most views.  Overall, although the partners took a generally 
positive view on LAAs, these views were largely qualified. 
 
8.2.1 Yes 
Few partners gave unreserved praise to the LAA.  One might expect the ‘weaker’ 
actors identified in chapter seven to be more likely to consider the LAA a 
success, given the boost that these organisations have received in terms of their 
ability to operate within a local area.  However one of the partners from an 
organisation widely regarded to be the strongest, i.e. the PCT, has also 
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considered the LAA a success indicating that it is not solely self interest that led 
the partners to take this view. 
 
One of the most significant reasons cited for the success of the LAA was the fact 
it was a major component of a one document system providing the direction of 
local public service delivery for an area as opposed to strategy/delivery 
documents for a plethora of agencies.  In the words of one partner it was “the first 
time I remember the electorate in St Helens could go and draw a single 
document off and see what the place was like… what the priorities were, and 
then the performance management on them and say how are we doing on 
each?” h  As an example of this, figure 8.1 illustrates an example of an indicator 
and target from St Helens’ LAA. 
 





















activity and  
















Figure 8.1 - An example of indicator reporting from St Helens’ LAA 
(Source: St Helens Together: 2008) 
 
Similarly the partnership angle of the LAA was noted as a contributing factor, with 
one partner praising the LAA as being “a really good way of trying to identify the 
things that matter to local areas and get those as the things that people are 
focused on jointly” d although, as the earlier chapters have illustrated, the extent 
to which this worked in practice varied significantly.   Another partner praised the 
LAA for its ability to “bring people together to address common issues” q citing its 
ability to do this where previously those partners existed in silos, as a key 
indicator of its success.  However, the same partner pointed to the difficulty of 
rating the LAA as a quantitative target based exercise, noting that many of the 
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benefits such as improved partnership working are largely qualitative and difficult 
to accurately measure. 
 
Most interestingly of all, the LAA won plaudits at the national level, not from the 
politicians - whose political baby it was - but from the senior civil servants who 
implemented the scheme and were tasked with designing and implementing the 
LAA’s successors.  They point to people within Westminster that “launched 
investigations30 into LAAs and then dropped them because … [they] were 
impressed actually, as a policy” o.  This led the civil servants to describe the LAA 
as ‘the dog that doesn’t bark’ o as it proved to be effective despite any overt 
showiness.   
 
The civil servants also pointed to how LAAs caused a shift in the culture of 
Whitehall.  This resulted in ministers becoming reluctant to force departmental 
priorities into an LAA because it meant they had to potentially pick a fight, not 
with the area, but with their cabinet colleague with whom they were competing for 
resources.   This mean that that rather than attempting to “unstitch an 
LAA…[politicians] backed down because they realised that actually, the way the 
system has been created, everyone has to jump together” o otherwise, a 
politician can be seen to be bringing about difficulties for local areas based purely 
on selfish reasons.  This in turn could have implications for the politician (and the 
government) on a national scale i.e. through negative media headlines over 
divisions and arguments within the cabinet. 
 
8.2.2 No 
There were a limited number of partners, many of whom delivered the sternest 
criticisms of the LAA, who believed that it was not a success.  One representative 
from the private sector used this analogy: 
 
                                            
30
 i.e. To find evidence that the LAA was ineffective, wasteful or inefficient in order to discredit the 
LAA and by extension, the government. 
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“It’s like turning up at Stratford, expecting to see a full production 
of Hamlet and finding the Reduced Shakespeare Company on 
stage doing the whole thing in three minutes.  You get the flavour 
of what the play was about, you get a little bit of the humour, a 
little bit of the drama, but you don’t really see any of it.” f 
 
By this, they meant that the LAA only assisted with telling part of the story of local 
government, later referring to it as a ‘guttered approach’ which led to missing 
much of the nuance that they felt was important to local government work.  
 
One of the other more prominent critics of the LAA – the police – also summed 
up whether they believed the LAA model was a success in one word: “no”.  When 
asked to elaborate, they cited the difficulties of joining up the work of various 
thematic partnerships to the wider LSP group, so that all partners were working 
towards delivering LAA targets.  This points again towards the expanded silo 
theory (Davies: 2009) in which the LAA/LSP structures broaden the silo, but still 
ultimately prevent full partnership working.  They also pointed to their belief that 
the LAA failed to deliver ‘added value’ in breaking down/expanding these silos, 
stating their view that they “would put any money on the targets that have been 
set in the LAA would’ve been achieved in any event because each of the 
individual partners would’ve been working on those targets anyway.  So nothing 
different has come from it.” 
 
This strong criticism of the LAA and it’s ability to deliver added value is notable 
for the irony in the fact that the partner that held this view represents the one 
partner most singled out for praise as being the most effective in terms of actual 
target delivery.  This links back to the discussions held in chapter seven about 
whether the LAA suited a particular actor’s working methods, illustrating that 
whilst the police were one of those actors identified as being better suited to the 
LAA’s bureaucracy, this does not guarantee that those actors will buy into the 
system as a result. 
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8.2.3. To Some Extent 
However, perhaps as one might expect, the majority of interviewees were more 
measured in their analysis, with one partner summing this feeling up by 
comparing the LAA to the curate’s egg.  By this most partners contended that the 
LAA contained elements of both success and failure. 
 
One partner struck an ambiguous note declaring it to be “probably no worse, or 
no better than many other structures that have tried to do that in the past and 
probably will try to do it in the future” j, before going on to place the LAA as 
simply a necessary function of the New Labour style of government through 
performance management.  Developing this, another partner felt that, while the 
LAA hasn’t been an overall success, it helped to “foster better relationships and 
partnership working” c. One partner felt that while the LAA itself was a good, 
credible policy document, it remained to be seen how it would be delivered, 
stating that “it will only succeed if it is accepted by government and is properly 
resourced.” 
 
The tenuous post general election position of the LAA was one that was shared 
by a former Chief Executive of Liverpool City Council.  He felt that the LAA 
arrangement was ‘fragile’ and susceptible to the “new environment of the public 
sector [which] is going to be a big test [of their resilience]” k  In particular he felt 
that “partners in successful areas will continue to work together” but any scheme 
ran the risk of those partners working in less successful parts of the LAA seeking 
to extricate themselves from the process at the first opportunity, causing 
fragmentation and a return to organisational silos. 
 
8.2.4 LAAs as a ‘Staging Post’ 
A viewpoint which seems to best fit the overall findings of the research requires a 
reframing of the question as to whether the LAA has been a success or not.  
There were a notable number of partners that felt that the LAA could be 
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considered a success as a staging post for local public service delivery rather 
than an end in itself. 
 
The idea was first discussed by a senior civil servant from GONW who felt that 
the LAA was an effective “stepping stone towards central-local devolution, rather 
than the culmination of central-local devolution”.  If the LAA was considered in 
those terms then, in the civil servant’s view, it would be fair to consider it a 
success.  However if the LAA was to be considered the culmination of this 
process, whereby all policy development would stop and continue along this 
model, then it was not a success – owing to the sizeable number of weaknesses 
identified during the course of the previous chapters.  In this regard, the civil 
servant was clear that much work was still needed on a policy system that was 
showing signs of being effective. 
 
This was a view that was largely shared by John Denham who emphasised the 
importance, once again, of viewing the process as a journey in continued need of 
review and adjustment.  Under this premise, identifying the two areas of centre-
local relations and cross-service cooperation as major themes, John Denham felt 
that it “has been a success because we are in a lot better place than we were 
before we started.”  Again, echoing the thoughts of the representative from 
GONW, John Denham felt that if you asked if the LAA had “sealed the deal; has 
this re-defined [local governance] forever? then no, of course it hasn’t” l. 
 
One senior police officer best summed up the LAA model through the use of a 
simple ‘marks out of 10’ concept.  He gave the LAA 7/10, praising it for its 
freedom of choice and its effectiveness as a regime, before citing weaknesses in 
some of the targets.  However, while noting that 7/10 was not a perfect score, 
‘you’d pass most of your exams with that’ j.  This statement really best reflects 
the majority of partner views on the LAA, in that it was a relative success as a 
policy programme, yet still retained room for improvement in future schemes. 
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8.3 What where the policy successes? 
It has already been mentioned that success in an LAA is akin to the successful 
family of Anna Karenina, whereby “successful families are all alike, but 
unsuccessful families are different in every way” or, as one partner put it “It’s like 
lining ducks up, Success in anything doesn’t rely on one factor, it relies on a 
series of things being lined up and if one of those is out of whack and the 
partnership doesn’t correct it then you’re not going to get there”.  However within 
this, there were a number of specific policy successes identified by partners, 
which contributed towards effective LAA delivery, although it is fair to say that the 
strengths identified by partners were outweighed by weaknesses. 
 
The indicator and target system which formed the spine of every LAA was 
identified as being one of the central successes by John Denham, as it enabled 
local areas to be stretched in order to attain results that they might not achieve 
otherwise.  He used the example of A&E waiting times to illustrate the point, 
saying that while high targets were rarely met, hospitals often attained waiting 
times that were very close to this target– something that they would fail to do 
without being stretched. 
 
Another partner praised the executive board and thematic partnership aspect of 
the LAA delivery mechanisms as being a significant success as it allowed for 
‘jointly celebrating’ achievements as a partnership and publicly demonstrated 
how things were going well as a spur for further action, rather than just a forum 
for criticism of partners. 
 
8.4 What where the significant policy weaknesses? 
Compared to the strengths, partners were much clearer about what the policy 
failings and weaknesses of the LAA were and held forth on a variety of issues. 
 
One partner spoke of how the various sub-partnerships tasked with delivering the 
LAA lacked formal accountability to the partnership, which could limit the action 
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that might need to be taken if indicators were not met.  Instead the sub-
partnerships were described as just “a gathering of likeminded people.”  
Reflecting on the accountability measures for partners, another partner spoke of 
the need for clearer, and more partner-specific financial rewards, feeling that “if 
the PCT succeeding affected my funding, I’d be a lot closer to the PCT and 
probably vice versa” g.  Thus, while the LAA proved an effective vehicle for 
getting partners to engage on likeminded ventures, partners clearly felt that the 
methods of tying them together in order to deliver results could be improved. 
 
A number of partners felt that the lead in time to develop the LAA served as a 
particular weakness, particularly in an environment where there were a wide 
range of views to be considered and filtered.  While the case of the voluntary 
sector was considered in the previous chapter, one respondent also pointed to 
the nature of the two-tier district and county structure of local government 
(although largely dismissed within the national overview survey as significantly 
impacting LAA delivery) and how reflecting the needs of multiple districts within a 
short timeframe could be considered a limitation. 
 
The other significant weakness identified by several partners was the presence 
of indicators on which they were unable to take any action against due to 
limitations on legislation.  In many cases this required primary legislation from 
Westminster in order to create the environment where local areas could take 
meaningful action.  A full account of this is provided in the previous chapter. 
 
8.5 Learning Lessons: Improving Future Practice 
Whilst this chapter is largely dedicated to identifying the policy lessons from 
LAAs and thus improving future practice, different anecdotes emerge from the 
case study process which cast doubts over some partners’ willingness or ability 
to seek out and learn these lessons.  This is despite the essential need for 
partners at all levels to engage in a lesson-learning process to improve their own 
practices at the very least given the cyclical nature of government.  One partner 
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who formerly worked for the Civil Service identified this need, quoting Former 
United States of America President Harry Truman who said “there’s nothing new, 
only the history that you don’t know yet” m and pointing out how this is telling of 
public policy.  Similarly, although oft repeated, an awareness of the line ‘those 
who don’t learn from history are doomed to repeat it’ is also pertinent, in order to 
prevent the needless repetition of pitfalls in future schemes. 
 
However, despite this, in the period following the election of the Coalition 
Government – when it became clear the LAA model was to be scrapped – some 
partners were reticent to participate in an exercise that involved reflecting upon 
previous initiatives.  Although widely praised as a strong leader, and a key driver 
in the success of their LAA, the Chief Executive of St Helens council epitomised 
this view, declining to take part in any interview because “as the LAA's have been 
abolished, views of the LAA's now seem largely irrelevant.”31  When this was 
raised with other officers within the council, they replied that this represented a 
willingness to look to the future rather than the past despite, as outlined earlier, 
the importance of learning lessons, especially in an environment which will still 
largely involve the kind of partnership working that occurred under LAAs. 
 
Thankfully, this outlook was limited to only a few actors, and most people were 
willing to reflect upon the LAA process. 
 
8.6 What did partners want to see? 
After considering the overall successes and shortcomings of the LAA, both in 
overall terms and in terms of detailed aspects of policy, all the partners identified 
aspects of the LAA that they would like to see changed in order to improve the 
future practice of local public service delivery.  They can be placed in several 
broad categories covering the range of the life of the LAA. 
 
 
                                            
31
 In an email communication. 
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8.6.1 Learn from Pilots 
One of the central themes for improvement is that of better lesson learning – 
particularly from the LAA pilots.  One senior civil servant who formerly worked at 
GOR noted that “[Central Government] would undertake these pilots, but before 
the ink was dry... they were rolling out the main initiative without any period of 
learning” m.  As a result the main LAA programme was instigated without really 
addressing any of the shortcomings that would arise, thus allowing them to filter 
through to the full rollout.  The same partner saw little scope for change in this 
regard (something that this chapter will focus on) due to “the political 
environment and the imperatives of the timescales and so forth that we were not 
very good, in a systematic way, of piloting things, learning from the pilot, 
adjusting and then rolling out” m. 
 
8.6.2 Negotiation 
Reflecting on some of the policy weaknesses and focusing on the genesis of 
each individual LAA, many of the partners wanted to see more time allocated to 
the initial negotiation of the LAA, with the addition of a ‘front loading process.’  
One of the reasons cited for this was down to the fact that “it was local authority 
led and some of the other partners were unfamiliar with the process” q and the 
time it took them to get up to speed left some partners “a little bit behind in 
relation to the knowledge and understanding of what it means and what the 
implications are” q  Another partner felt that this short timeframe was exacerbated 
by the need to build “good partnership relationships and systems” before work 
could begin properly in order to “get a meaningful local area agreement” r.  
However, if LSP structures remain when moving forward into any successor to 
the LAA, this issue might be negated.  To help this process, the same partner felt 
that “clearer information at the outset around the process… would’ve been nice” 
although they accept the difficulties of achieving this with a new policy scheme. 
 
Consequently, what is required is an adequate period, prior to formal negotiation 
on any potential document, dedicated to relationship building.  With this in mind, 
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one partner said that any future partnership initiative should attempt to frontload 
the process.  This could be achieved by allowing the partners to meet 
beforehand to discuss their responsibilities and shared interests, in order to build 
a more effective agreement, and consequently a more deliverable agreement 
that partners are happier with. 
 
However, reflecting the evidence of central predetermination of indicators 
discussed in chapter six, one partner working in Liverpool’s local authority felt 
that a shorter negotiation period would be helpful, cutting out what they termed 
‘artificial negotiation’ a (i.e. negotiation on targets that they believed were subject 
to top-down pressure) and thus avoiding significant wasting of time and man 
hours.  They suggest that if this predetermination is the case, central government 
should be open about this, saying that “if there’s only room for manoeuvre on 5% 
of it…let local authorities across the country get on with delivering [the other] 
95% of it and have a much smaller streamlined process to just tinker with the 
edges” a with the resultant process taking a matter of weeks rather than months. 
 
While there is validity in avoiding a costly and time consuming, but ultimately 
pointless target negotiation process, the points made by the other partners of 
‘front loading’ the process in terms of the partnership remain valid.  The time 
taken to introduce partners to each other, their priorities and organisational 
structures has the potential to yield greater results as the scheme develops, 
reflecting the Invest v Spend argument discussed in chapter seven. 
 
8.6.3 Fewer Targets 
Reflecting on the discussions raised in chapter six, the number of national 
indicators contained within each LAA was a popular issue in terms of improving 
future practice.  Interestingly, no partner argued for an increase in targets, even 
at the central level, and few argued for the status quo of up to 35 to remain.  Yet, 
the issue of striking a balance between too many/few targets was also felt in 
order to set a reasonable, but workable agenda. 
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Overwhelmingly, the opinion of partners was for a further reduction in the 
performance indicators, continuing the trend which initially reduced them to the 
35.  Partners focused on the unmanageability and the unrealistic aspect of 
having 35 priorities for an area, with even senior civil servants questioning if an 
area really could have 35 priorities.  One partner also reflected that the statutory 
education targets only added to this burden, and even without these statutory 
targets it led to “about 20 targets too many” suggesting an area have no more 
than 15 targets.  This figure of around 15 targets was frequently raised by 
partners in terms of a realistic number of targets to focus upon.  Interestingly, this 
is the same number of outcomes as is utilised in the Scottish Local Output 
Agreement (Scottish Government: 2008). 
 
The furthest that a partner goes in terms of indicator reduction is the selection of 
3-4 top priorities for an area, supported by 50 other indicators for central priorities 
– again a reduction from the 198 that were initially used/monitored in the original 
LAA.  This returns to the issue of stronger actors and their potential domination of 
the local agenda, and has the potential to significantly amplify these concerns if 
there are only a few priorities within a local public service delivery scheme. 
 
8.6.4 Outcomes 
In many regards, the performance management aspect of the LAA was 
considered to be an essential factor of any future scheme with one partner noting 
that “if [tax payers] are spending money on this, [they] really should know what 
[they’ve] got for that” d.  Similarly they noted that the performance management 
aspect is useful for engaging partners by illustrating how they can contribute, and 
how the LAA affects them. 
 
However, there were calls for more uniformity of the indicator/target selection to 
end the occurrence of instances where LAA targets could differ from the internal 
targets set by individual agencies with one partner calling for LAAs to “respect 
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local drivers within different statutory bodies who are trying to deliver things” j by 
ensuring that LAA targets were set at the same level as each partner agency and 
across the same timeframe.  Otherwise, in the same partner’s view “all you’re 
doing is confusing people” j. 
 
8.6.5 Realistic Outcomes 
Whilst there was a significant amount of praise for the indicator/outcome based 
model of performance management – albeit with in depth criticisms – partners 
indicated that they would welcome a move which gave some of the indicators a 
more realistic slant. 
 
Several partners pointed to indicator targets that required primary legislation in 
order to be effectively delivered.  As indicated in chapter six, the most prominent 
example of this was traffic congestion, with an indicator LAAs were compelled to 
adopt, yet local areas lacked the powers locally to make effective changes to 
public transport provision to deliver against the target.  While no partner made a 
realistic argument about the creation of such powers for local areas, instead they 
suggested that a greater awareness of what was in the power of local authorities 
to deliver would be more beneficial.  As such some partners wished to see the 
suite of indicators more closely vetted to reflect this. 
 
8.6.6 Less Top Down 
Reflecting some of the significant themes to arise from chapter six, one of the 
common themes for partner improvements focuses on the central-local aspect of 
LAAs.  Within this a common theme was reducing the amount of top-down 
control that the centre has over local areas, although numerous ways of 
achieving this are suggested. 
 
There was a conflict about how GOR fitted into this procedure, with one partner 
in St Helens wanting to see “less involvement from Government Office North 
West, which had become an irritation to the LSP” h, reflecting some of the  
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themes about how GOR exercised their role as centre-local intermediary.  
However Whitehall saw it slightly differently, indicating that their analysis made a 
case for a stronger ‘Executive Regional Minister’ presiding over a more powerful 
regional infrastructure which – in the words of John Denham - would “create 
precisely that level of regional autonomy of action from central government that 
the councils perhaps were looking for in their regional bodies” l. A move in this 
direction, contended Whitehall, would simultaneously solve the problem of GOR 
which is perceived (and is, in practice) to be delivering a Whitehall agenda whilst 
also reducing the perception of top-down control by providing some element of 
distance between Whitehall and the local authorities. 
 
However, echoing thoughts expressed by a wide variety of partners, John 
Denham points out that a total ‘let go’ by central government is unlikely to 
happen when “50% upwards of your money comes from central government, in a 
political culture in which central government is held to account for local failings” l.  
In making his point he alluded to the ‘Baby P Case’32.  He spoke of how a “local 
government minister went to Utrecht to a European government conference at 
the time of the baby P scandal and [they] couldn’t find anybody from any other 
European country who could understand why the central government was 
involved in the Baby P case” l.  Explaining this, and contrasting Britain with 
Europe, he felt that an environment exists in the UK where “people look to the 
government to hold Haringey council to account” l.  In many ways this merely 
reflects the highly centralised culture of UK government alluded to throughout 
this research, but remains something that should be considered when 
considering the reflection on how to create a less top-down policy environment. 
 
Given the contention that a total ‘let go’ by Whitehall is an unrealistic option, one 
partner instead called for a clearer distinction to be drawn over what central 
government see as mandatory within any local public service delivery.  Pointing 
                                            
32
 [A child abuse case which caught the public attention in 2009/10, principally involving the child 
protection services from Haringey Council, but in which Central Government became involved] 
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to the pressure that was placed on local areas by Whitehall departments (as 
discussed in chapter six) the partner felt it “would’ve been helpful for us to be 
very clear how local an agreement it was” r, suggesting that instead of Whitehall 
departments placing pressure on the local authority to adopt indicators (including 
through threat of funding withdrawal etc) they should simply make more 
indicators mandatory – should a case be made that they were of sufficient 
importance that all local areas should be required to report on them.  This also 
reflects the notion of ‘artificial negotiation’ of targets that would be included in an 
LAA regardless, discussed earlier in the chapter. 
 
8.6.7. Partnership 
One of the popular themes amongst partners was a focus on improving the 
strength of partnership working in future schemes, and in doing so responding to 
weaknesses in the LAA process, particularly in its earlier stages.  Indeed John 
Denham notes that “the LAA process in retrospect didn’t provide such clear 
incentives to participate” l, although this has been shown to vary across partners. 
 
The biggest way that partners suggested this could be achieved was through the 
‘front loading’ negotiation process outlined earlier in the chapter.  However, 
rather than focusing on the selection and negotiation of indicators and targets, 
the partners felt that time would be best spent on ‘simple relationship building’ – 
i.e. allowing partners to forge working relationships before negotiation began.  
Before beginning work on the detailed aspects of the LAA, partners felt it would 
be useful to spend some time “developing an understanding of what each other’s 
objectives are” n before then trying to identify a common purpose which links 
these objectives and consequently forms the basis of mutually beneficial 
partnership working.  Furthermore, to achieve this partners pointed to the 
importance of the creation of an environment where each actor could approach 
each other with an ‘openness and candour’ about their objectives, something 
which would be helpful both at an early stage, and throughout delivery as well. 
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There was also a feeling that this process, whilst very important at the beginning 
in order to establish a sense of common purpose and understanding, needs to be 
a continuous one in order to be effective.  One partner’s experiences of the LAA 
suggested it would be unwise to “assume or take for granted what a partner said 
five years ago is what they still think” due to the fact that all organisations move 
on” n.  This reflects the fact that organisational priorities can change, particularly 
noting those organisations like the police which operate on a short time scale, but 
also actors within institutions can change i.e. through promotion or retirement.  
Given the importance of personal working relationships cited in chapter seven, a 
constant process of fostering these relationships and ensuring that partners are 
all aware of their priorities and current operational outlook is essential. 
 
Amongst the ‘weaker’ actors identified in chapter seven, there is also an 
indication that they wish their new found involvement in the partnership to 
continue, but for any new scheme to consider the contributions and effectiveness 
of organisations that were involved in previous schemes, rather than them having 
to earn recognition from square one.  Indeed, one senior partner from the fire and 
rescue service felt that any future scheme do more to make partners feel 
involved in the process, rather than having it imposed upon them.  Indeed, there 
was a palpable fear amongst these actors that, if a successor to the LAA went 
back to the ‘traditional’ actors, they could see themselves sidelined, and many of 
the benefits they had delivered and the role for which they had earned wide 
praise amongst partners could be undone. 
 
One senior civil servant also felt that while the LAA was full of successful leaders, 
and identified this as part of its success (see discussion in chapter seven), more 
could be done to facilitate collaborative leadership whereby partners work 
together to seek out and maximise the opportunities that could benefit all the 





One of the most telling statements to arise from a partner was ‘people follow the 
money’ (as discussed in chapter seven).  By this the partner meant that 
organisations were only really interested in schemes which had funding attached 
and were viable, or would only work with other partners if it meant extra funding 
being available.  However partners pointed to the failure of the LAA to effectively 
create the environment of pooled funding that would bring partners closer 
together. 
 
As well as the issue of pooled budgets one partner g pointed to the financial 
reward system for target delivery.  They suggested that, by tying partner 
organisations together, and making them jointly responsible for achieving targets 
– and the accompanying reward money – this would make them more likely to 
work together, stating that the police and PCT would likely have closer ties if their 
funding was dependent on each other’s success.   
 
The same partner commented that a failure to do this would simply see a return 
to the silo working that characterised previous methods of local public service 
delivery, and to avoid this any scheme requires funding, or compelling 
accountability structures, otherwise “you might as well not bother, because 
everyone’s busy.  That’s the way it works” g.  In the view of the partner, a lack of 
either of those vital characteristics would lead to it being viewed as a talking shop 
creating the same issues of disengagement faced by some of the thematic 
partnerships within the LAA model. 
 
8.6.9 Concentration of Power 
Although the research has indicated that the power within partnerships has been 
spread around slightly, particularly amongst a wider group of local actors, control 
of the LAA still lies with a few key organisations.  To combat this one partner 
suggested that more work can be done to dilute this concentration of power, 
particularly down to a community level (moving towards some of the principles 
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outlined in the early LAA policy documents).  They referred to the Bishop of 
Liverpool, James Jones, who said that ‘at the end of this process, those with 
power should have less of it’ r.  This statement does hold up for the LAA, as 
those in power do have slightly less of it, but in terms of a mass dilution of power 
to local areas, this process has a not achieved this goal. 
 
One of the ways that Hazel Blears suggested to effect this concentration of 
power was through more agreements sitting beneath the LAA at a 
neighbourhood level, feeling that an agreement between the Local Authority and 
a neighbourhood community could add further depth to the process.  In particular 
she felt this could prove useful in particularly deprived areas (as discussed in 
chapter six) with high concentrations of deprivation, allowing specific areas to 
focus on the issues of importance in a bespoke manner, allowing for targeted 
responses. 
 
8.6.10 International Examples 
One of the most surprising revelations to arise from the interview process 
surrounded the use of international examples.  What became apparent was that 
CLG made little attempt to look at international case studies when developing 
LAAs – in effect developing them in isolation. 
 
Both John Denham and the senior civil servants from CLG admitted that there 
was little attempt to utilise international examples in the process, particularly 
during the initial development of LAAs, with the process instead focusing 
primarily on the lessons to come from the Lyons Inquiry into local government. 
 
The only person who alluded to any form of international examples influencing 
LAA development was Hazel Blears, who related a strange story about how the 
main international inspiration for CLG local government policy arose from a 
private holiday taken by Ms Blears to Cordoba, Spain, where elected mayors 
have high degrees of autonomy and funding.  This is telling when coupled with 
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the admission by civil servants’ admission that they themselves did no 
international fact finding.  When considered together, and reflecting upon the 
international examples in chapter three, this represents a missed opportunity to 
draw upon best practice from similar schemes (most notably Canada’s 
Vancouver Agreement) in order to improve the LAA. 
 
At the local level, one partner in Liverpool touched upon using international 
examples in order to improve practice in the UK.  They noted that: 
 
“Sometimes we don’t see all of the solutions and sometimes the 
solutions are invented elsewhere and we have to have 
thoughtfulness and a generosity of spirit to accept that we didn’t 
invent everything here” g 
 
Whether this holds true for CLG, or whether they simply were driven to comply 
with more pressing currents33 within Whitehall at the time of the LAA’s 
development, the near total failure to draw upon international examples in order 
to improve UK practice represents one of the most significant policy failings of 
the LAA. 
 
8.7 Where now for LAAs? 
As briefly discussed in chapter four, following the general election in 2010, LAAs 
were abolished – something that was likened by one partner to the costly 
scrapping of several brand new, unused Nimrod bombers which had taken place 
days previously, as an example of wasteful government spending, that had 
‘thrown the baby out with the bathwater’.  However, while cautioning against 
wastefulness, another partner was clearly aware of the need for economic 
prudence in the post-election policy environment, speaking of the financial 
pressures facing local public service delivery due to budget cuts. 
 
                                            
33
 I.e. responding to the findings of the Lyons review, as well as the wider LGMA agenda 
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Yet despite this, many partners were forthright about the will to continue with 
partnership working in this new environment, with one partner in St Helens noting 
that “we’ve done [partnership] now for 20 years so it would be called something 
different every five years34 but the same principle remains of getting the key 
public and private sector partners around a table” i. 
 
Whilst considering the concerns of the local partners, the following sections of 
this chapter will discuss what the near future of local public service delivery is 
likely to look like, whilst also assessing the extent to which they seek to respond 
to the wishes of partners. 
 
8.7.1 Where would Labour have taken it? 
One of the hypothetical questions surrounding the research is how the Labour 
Government of Gordon Brown proposed to continue the development of the LAA 
model and other forms of local public service delivery, had they won a fourth term 
following the general election in 2010.  Given that this didn’t happen, what follows 
is largely an exercise in ‘what ifs’.  However it provides useful insights into what 
Labour ministers saw as the deficiencies in the LAA model as it stood and how 
they sought to rectify them.  Indeed, in the much the same way as current 
Coalition Government policy can be analysed, these potential policies can be 
considered in terms of how well they would reflect the changes that the various 
partners wished to see in order to improve LAAs. 
 
As indicated earlier, John Denham indicated that a fourth Labour term would 
have seen a move to a stronger regional level of governance with the creation of 
‘executive regional ministers with a cheaper but much more powerful regional 
infrastructure’ where the aim would have been to create ‘autonomy of action from 
central government.’  John Denham continued to argue that the emphasis would 
shift towards the locality with the ‘central-local relationship’ being increasingly 
                                            
34
 Referencing the various local public service delivery schemes that local areas have worked 
with 
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handled at a regional level – with Whitehall only receiving ‘advice’.  This was a 
policy that featured in the 2010 election manifesto, with talk of ‘an enhanced role’ 
for regional ministers (Labour: 2010), although it did little to elaborate beyond 
this.  In principle this development would have gone some way to responding to 
the critique of GOR representatives and the confusion over their role, although 
the extent of this autonomy would’ve still raised the same questions about whose 
side the Minister was ultimately on when making policy decisions – London or the 
Locality?   
 
Former Secretary of State Denham also discussed how a simplification of the 
structures of regional governance was to have been presented to Government 
for consideration (indicating that this was not official policy, only a potential 
direction - Indeed, this policy did not feature in the Labour Party’s 2010 election 
manifesto (Labour Party: 2010)).  This proposal would entail a streamlining and 
consolidation of the various regional bodies (GOR, RDA etc) into one single 
organisation overseen by the Regional Minister.   
 
One of the main criticisms of LAAs was the number of indicators that local areas 
had to adopt, with partners calling for the total to be reduced from the maximum 
of 35.  This a view with which those in Whitehall concurred, with John Denham, 
Hazel Blears and senior civil servants indicating that this was something that 
would have been likely to occur as Labour developed their local public service 
delivery agenda.  The Civil Servants went on to argue that indicator reduction 
would continue the trend of reducing performance indicators – continuing from 
the reduction from over 2000 performance indicators leading into the LAA (CLG: 
2008). 
 
One idea raised by Hazel Blears was a change in the concepts and culture of 
central government to reflect those at the local level.  One of the key criticisms of 
central government raised in chapter six was that the various Whitehall 
departments continued to act within their respective silos, despite the expectation 
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from Central Government that the various local agencies would pool their 
budgets to deliver public services.    Echoing the sentiments raised by one local 
partner that partnership working became more effective when partners’ futures 
(i.e. funding) were linked to one another, Hazel Blears intimated that discussions 
were held with Sir Gus O’Donnell [Cabinet Secretary] about the creation of 
pooled budgets at the central level, forcing partners with responsibilities for local 
public service delivery to work in a more joined up manner. It was also indicated 
that this move towards pooled budgeting would help to end the Whitehall culture 
whereby “a minister’s success is judged on how many bills they’ve brought, how 
big is their budget and how much power can they wield over everybody else” 
towards a culture where success was “the ability to make a difference” d.  Whilst 
it could be argued that the two models of Ministerial success are not mutually 
exclusive, a shift towards Whitehall reflecting local partnership structures and not 
simply adopting a ‘do as I say, not as I do’ attitude would represent significant 
steps in allaying partners concerns over top-down control.  In particular, if central 
policy documents were produced which advocated cross-sector working and the 
ways in which this could be done, this would help to reduce the number of 
organisations which have difficulty aligning their own internal organisational 
structures with those of an LAA or other scheme, as this process would largely 
have already been done for them. 
 
8.7.2 Total Place 
However, beyond this, those in Whitehall envisaged local public service delivery 
moving beyond the LAA model in the longer term, with an indicator and target 
model like the LAA becoming, in the words of John Denham “the default position 
for those parts of the country that at this stage didn’t have the capacity to go 
further” l.  Some of this shift in policy direction was intended to be addressed 
through ‘Total Place’. 
 
The Total Place model of governance, first piloted in the 2009 budget (Treasury: 
2009) and rolled out towards the end of Labour’s final term of Government was 
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intended to take on a central role in local public service delivery.  This would 
address concerns about single-pot funding by reducing the amount of funding 
that was ‘ring fenced’.  By doing this, the aim was to provide a larger amount of 
money available to spend, which in turn was intended encourage partners to 
work together more efficiently and effectively. 
 
Many of the interviewees from Whitehall felt that a move towards the Total Place 
model of governance would occur, with two avenues developing as the LAA and 
Total Place models combined.  The first would be a continuation of the target 
reduction agenda (i.e. from 35 to 15 and further).  Civil servants envisaged this 
taking place along the lines of recommendations from the Local Government 
Association (LGA: 2010) calling for significantly fewer targets and ‘far greater 
freedom for the local areas in the selection and definition of those targets’ o, all of 
which would contribute to a much more focused policy. 
 
The second point, on which the Whitehall actors elaborated, was a shift towards 
a greater emphasis on the pooled-funding seen as a significant barrier to 
progress, both centrally and locally.  Hazel Blears envisaged that this would 
focus on vastly improving the efficiency of the single capital pot / area based 
grant model, encouraging partners to share resources, i.e. through building a 
‘one stop shop’ for council services, rather than spreading them across multiple 
sites. However, while this would generate fiscal efficiency, it doesn’t particularly 
cover any solutions to the institutional barriers that are still evident in local 
partnership working. 
 
It was envisaged that, as the fourth term developed, the LAA would consequently 
serve as a basic expectation of local authorities, with those areas which – to 
quote John Denham -  had the ‘ambition and attitude’ to stretch themselves 
further given the opportunity to do so, referencing the analogy of schools and the 
national curriculum discussed in chapter seven. 
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Now, the chapter seeks to draw the emphasis away from the hypothetical 
direction of a fourth term Labour government, and move towards a consideration 
of Coalition policy.  In this regard, the partners also discussed how Total Place – 
in principle if not in name – retained its relevance within early Coalition policy. 
 
Partners first discussed this in light of how Total Place remained in place, despite 
other schemes such as the entire structure of regional governance and LAAs 
being abolished in the flurry of departmental closures and cuts following the 2010 
election, which was dubbed as the ‘Bonfire of the Quangos’ (Telegraph: 2011).  
They indicated that the fact Total Place remained in this environment indicated 
that the Coalition saw some value in the programme – and the fact its name was 
not changed immediately in order to distance itself from its political origins also 
surprised partners.   
 
Now the chapter will move to consider Coalition policy, whilst providing a more 
detailed consideration of how the Coalition sought to reflect and respond to the 
policy lessons created from LAAs. 
 
8.8 Coalition Agreement 
The first major policy to be published by the coalition was the ‘Coalition 
Agreement’ (Cabinet Office: 2010) which set out the principles that would define 
the programme for Government.  Ostensibly, the aim of this document was to 
provide a reference point for the two parties of coalition – the Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats – so that the general direction of future policy could be agreed 
beforehand, thus avoiding political arguments at later stages of the Coalition’s 
time in office. 
 
Although they Coalition Agreement set out the principles that would guide all 
aspects of government, once section focused on the proposals for Communities 
and Local Government.   One of the major moves was the abolition of many of 
the structures of regional governance.  The Coalition Agreement proposed the 
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abolition of the Regional Development Agencies as well as GOR London, with a 
view to scrapping other GORs as the term progressed (Cabinet Office: 2010). 
 
In terms of establishing new policy, the Coalition Agreement proposed to deliver 
increased localism including allowing more citizens a say in decision making in 
their area.  In principle this is not dissimilar to the stated principles behind much 
of Labour’s local government initiatives of the previous ten years.  However, 
where the Coalition proposed to differ was in terms of Elected Mayors.  The 
Coalition Agreement proposed that the 12 largest cities would be granted the 
opportunity to vote on whether they wished to have an Elected Mayor (Cabinet 
Office: 2010) although the agreement did not specify what new powers these 
mayors would have. 
 
At this stage it was evident that the Coalition Agreement did not go into explicit 
detail about the policies and what they entailed.  However, it did offer an 
indication of what would be delivered in the period following the election. 
 
8.9 The Big society 
One early initiative from the Coalition which caught the attention of the partners is 
the concept of ‘the Big Society’.  However, despite forming a central plank of the 
Conservative Party election manifesto (Conservative Party: 2010), the Big 
Society scheme has been one of the most misunderstood (about what it entails, 
how much it costs and who it involves) policy initiatives of recent years, requiring 
several re-launches. 
 
Along with the LEPs, the Big Society formed part of a wider push towards 
renewed localism, with the policy forming ‘a massive transfer of power from 
Whitehall to Local Communities’ (Cabinet Office: 2011).  At its heart, the 
Coalition aimed for this to be achieved by encouraging charities and community 
groups to take on the running of local services, most notably, perhaps, through 
the creation of free schools.  However, commentators have decried the initiative 
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as a smokescreen for cuts to public services forced by a need to reduce 
expenditure as a result of the financial downturn (New Economics Foundation: 
2010).  Again, like with the previous discussion of LEPs, the aim here is not to 
provide a full critique of the big society itself, but to discuss how it responds to 
the policy lessons of the LAAs. 
 
The issue of the Big Society is particularly pertinent for Liverpool given that in 
2010 it was selected as one of the four vanguard areas35 to pilot the proposals, 
only to withdraw from the scheme in February 2011 citing difficulties arising from 
the impact of austerity measures (BBC News: 2011). 
 
Again, the fluctuation of stronger and weaker actors comes to the fore with the 
Big Society proposals, prominently elevating the role of the voluntary and third 
sector to an even greater level than they would’ve experienced within the LAA. 
 
However, even though this move would increase their role in local decision 
making and the running of local public services, one of the most fervent critics of 
the big society scheme were representatives of the voluntary sector.  One 
representative of the third sector questioned their capacity to take on such a role 
in delivering local public services and the confidence (or lack of) that the public 
would hold in them performing the delivery of those services, feeling that; 
 
“If somebody’s going to operate on my prostate, I want them to 
have done 400 previous operations first, I don’t want somebody 
with a manual in one hand saying I’m not quite sure where it is, 
but it’s got to come out.” r 
 
By this they meant that while campaigning for better run and more responsive 
local services, those groups still believe that by and large the people that run 
                                            
35
 The four vanguard areas were Eden – Cumbria, Liverpool – Merseyside, Sutton – London and 
Windsor and Maidenhead – Berkshire. 
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them at present are the most appropriate to run them, and the capacity that they 
have built allows them to run a more efficient organisation.  Indeed, there were 
worries that, as a result, local services could descend into ‘mob rule’ with 
decisions being made ‘by a text poll on Sky News’ which might lead to 
reactionary decisions being made, which in turn could inhibit the local area.   
 
Perversely, voluntary sector actors also felt that the Big Society proposals could 
reduce the capacity of long standing activists within the area.  There was a worry 
amongst the voluntary sector that, in order to facilitate voluntary sector working, 
representatives either from or endorsed by central government could arrive in the 
area. They questioned whether as a result, “a community organiser who has 
worked at their kitchen table for 20 years is no longer a community organiser 
because somebody has turned up with a badge?”  As a result this leads to 
questions as to whether, albeit inadvertently, the Big Society can still maintain an 
aspect of centralism by failing to engage with/draw upon existing community 
capital. 
  
Latterly, the Big Society faded from the frontline of local public service delivery, 
having failed to capture the imagination of the general public.  This could be 
largely attributed to a lack of clarity about its role, and the presentation of an 
unrealistic vision of how to deliver public services for local areas.  In turn, new 
initiatives emerged which offered a more coherent vision of how this could be 
achieved. 
 
8.10 Coalition Policy - Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) 
On the 29th June 2010, a letter was published by CLG, signed by incoming 
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government; Eric Pickles and the 
Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills; Vincent Cable, inviting 
local authority and business leaders to submit proposals for Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs) (CLG: 2010b).  The aim of these LEPs was to ‘provide the 
strategic leadership in their areas to set out local economic priorities’ as part of 
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the Coalition’s plans for sub-national economic growth (CLG: 2010b).  Citing the 
belief that the local authority boundaries might not be analogous to the ‘functional 
economic area’ in any locality, these new LEP structures encouraged 
neighbouring authorities to collaborate. 
 
Structurally the LEPs were intended to replace the Regional Development 
Agencies which were abolished in 2010 as part of the wider removal of regional 
governance in the UK.  However, their structure and purpose mirrors not only the 
Multi Area Agreement (the cross authority initiative brought in under Labour) by 
involving multiple local authority areas for sub-regional strategic decision making, 
but also the Metropolitan County areas which were abolished in 1986 as 
discussed in chapter two. 
 
As an addendum, whilst this section seeks to contribute to the emerging literature 
around LEPS, particularly through a discussion of how the LEPs respond to the 
policy lessons of LAAs, it will not include a detailed literature review of the LEP. 
 
8.10.1 The Basics 
Currently, there are 39 LEPs in England (see figure 8.2), varying in size from two 
local authorities (Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly) to 15 top tier authorities (Heart 
of the South West, with London forming its own LEP and several authority areas 
opting to participate in more than one LEP (The LEP network: 2012).  In October 
of 2010 the government announced that 24 of the proposed LEPs were suitably 
advanced in order to proceed, whilst another 15 have been agreed in the 
following period to date (CLG: 2012a). 
 
The number of the areas that have chosen to align themselves with more than 
one LEP is indicative of the fact that for areas that sit geographically between two 
major centres, or have multiple authority boundaries believe there are benefits of 
participating in more than one LEP, even if this means opening up to two sets of 
pressures faced under schemes like the LAA.  However, this raises questions as 
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to how these overlapping LEPs can truly be effective, given that actors in those 
areas will have to sit on two sets of boards and be responsible for two sets of 




Figure 8.2 - Local Enterprise Partnerships in England 




8.10.2 To what extent do LEPs address the LAA’s Policy Failings? 
The LEP structures did offer some element of response to the policy failings of 
the LAA, although they also raise a significant number of questions in their own 
right.   
 
Replacing ‘social’ with ‘economic’: One of the principal departures from the LAA 
– and indeed much local policy under labour – is the shift in the focus towards 
economic development, which in turn can act as a driver for social improvement, 
as opposed to the more balanced three-pronged sustainable development 
avenue favoured under New Labour (ODPM: 2003).  Indeed environmental 
development is barely mentioned in the initial letter to prospective LEPs (CLG: 
2010b). 
 
This has far reaching implications both for actor involvement and the relative 
number of people that can practically and realistically be involved with such an 
undertaking.  However, most importantly, this can present a significant barrier to 
improvements on a wide range of policy areas, particularly including social 
exclusion and deprivation, which are influenced by a number of factors beyond 
economic development, such as education and health. 
 
 Silos: Prior to the inception of LAAs, one of the major criticisms of government 
(central and local) working was that silo working was a major barrier to working 
(Sullivan: 2007).  This research has also pointed to the validity of Davies’ 2009 
notion of expanded silos, showing that the governance structures of the LAA 
failed to break down these silos.  This was coupled with actors from Whitehall 
admitting a strong departmental silo culture was prevalent throughout Whitehall, 
inhibiting cross-departmental working.  At the central level early indications show 
that these silo structures and the associated problems are likely to continue, with 
early assessments of the LEPs pointing towards poor coordination between 
departments, for example  inconsistencies in the link up between government 
skills policy and how any LEP would go about delivering it (Bentley et al 2011). 
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Involvement of Stronger/Weaker Actors: As well as strengthening silo walls, the 
LEP has the potential to create a new dynamic of stronger and weaker actors 
that can influence the direction of local public policy.  As indicated, some of the 
weaker actors that came into the LAA process could find themselves on the 
periphery of decision making once more (although in theory, at least, the 
Voluntary and Third Sector could forge a new role in the big society proposals). 
 
However, these proposals are also likely to see the rise of new ‘stronger actors’ 
as well as those which will maintain their status quo, including the elevation of 
some actors that were previously identified as being on the fringes of local 
government working.  Most notably the LEPs will see private sector interests via 
local business leaders and the chamber of commerce come to the fore, 
especially given that the government wish each LEP to be chaired by a 
prominent business leader. 
 
This is a stark turnaround from the LSP/LAA period, during which business 
groups were amongst the harshest critics.  However while this represents a role 
reversal for these partners, this change is evidently not all inclusive, and indeed 
more closely resembles a game of institutional snakes and ladders. 
 
Partner Capacity: On early inspection it appears that the LEP may lead to 
significant disparities in performance, based on the capacity of an area’s 
business community and business leaders to take on such a scheme.  It is 
reasonable to expect a major urban centre or industrial area such as Liverpool, 
Manchester or Birmingham to have a plethora of business leaders, often from 
large companies (e.g. a look at the Merseyside LEP reveals representatives from 
Tesco, Peel Holdings and Jaguar Land Rover amongst others) (Mersey 
Partnership: 2011).  However, smaller areas, particularly containing towns which 
are not home to large companies, may not be able to draw upon the same level 
large businesses and business leadership.  In turn, even taking the 
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Government’s message that economic growth will tackle social exclusion and 
deprivation on face value, this will mean that these areas could be less equipped 
to drive growth on a massive scale.  This could impinge on their ability to focus 
on areas of ‘hidden’ deprivation, which are masked by the overall wellbeing of the 
area (Nurse and Pemberton: 2010). 
 
However, even these arguments rely on the capacity of the business leaders 
themselves to chair a multi-agency partnership.  This is despite the fact that 
business leaders have discussed the difficulties of relating to, and working with 
local government – particularly surrounding the timescales and technical 
language.  Given these concerns, it is reasonable to raise questions about the 
extent to which these business leaders are capable of fulfilling this role. 
 
For a period in 2010/11 it seemed that LEPs would be seen as ‘the vehicle’ for 
local public service delivery, despite their wider regional outlook.  However, in 
late 2011 they were to be sidelined in this role by a policy which seemed to 
provide a much better fit for service delivery at the local authority level: the city 
deal. 
 
8.11 City Deals and Elected Mayors 
The last policy to be instigated, and arguably the one with the most impact on low 
local areas are governed and deliver their local public services, was that of 
Elected Mayors.   
 
This process began in late 2011 with the publication of ‘Unlocking Growth in 
Cities’ (HMG: 2011).  In this, the Government proposed the creation of ‘City 
Deals’ focused on the 12 largest cities outside of London – owing to their 
economic potential.  In creating these City Deals, areas were allowed to choose 
from a ‘menu’ of initiatives which the government believed would help cities to 
increase economic growth.  Amongst the proposals was access to a Regional 
Growth Fund amounting to £1bn, as well as local funding being streamed into a 
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single capital pot allowing for local leaders to direct it as they see fit (HMG: 
2011). 
 
However, in introducing these proposals, the government explicitly stated that it 
would be a ‘two way deal’.  In particular, in return for being granted these 
initiatives, areas were expected to show a commitment to ‘strong accountable 
leadership’ (HMG: 2011).   By this, the inference was that these cities would 
adopt the directly-elected mayor mode of governance.  
 
However, many cities were allowed to sign off their city deal with government on 
the basis that they would hold referendums36 for local citizens to decide whether 
to accept the elected mayor model.  Despite this, two areas – Liverpool and 
Salford – opted to accept these proposals without holding a referendum.  This 
generated significant controversy in Liverpool, largely owing to the irony that 
localism proposals were being introduced without consulting local citizens 
(Liverpool Daily Post: 2012).   
 
Therefore, on the 3rd May 2012, while several cities held referendums on elected 
mayors, including Bristol, Manchester and Birmingham, Liverpool held elections 
for who would actually hold the post of Elected Mayor.  However the proposals 
were dealt a significant blow, with the citizens of Birmingham, Nottingham and 
Manchester rejecting the initiative – although Bristol did vote in favour.   
 
This led to questions amongst Liverpool practitioners as to whether the city 
needlessly adopted a model of governance without holding a referendum, in 
order to ensure access to City Deal funding, when other cities did not.  Privately, 
practitioners across Liverpool also questioned whether Liverpool’s eagerness to 
gain funding also meant that the City did not secure as good a deal as other 
cities. 
 
                                            
36
 These referendums took place on May 3
rd
 alongside the local government elections 
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As a result, whilst the government only partially succeeded in creating directly 
elected mayors in the major UK cities, the City Deal represents a shift towards 
more locally responsive service delivery, with areas able to decide upon their 
own priorities.  However, questions remain as to how any Mayor will be able to 
direct actors within the area in order to deliver those schemes and whether this 
will respond to any of the criticisms raised by previous schemes such as the LAA.   
 
In particular the state of centre-local relations in the post referendum will be 
under scrutiny.  This will focus on whether the government will accept and 
honour the City Deals in cities that have rejected the referendum proposals in 
lieu of restructured governance arrangements (Planning: 2012), or whether those 
cities – such as Liverpool – which eagerly adopted the government scheme will 
receive preferential treatment as part of the ‘two way process’. 
 
8.11.1 A Future for Partnership?  
The attitude of refusing to reflect on past initiatives, exhibited by some of the 
interviewees raises significant questions about whether there is a real desire to 
learn the lessons from past schemes in order to improve future ones. 
 
However, despite seeking to quickly move on as the legislative agenda changes, 
actors in both case studies indicated more than just the passing whim of 
partnership, pointing out that in both areas the roots of partnership were laid 
down well in advance of the LSP/LAA structures.  Similarly, most – though not all 
– partners indicate that the culture of partnership working is one which has 
considerable value, and is something they wish to retain, even if not explicitly 
mandated by central government.  One senior partner involved in Liverpool’s 
LSP said that “[Liverpool is] in agreement on what our issues are.  We’ve got our 
own local agreement.  Get jobs, get skills, improve housing, trade our way with 
the world and get more people living and working in this city, more businesses 
here.  That’s our local area agreement. We know what we need to do” r.  Given 
the strong guiding and funding role of central government they expressed 
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disappointment that, in light of funding cuts, this role was substantially weakened.  
However they remained defiant and that they would continue their aim of 
delivering upon what they saw as their raison d’être. 
 
For any of these schemes, or those that follow them, it is essential to be aware 
that, in the words of one partner, the current generation does not have a 
monopoly of wisdom, and so they must continue “to look into the past in order to 
plan for the future” m and that even if a policy is 80% right, there is still 20% that 
can be improved in order to make a significant impact on successful delivery. 
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Chapter Nine - Conclusions 
During the course of the previous chapters the research has reached several 
important conclusions which have significant implications for the future of local 
public service delivery.  These findings focus on centre-local relations and 
vertical governance, as well as local actor relations and horizontal governance.   
 
Chapter one began by identifying some of the methods of delivering local public 
services in the post WWII period up to, and including, the early New Labour 
administration before chapter two explored the LAA in more detail.  These two 
chapters established the main themes of the research – that of vertical and 
horizontal governance – and the key research questions. 
 
Following this, chapter four examined some of the theories and concepts that 
could be used to analyse the research questions.  This culminated in the design 
of a conceptual framework that identified the ‘Strategic Relation Approach’, 
‘Regulation Theory’ and ‘Path Dependency’ as the key concepts that would be 
utilised. 
 
Chapter five outlined the methodological considerations that would guide the 
research.  This included the methodology for a national overview survey of LAA 
practitioners, the results of this survey, and the rationale for the selection of two 
detailed case study areas: Liverpool and St Helens. 
 
Chapters six, seven and eight outlined the results that were found following a 
series of detailed interviews with practitioners from the central, regional and local 
level.  These chapters focused on vertical governance, horizontal governance 
and the future of local public service delivery respectively. 
 
Throughout, the research process sought to contribute to knowledge by 
identifying and filling in gaps in the existing body of research.  This included 
Brenner’s (2008) notion that much of the existing literature about the state and 
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central-local relations did not focus explicitly on local actors and how they worked 
within this process and Matheson et al’s (2011) note to a similar effect, pointing 
towards a lack of research on local partner relations.   
 
In concluding, what follows is a brief discussion about the most significant 
findings to arise from the research.  This will be split into the three main themes, 
as identified in chapter three: vertical governance, horizontal governance and 
improving future practice.  These themes relate to the findings covered in 
chapters six, seven and eight, respectively.  Following that, there will be a section 
reflecting upon the research methods and how they might be improved for future 
research, a section on avenues for future research and a discussion on the post 
LAA policy environment and the key questions that sit within this. 
 
9.1 Centre Local Relations and Vertical Governance 
The most overwhelming conclusion to arise surrounding centre-local relations, as 
discussed in chapter six, is that despite the LAA being hailed as a solution to the 
centralisation of British politics, it proved to have the opposite effect and in many 
ways could be seen as a preserver of the status quo. 
 
Amongst other things, there was a strong indication that large elements of the 
indicator selection process were pre-determined according to an area’s socio-
economic profile, which meant that large numbers of areas took up a broadly 
similar profile of indicators in response to the issues facing their area, in a way 
that didn’t accurately reflect local priorities.   
 
More specifically, and even more telling of the strong hand that central 
government still held over the localities, was the suggestion that areas were 
essentially forced to accept individual indicators into their suite of up to 35 
priorities that they did not consider a priority – thus potentially wasting their local 
resources on something they did not perceive to be a important for their area.  
This occurred when an area was in receipt of central funding, and the relevant 
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Whitehall department wished to ensure that the area showed sufficient 
commitment through its LAA.  Areas reported being subject to threats of the 
removal of the funding if they did not adopt the specific indicator, as well as peer 
pressure when an area sought to rebel where neighbouring authorities had 
succumbed. 
 
This strong top down pressure signified that even before the LAA was in place 
there was a strong suggestion in many cases that it was not a ‘local area 
agreement’ in spirit, where many areas had indicators which they might not have 
picked had they been given a totally free hand.  The role of various actors in the 
vertical governance of the LAA also had a significant impact on its effectiveness 
and its ability to reflect the principles under which it was established i.e. to be a 
locally reflective policy document. 
 
The most significant issue to emerge from the vertical governance of the LAA 
concerned the role of representatives from GOR, particularly over the gulf of 
understanding over their role.  Rather than being local champions, GOR were 
keen to point out (and most local actors became keenly aware) that they were 
civil servants representing Whitehall and that as a result this ‘‘local champion’ 
that would act on a locality’s behalf” role was unlikely to transpire. 
 
Instead, what emerged was that the effectiveness of the GOR representatives 
was influenced by two issues:  a combination of their ability to engage more with 
the area and its issues, followed by the ability to reflect this knowledge in their 
negotiation and subsequent dealings with the LAA.  Where this was less likely to 
happen, local actors were more likely to report less satisfaction with the 
negotiation process and the actions of their GOR negotiator – particularly in 
relation to reflecting issues of local importance.   
 
It also became clear that the ‘human element’ of relationships with GOR 
representatives was crucial.  It was noted that the personal attributes of a GOR 
263 
representative, such as the knowledge of their area, good working relationships 
and the ability to speak candidly were all significant contributors to the success of 
negotiation and the continued LAA process.   
 
The presence of stronger actors is something that affected the LAA in terms of its 
vertical and horizontal governance.  However the implications for the vertical 
governance and the top down control of the LAA are considerably more telling.  
Several actors emerged – most notably the Primary Care Trust (PCT) and police 
force – which were not convinced by the LAA, and indeed they were able to 
openly question it and its value to their organisation.  It is no coincidence that the 
organisations that were most able to do this were those with a strong 
accountability chain which operates on a national scale, with accompanying 
funding and policy priorities which operate on much the same scale.  As such 
these organisations – whilst participating fully in the LAA – stood as barriers to 
the total effectiveness of the LAA as a local policy initiative, especially in areas 
facing pressing issues such as deprivation where these ‘stronger’ partners would 
play a key role. 
 
Reflecting on how the research relates to the theory, in many ways, the findings 
in terms of vertical governance serve to echo the wider discussions about the 
Strategic Relational Approach.  Indeed the fact that central government retains 
strong control over local priorities indicates that by and large local areas had not 
been privileged with greater power in any meaningful way, but instead that 
Whitehall departments had seen a greater ability to pursue their own agendas at 
a local scale. 
  
It could also be argued that, referencing the discussions about regulation theory, 
that the LAA did represent a mode of regulation, specifically given the direct and 
indirect measures about improving economic development.  However, given that 
the 2008 recession would be classed as a ‘crisis’ within the regulation theory 
literature, and the fact that this period coincided with the lifespan of the LAA, 
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questions remain as to whether this mode of regulation was successful or not.  In 
particular, these questions revolve around whether the LAA provided a robust 
platform for areas to continue to regulate their economic development throughout 
this period of economic turbulence, or whether a new form of regulation was 
required in order to achieve this.  
 
9.2 Local Relations and Horizontal Governance 
The findings in chapter seven about local relations and horizontal governance 
demonstrated that the two strands of governance (horizontal and vertical) did not 
operate in isolation.  In particular, the stronger actors discussed in the previous 
section had significant impacts on the horizontal governance of the LAA, 
particularly on the effectiveness of the LAA’s accountability structures.  This was 
due to the fact that these actors (most notably the police) believed that their own 
internally set targets and accountability structures were more pressing than those 
set by the LAA, and in turn they would be satisfied if the internal targets were met 
– even if the LAA targets for the same period were not.  This dealt a serious blow 
to the credibility of the LAA targets as it raised the serious prospect that a major 
partner could set the precedent of failing to meet its targets and then effectively 
‘shirking’ the consequences. 
 
More interestingly at the local level was the identification of ‘weaker’ actors, i.e. 
those which might not have previously played a traditional role in local public 
service delivery yet, made the most of their opportunity to engage with the 
process.  This simultaneously illustrated the valuable contribution that actors can 
make, even when it may not be immediately clear.  These actors embodied the 
‘invest versus spend’ model of public service delivery, taking a long term view of 
how action in the short term could affect their organisation and its needs.  Widely 
viewed as those which have most benefited from the process, they did this 
through modifying their organisational models to respond to what they saw as an 
opportunity – in stark contrast to the stronger, nationally driven, organisations 
that saw the LAA as secondary to the delivery of their own internal agenda. 
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The draw of funding was shown to be one of the main drivers through which 
partners engaged with the process, with many openly stating that, if no funding 
was attached, their interest in joint working would be drastically diminished.  
Similarly, when the LAA was scrapped in 2010 and the accompanying funding 
began to recede, it was evident that some partners were eager to withdraw from 
the process – seemingly unwilling to spend any more time than was necessary 
on a programme that did not benefit their organisation financially.  Emphasising 
the findings about invest versus spend, this illustrated that for some 
organisations, the culture of partnership didn’t exist beyond engaging out of 
compunction, rather than a deep seated desire to work with other partners on 
wider reaching issues affecting the area. 
 
In many ways one of the reasons for this reflected a lack of effective relationship 
building between partners, particularly over the development of trust – something 
that was identified as being essential to delivering within a partnership.  Where 
these relationships were absent partners were less likely to be cede funding (for 
which they still held accountability) to other agencies, thus acting as a barrier to 
effective delivery.  Indeed, these personal relationships and personal attributes 
were cited as being one of the most essential tools of an effective partnership 
with the characteristics of the actors present being more important than simply 
the presence of a ‘title’.  All of the results from the horizontal governance aspect 
indicate that for an effective partnership to occur the culture of partnership has to 
be present, with actors that want the partnership to work.  Simply forcing various 
local actors to work together will not have the desired effect unless that culture is 
in place. 
 
These findings can be explained through notions of path dependency – whereby 
actions are predetermined both by past action and organisational structure.  In 
particular, path dependency helps to understand why larger organisations such 
as the police look towards their traditional central accountability chains over 
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those of the LAA, while those organisations with little experience of local public 
service delivery at this level (and thus little path dependency) were able to avoid 
being limited by any such agenda. 
 
Reflecting upon the SRA and its implications for horizontal governance, it 
became clear that, at the local level, certain actors were more able to adapt to 
the LAA and thus could be seen to be privileged over others.  In particular the 
police and PCT stood out in this regard.  This links back to the discussions about 
the SRA in chapter six on vertical relations, and how central actors (and central 
priorities) can dominate the decision making process.   
 
Yet, the group of actors – most notably the fire and rescue service – which 
sought to maximise their opportunity to work at a strategic level demonstrate that 
this privileging is not as clear at the local scale.  This was especially so, given 
that their attitude seemed to be forward looking and altruistic in nature, 
embodying a true sense of partnership.  These actors do echo Goodwin and 
Pemberton’s (2010) work, however, about how actors seek to maximise 
opportunities to work within a system to benefit their organisation whenever such 
opportunities arise.  By this it could be argued that a failure to be privileged in the 
past means that any opportunity for involvement that arises has to be maximised 
to ensure future opportunities for involvement. 
 
9.3 Improving Local Public Service Delivery  
Regarding the improvement of the future practice of local public service, there 
are several lessons which can be taken from this research that should influence 
any future local public service delivery scheme. 
 
The first is the importance of looking at international contexts.  One of the most 
surprising findings was the admission that no effort was made to consider 
international examples that delivered similar things / operated on a similar scale 
to the LAA and that instead the LAA was conceived purely out of response to the 
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UK policy climate at the time.  This is despite the fact that this research has 
uncovered several existing schemes (i.e. Canada’s Vancouver Agreement) which 
bear striking similarity to the LAA and could offer useful lessons to improve 
aspects of practice before, during and after the implementation stages. 
  
This lesson learning should not be limited to international examples.  There are 
many past examples of schemes within a UK context which are akin to a ‘policy 
pendulum’ which merely swings between ideological positions as elections are 
won and lost.  Indeed, the schemes which are now replacing the LAA as the 
vehicles for local public service delivery bear a striking resemblance to some of 
the schemes that were in place in the 1980s.   
 
One of the most prominent examples of this is the Local Enterprise Partnership 
(LEP), which shares many similar characteristics with the Urban Development 
Corporations.  The striking similarity to policy in the 1980s lies in the central role 
for private sector businesses over other actors as the drivers of local economic 
growth, which in turn is viewed as the solution to social problems.  Given that the 
private sector is one of the groups of actors that struggled most with the LAA– 
particularly the requirement to engage with bureaucratic style structures – the 
move towards LEPs indicate a shift that will be looked upon favourably by these 
organisations, whilst potentially leading to the alienation of partners that have 
developed with the LAA.   
 
One of the principal recommendations of this research is the establishment of a 
stable policy platform as opposed to the ‘policy pendulum’ which currently exists 
and leads to partnership and policy fatigue identified by Huxham (1996).  Indeed 
the move to LEPs represents well over 10 major policies brought forward in the 
last 3 decades that cities such as Liverpool (and Merseyside as a Metropolitan 
County Council and latterly City Region) have had to acquaint themselves with 
and deliver.  This constant changing of the policy landscape – which Jones 
(2010) described as a ‘peculiarly English disease’ borne of the centralised policy 
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environment -  proves wasteful and disengages actors from a process which 
many already show signs of failing to engage. 
 
9.4 The Future of Local Public Service Delivery 
Following the 2010 general election and the abolition of LAAs, several policies 
emerged relating to local public service delivery (as discussed more widely in 
chapter eight).     
 
The first was the concept of ‘The Big Society’: a scheme which encouraged local 
citizens to run local public services by themselves.  This quickly faded in large 
part due to a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the public coupled with 
widespread misunderstanding about its role.  Although upon its launch (and 
subsequent re-launch) the Big Society appeared to be one of the prominent 
methods for delivering local public services, it was largely dismissed by local 
actors, and soon subsumed by two more rounded policies: The LEP and City 
Deals. 
 
The LEP, as discussed previously, provided a means for the private sector to 
lead on local development issues.  This is based on the understanding that 
economic prosperity will, in turn, lead to an improvement in social conditions.  
While the functions of LEPs remained (and to some degree, at the time of writing, 
remains) unclear, what became apparent is that they possess the ability to grow 
into their role, to adopt a wide range of functions across a multi-local authority 
area, operating on a scale not dissimilar to that of the Multi Area Agreement. 
 
The City Deal however, introduced in November 2011, offers perhaps the most 
complete model for local public service delivery, as envisaged by the Coalition.  
At the heart of the City Deal is greater funding and the improved ability for local 
areas to designate spending priorities, in return for demonstrating a commitment 
to improved local leadership.  Ostensibly, this meant the Elected Mayor model of 
governance – an issue on which referenda were held in May 2012, which many 
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cities opted to reject.  In the meantime, Liverpool and Salford opted to adopt the 
Elected Mayor model without such elections. 
 
In Liverpool and Salford, in particular, clear questions remain about the 
implications for instigating a mode of governance designed to increase local 
autonomy without asking local citizens if it reflects their wishes.  Beyond this, 
there are questions about whether such a large number of ‘no’ votes will lead to a 
two-tier hierarchy of cities in the UK, or whether some cities have needlessly 
changed their modes of governance in search of funding that they might 
otherwise have still received. 
 
9.5 Reflecting on the Research 
Although the research is substantial, at this point it is necessary to provide a 
moment of reflection in order to identify how, if the research was being conducted 
anew, it could be improved. 
 
The biggest challenge to the research came in 2010 with abolition of the LAA, 
which forced the research to follow an unusual trajectory.  Beginning as a study 
of current government policy, following the LAA’s abolition it was essential to 
carefully place the research within a newly developing policy environment.  In 
reality, this did not particularly inhibit the research, despite requiring a 
fundamental reconsideration of how it was structured and presented.  
 
The main strength of the research comes from the calibre of people that were 
interviewed.  The research is able to draw from the views of elected ministers, 
former chief executives and senior policy makers across two case studies.  This 
is as well as a national overview survey of LAA managers, which received a 
response rate of nearly 40% - something that CLG failed to achieve in a parallel 
study of LAAs undertaken in 2010 o.  Broadly speaking, the people who were 
interviewed provided helpful contributions and thoughtful, constructive criticism of 
their experiences in dealing with the LAA.  Indeed, with only one exception, if 
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conducting the research again, the same participants would be used owing to a 
combination of their seniority, experiences and insights. 
 
Although more interviews, with more people, across more case studies would 
clearly be ways in which the findings could be strengthened even more, the case 
studies and the interview schedule sat quite well within the research process.  
However, there are specific interviews which would have stood to add even 
greater strength.   
 
Initially, the intention was to interview the elected leaders of the councils within 
both case studies, in order to gain their insights about the LAA process and their 
experiences of cross partner working.  However, in both case study areas (but 
particularly in St Helens) contacts within the local authorities felt it was 
inappropriate to involve the elected members/leaders citing a desire not to place 
them in a position where they might criticise the work of other elected members.   
 
Similarly, despite being able to offer key insights, there were a number of people 
who were approached that declined to participate.  The case of the St Helens 
Chief Executive and the belief in being forward looking were discussed in chapter 
eight on the future of local public service delivery.  When approaching ministers 
from central government, care was taken to approach both current, former and 
shadow ministers from all parties with responsibilities for CLG in order to gain a 
range of views.  However, whilst two Labour ministers agreed to be interviewed, 
the Conservative ministers who were approached all declined to participate.  
Although it is difficult to see what might persuade them to participate in future 
research, their participation would be welcome. 
 
The final group of people who would have been a welcome addition to the 
interviewees are those from organisations which had been disbanded by the time 
the research reached its data collection phase, or had opted to participate in the 
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redundancies which became characteristic of local public services in the period 
following the 2010 general election.   
 
Ultimately, however, whilst the inclusion of those people would have added 
further depth to the findings, there is more than sufficient coverage from the 
actors that were interviewed at all three tiers of government/governance. 
 
Reflecting upon the theories and concepts, as outlined in chapter four, it appears 
that they were broadly useful in analysing the findings – i.e. that they remained 
relevant throughout and allowed for deeper consideration of the findings to 
emerge from the case studies.  In many ways the Strategic Relational Approach, 
in particular, proved to be an excellent lens through which to investigate LAAs 
given the strong element of central control that has emerged.  This theory has 
also helped to identify which actors have benefited over others from the LAA.   
However regulation theory and path dependency have also helped in 
understanding the LAA and partner interactions, while the other theories and 
concepts discussed in chapter four and the contributions that each made should 
not be overlooked. 
 
9.6 Avenues for Future Research 
As part of the conclusions, some consideration should be given to the direction 
that future research may take in further exploring this subject. 
 
Given that the LAA has been concluded and its successors brought into place, a 
continued consideration of how these schemes respond to the policy lessons of 
the LAA is welcome.  In particular, there are outstanding questions about the 
management mechanisms of the LEP and how accountability will be sought –
both centrally and locally - against those actors tasked with delivering economic 
development for their area. 
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There are also questions about the continued involvement of actors which have 
been identified as benefiting from the LAA system, given that the LEP contains 
no provision for their continued involvement.  What happens to this capacity, and 
who is likely to benefit from any opportunity to participate, could also form the 
basis of future research. 
 
As a still emerging policy, there is a wealth of research that can be conducted on, 
and about, the City Deal.  In particular the exploration of whether the rejection of 
Elected Mayors will lead to a two-tier governance system with regards to dealing 
with Whitehall.  Beyond that, issues of privileging and ‘stronger’ and ‘weaker’ 
actors can also be explored within this new policy environment, in order to better 
understand which organisations will benefit from the City Deal. 
 
Although conceived as two separate projects, it is clear that City Deals, LEPs 
and ‘The Big Society’ have aims that may often conflate given that they both 
seek to improve an area’s fortunes.  A consideration of the cross-sectoral 
impacts that arise from delivering these two schemes side by side and the 
implications to arise from this could also be explored in further detail. 
 
Further to these avenues, given that the research has identified a shortfall in 
comparative studies of local public service delivery mechanisms, there is scope 
for future research to fill this gap.  However, the aim should be for this 
comparative study to take place at, or, at the least influence, the central level of 
policy making.  As one of the principle recommendations of this research is the 
establishing of a stable policy platform for local areas, learning from other 
contexts – as well as past examples from the UK – is essential.  Ignoring best 
practice, and its ability to be transferred to an English context, should be actively 





9.7 Concluding Thoughts 
Ultimately, what the research shows is that, despite the LAA being intended as a 
way of deepening the devolution of powers to local communities, the centralised 
nature of the main agencies in this process meant that this reality never 
transpired.  Instead, we saw glimpses of this intended policy outcome, with 
overtones of strong central control of the process.  Despite this, the LAAs 
remained broadly well received by actors, providing for the fact that 
improvements were required to improve upon the LAA’s limitations. 
 
To draw the thesis to a close, two perspectives appear to best sum up the 
findings, particularly about the relative success of LAAs.  The first (paraphrasing 
a view held by many partners) is that if the LAA is viewed as the end point of 
local public service delivery then its’ flaws would not merit calling the project a 
success.  However, if one was to view the LAA as a staging post from which 
minor changes could be made to the model to address these flaws, then the LAA 
represented a substantial success. 
 
The final perspective is closely linked to this.  This view holds that, despite 
several flaws the LAA was, fundamentally, a good piece of policy which was 
viewed favourably by those practitioners that were tasked to deliver it.  In seeking 
to replace the LAA, many aspects of governance – most notably the need for 
strong partnership working – have been lost in an act of ‘throwing the baby out 
with the bath water’.  Any future local public service delivery scheme should aim 
to avoid doing this at all costs.  To date the UK has not perfected a model for 
delivering local public services, however that is not to say that previous schemes, 
including the LAA, have not developed effective modes of working.  Only by 
learning from these schemes – both good and bad practice - can we ever hope to 
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Appendix I – Full Suite of Interview Questions 
 
INTRODUCTION:  INTRODUCE THE INTERVIEWEE, THEIR ORGANISATION 
AND JOB ROLE.  ALSO MENTION THE DATE FOR REFERENCE 
 
1. Can you briefly discuss your role and how you work within the LAA? 
 
LAA DEVELOPMENT AND THE REGIONS 
2. What was your experience of producing the LAA in the first instance, 
particularly in reference the guidance and help that was available to you 
from central government? 
3. What was your experience working with GOR in signing off the LAA?   
4.  To what extent did you feel the GOR considered issues specific to your 
local area when negotiating and signing off on the targets within your 
LAA?   
5. How do you feel these requirements were balanced against national policy 
prescriptions? 
6. Can you describe your relationship/dealings with regional government 
office in the period since your LAA targets were signed off? 
 
THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
7.  Can you briefly describe the role that the Local Authority had in 
developing and continuing the work on the LAA? 
8. To what extent do you feel that the LAA reflects local government policy 
documents/positions and vice versa? 
 
ROLE OF PARTNERS 
9. Since beginning work on the LAA, how do you feel that your organisation’s 
relationship with other partners within the LSP has changed? 
10. Can you give any examples/details of where you have worked with other 
statutory partners to deliver on the aims of the LAA? 
294 
11. Of the statutory partners, who do you feel is the strongest actor acting 
within the LAA?  Why do you feel this? 
12. Has there been an actor who has been particularly pro-active in pushing 
their goals/agendas while developing the LAA?  How have they done this? 
13. Have there been any instances where a partner’s internal accountability 
structures has limited action on any particular indicator?  
14. Can you discuss the methods that were used to remedy this?  
15. Have there been any instances where a statutory partner has not given 
their complete support to the LAA process?  If so, what are the 
circumstances surrounding this? 
16.  Did this reduced participation limit the ability of the LAA to meet any 
particular target? 
17.  Where there any implications in the future ability of the LAA to deliver 
against its targets as a result of this? 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY  
18.  Can you discuss the extent to which elected officials are involved within 
the LAA process, including negotiation and delivery? 
19.  To what extent do you feel the LAA considers and reflects concerns 
raised by elected officials? 
20. Ultimately, who are all LAA partner’s responsible to? 
21. Are there any methods where local residents can effect change on the 
LAA once the targets have been signed off? 
22. How are the targets delivered by statutory partners reported and held 
accountable to the general public? 
23. Can you outline the methods by which the partners are held accountable 
for the indicators they are responsible for delivering against? 
24. Have there been any instances where any of these procedures have been 
instigated? 
25. If so, please can you provide further details?  
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26. Are there any other specific methods by which LAAs become accountable 
to local residents?  
  
LAAs AND THE FUTURE  
27.  In your view, who is the biggest benefactor from LAAs. 
28.  In your opinion, how will a potential change of government in the 2010 
general election impact on the LAA agenda, both on a wide scale and 
within your area? 
29.  From your experiences of working within the LAA system, what would 
your suggestions be in order to improve it? 
 
QUESTIONS FOR LOCAL PARTNERS SPECIFICALLY 
30. To what extent do you feel your organisation’s aims are included and 
referenced within the LAA 
31. Are there any instances where the LAAs specific targets are not shared by 
your organisation? 
32. If yes, what are your procedures for remedying this? 
33. With regards to your work relating to the LAA, who do you believe you are 
ultimately accountable to? 
 
QUESTIONS FOR REGIONAL PARTNERS SPECIFICALLY 
 
34. What is your understanding of the role of GOR in the LAA process? 
35. What specific guidance where GOR given by central government over 
their role in the signing off process and the wider LAA system? 
36. How closely did GOR work with LSPs in producing their LAAs in the first 
instance? 
37. How long did the negotiation process take on average? 
38. Were there any areas which presented particular difficulties in their LAA 
negotiation process? If so can you elaborate? 
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39. In your experience, which took precedence between local indicators and 
national policy priorities? 
40.  Can you cite any examples where this was the case? 
41. Where there any instances where GOR would not sign off on any 
particular indicator? 
42. What were the reasons surrounding this? 
43. How was it remedied? 
44. [Provide discussion of Regional practitioner’s Allegiance (Goodwin et al)] 
Do you believe this is an accurate portrayal? Why? 
 
QUESTIONS FOR REGIONAL PARTNERS SPECIFICALLY 
 
45. How effective do you feel GOR has been in negotiating LAAs on behalf of 
the state? 
46. Has CLG ever played a direct role in any LAA? 
47. What comparisons can be made to other examples from the devolved UK 
e.g. Scottish Single Output Agreement? 
48. To what extent did CLG seek to learn from international examples whilst 
developing the LAA model? 
49. Who do you think the overall beneficiaries are of LAAs?  
50. What changes would you make to LAAs to improve their practice? 
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Appendix II – List of Interviewees  
 
Label Date Interviewee/Organisation 
a 20 Oct 2009 Liverpool First37 
b 21 Apr 2010 Government Office North West 
c 15 Jul 2010 St Helens Primary Care Trust 
d 26 Jul 2010 St Helens Council for Voluntary Services 
e 5 Aug 2010 Hazel Blears – Former secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government 
f 17 Aug 2010 Liverpool Chamber of Commerce 
g 19 Aug 2010 Merseyside Police (Liverpool) 
h 21 Sept 2010 Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service (St Helens) 
i 30 Sept 2010 St Helens Chamber of Commerce 
j 1 Oct 2010 Merseyside Police (St Helens) 
k 6 Oct 2010 Colin Hilton – Former Chief Executive, Liverpool City 
Council 
l 7 Oct 2010 John Denham – Former secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government 
m 22 Oct 2010 Former GONW civil servant 
n 9 Nov 2010 Liverpool Primary Care Trust 
o 18 Nov 2010 Senior Civil Servants – Communities and Local 
Government (Dual interview) 
p 26 Nov 2010 St Helens Together38 
q 10 Dec 2010 Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service (Liverpool) 
r 23 Feb 2011 Liverpool Council for Voluntary Services 
s 16 Mar 2011 Liverpool First39 
 
The interviewees, where anonymised, comprise senior representatives from their 
agency.  These representatives had direct experience of the LAA and in most 
instances sat on the LAA executive board for their area. 
                                            
37
 Liverpool’s Local Strategic Partnership 
38
 St Helens’ Local Strategic Partnership 
39
 This was a follow up interview with the initial interviewee ‘a’ 
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Appendix III – Paper published in the Journal of Urban 
Regeneration and Renewal 
 
 
This is where the unabridged thesis included the following third 
party copyrighted material: 
 
Nurse, A. and Pemberton, S. (2010). ‘Local Area Agreements as a 
Tool for Addressing Deprivation within UK Cities’ Journal of Urban 
Regeneration and Renewal 4(2): 158-167. 
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Appendix IV – List of Liverpool First Executive Board Members 
 
 Business Liverpool  
 Greater Merseyside Learning Skills Council 
 Government Office North West  
 Housing Corporation 
 Jobcentre Plus  
 Liverpool Chamber of Commerce 
 Liverpool Charity and Voluntary Services 
 Liverpool City Council 
 Liverpool Community College 
 Liverpool Community Network 
 Liverpool Hope University 
 Liverpool JMU  
 Liverpool Land Development Company 
 Liverpool Vision 
 Liverpool Primary Care and NHS Trusts 
 Merseyside Police 
 Merseytravel 
 North West Development Agency 
 Strategic Housing Partnership 
 The Pension Service 
 University of Liverpool 
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Appendix V – Liverpool’s LAA 
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Indicator(s), including those from  
national indicator set (designated  
indicators shown with a *)  
Baseline  LAA Improvement  
Target, including those to be designated 
(shown with a *), and including education  
and early years targets  
Partners who have  
signed-up to the target  
and any which are acting  
as lead partner/s 






NI 151 Overall employment rate  
08/09  09/10  10/11   
 
Richard Nutter LCC *  
PRG PSA 8 *  
(refer to footnote)  
63.7%  
(July 06 to  
June 07)  
65.3%  66.5%  68%  Liverpool First for  

















NI 165 Working age population  
qualified to at least Level 4 or  
higher PSA 2 *  
 
 
NI 171 New business registration  
rate  
(refer to footnote)  
 
Local Indicator - Environment for a  
thriving third sector - positive impact 
of local statutory bodies on local third  
sector organisations  
Local Indicator- number of jobs and  




(2006 APS)  
 
 








Total Jobs  
(2006) - 
226,432  




(2009 APS)  
 
 















(2010 APS)  
 
 















(2011 APS)  
 
 













Richard Nutter LCC *  
Liverpool First for 
Economic Growth  
 
 
Richard Nutter LCC*  
Liverpool First for 
Economic Growth  
 
Alan Lewis LCVS *  
Liverpool First  
Executive Board  
 
Richard Nutter LCC*  
Liverpool First for 
























Indicator(s), including those from 
national indicator set (designated  








LAA Improvement  
Target, including those to be designated 
(shown with a *), and including education  




Partners who have  
signed-up to the target  
and any which are acting  
as lead partner/s 
(shown with a *)  
08/09  09/10  10/11  
SE  NI 72 Achievement of at least 78  Tim Warren (Acting) LCC  
points across the Early Years  Children's Services *  
Foundation Stage with at least 6 in  61.6%  Liverpool First for  
each of the scales in Personal  (2007/08)  68.1%  68.5%  68.5%  Children & Young People  
Social and Emotional  
Development and Communication,  
Language and Literacy PSA 10  
SE  NI 73 Achievement at level 4 or  Tim Warren (Acting) LCC  
above in both English and Maths  67.6%  73.0%  73.1%  74.7%  Children's Services *  
at Key Stage 2 (Threshold) PSA 10  (2007/08)  Liverpool First for  
Children & Young People  
SE  NI 74 Achievement at level 5 or  Tim Warren (Acting) LCC  
above in both English and Maths  62.4%  72.1%  Indicator  Indicator  Children's Services *  
at Key Stage 3 (Threshold) PSA 10  (2007/08)  deleted  deleted  Liverpool First for  
Children & Young People  
SE  NI 75 Achievement of 5 or more  Tim Warren (Acting) LCC  
A*-C grades at GCSE or equivalent  37.1%  43.5%  45.3%  48.5%  Children's Services *  
including English and Maths  (2007/08)  Liverpool First for 
(Threshold) PSA 10  Children & Young People  
 
PRG  NI 80 Achievement of Level 3  Helen France LSC *  
qualification at age 19 PSA10*  35.4%  37.2%  38.9%  40.5%  Liverpool First for  
(2006/07)  Economic Growth  
 
SE  NI 83 Achievement at level 5 or  Tim Warren (Acting) LCC  
above in Science at Key Stage 3  66.0%  Indicator  Indicator  Children's Services *  
DCSF DSO  (2007/08)  73.0%  deleted  deleted  Liverpool First for  
























Indicator(s), including those from 
national indicator set (designated  










LAA Improvement  
Target, including those to be designated 
(shown with a *), and including education  





Partners who have  
signed-up to the target  
and any which are acting  
as lead partner/s 
(shown with a *)  
08/09  09/10  10/11  
SE  NI 87 Secondary school  Helen Winrow LCC  
persistent absence rate DCSF  7.5%  6.5%  5.5%  5.0%  Children's Services *  
DSO  (2007/08)  Liverpool First for  
Children & Young People  
SE  NI 92 Narrowing the gap  Tim Warren (Acting) LCC  
between the lowest achieving 20%  38.2%  34.6%  34.6%  33.5%  Children's Services *  
in the Early Years Foundation  (2007/08)  Liverpool First for 
Stage Profile and the rest PSA 11  Children & Young People  
SE  NI 93 Progression by 2 levels in  No baseline  Tim Warren (Acting) LCC  
English between Key Stage 1 and  data available  83.0%  83.0%  84.1%  Children's Services *  
Key Stage 2 PSA 11  Liverpool First for  
Children & Young People  
SE  NI 94 Progression by 2 levels in  No baseline  Tim Warren (Acting) LCC  
Maths between Key Stage 1 and  data available  78.0%  79.0%  82.2%  Children's Services *  
Key Stage 2 PSA 11  Liverpool First for  
Children & Young People  
SE  NI 95 Progression by 2 levels in  No baseline  Tim Warren (Acting) LCC  
English between Key Stage 2 and  data available  28.0%  Indicator  Indicator  Children's Services *  
Key Stage 3 PSA 11  deleted  deleted  Liverpool First for  
Children & Young People  
SE  NI 96 Progression by 2 levels in  No baseline  Tim Warren (Acting) LCC  
Maths between Key Stage 2 and  data available  53.0%  Indicator  Indicator  Children's Services *  
Key Stage 3 PSA 11  (2007/08)  deleted  deleted  Liverpool First for  
Children & Young People  
SE  NI 97 Progression by 2 levels in  No baseline  Tim Warren (Acting) LCC  
English between Key Stage 3 and  data available  50.4%  Indicator  Indicator  Children's Services *  
Key Stage 4 PSA 11  deleted  deleted  Liverpool First for  





















Indicator(s), including those from 
national indicator set (designated  








LAA Improvement  
Target, including those to be designated  
(shown with a *), and including education and  




Partners who have  
signed-up to the target  
and any which are acting  
as lead partner/s 





























NI 98 Progression by 2 levels in  
Maths between Key Stage 3 and  
Key Stage 4 PSA 11  
 
 
NI 99 Children in care reaching 
level 4 in English at Key Stage 2  
PSA 11  
 
NI 100 Children in care reaching  
level 4 in Maths at Key Stage 2  
PSA 11  
 
NI 101 Children in care achieving  
5 A*-C GCSEs (or equivalent) at 
Key Stage 4 (including English  
and Maths) PSA 11  
NI 116 Proportion of children in  
poverty PSA 9*  
(refer to footnote)  
NI 117 16 to 18 year olds who are  
not in education, training or  
employment (NEET) PSA 14 *  
 
NI 153 Working age people  
claiming out of work benefits in  
the worst performing  
neighbourhoods DWP DSO *  
(refer to footnote)  
 
 
No baseline  












No baseline  







(Nov 2007 to  
Jan 2008)  
 
35.01%  



















































































Tim Warren (Acting) LCC  
Children's Services *  
Liverpool First for  
Children & Young People  
 
Tim Warren (Acting) LCC  
Children's Services *  
Liverpool First for  
Children & Young People  
Tim Warren (Acting) LCC  
Children's Services *  
Liverpool First for  
Children & Young People 
Tim Warren (Acting) LCC  
Children's Services *  
Liverpool First for  
Children & Young People  
Richard Nutter LCC  
Liverpool First for 
Economic Growth  
Keiran Gordon  
Connexions *  
Liverpool First for  
Children & Young People  
Richard Nutter LCC  
Liverpool First for 























Indicator(s), including those from 
national indicator set (designated  










LAA Improvement  
Target, including those to be designated  
(shown with a *), and including education and  





Partners who have  
signed-up to the target  
and any which are acting 
as lead partner/s (shown  







NI 163 Working age population  
qualified to at least Level 2 or  
























APS 2011)  
 
 
Helen France LSC *  
Liverpool First for 
Economic Growth  
 
Connectivity  
LI  Local Indicator  Steve Holcroft  
Port (2007)  Liverpool City Council *  
Increase in tonnage through port  Ro-Ro units (k  651k  667k  684k  Merseyside Docks &  
units) = 635  Harbour Company  
Liverpool First for  
Economic Growth  
 
PRG  NI 167 Congestion - average  2005/06 (no  Steve Holcroft  
journey time per mile during the  2006-07 data  4.3%  4.7%  5.1%  Liverpool City Council*  
morning peak PSA5 *  available)  = 4.23  = 4.24  = 4.25  Merseytravel  
Person Miles  min.sec/mile  min.sec/mile  min.sec/mile  Liverpool First for  
Growth Index  Economic Growth  
= 100%  
Ave Person  
Journey Time  
per Mile  


























Indicator(s), including those from 
national indicator set (designated  










LAA Improvement  
Target, including those to be designated 
(shown with a *), and including education  





Partners who have  
signed-up to the target  
and any which are acting 
as lead partner/s (shown  
with a *)  
 
08/09  09/10  10/11  
PRG  NI 175 Access to services and  Steven Holcroft LCC*  
facilities by public transport,  Merseytravel  
walking and cycling DFT DSO *  Liverpool First for  
Economic Growth  
Percentage of all individuals 'at risk'  2007= 63%  64%  65%  66%  
within 20mins of the nearest strategic  
investment area by Public Transport  
and Walking  
 
Percentage of all individuals 'at risk'  Atlantic  41%  42%  43%  
within 20mins of each Strategic  Gateway  
Investment Area by Public Transport,  2007 = 40%  
Walking and Cycling  
Approaches  31%  32%  33%  
































2007 = 67%  
 
Speke/Halew  41%  42%  43%  

























Indicator(s), including those from 
national indicator set (designated  










LAA Improvement  
Target, including those to be designated 
(shown with a *), and including education  





Partners who have  
signed-up to the target  
and any which are acting 
as lead partner/s (shown  
with a *)  
 
08/09  09/10  10/11  
Distinctive Sense of Place  
LI  Local Indicator - Total room nights  Peter Harris LCC *  
sold in Liverpool (000)  808  966  851  890  TMP  
(2006/07)  Liverpool First for  
Economic Growth  
 
LI  Local Indicator  Robert Corbett LCC *  
LCC Cash Related efficiency targets  £27.4m  £28.2m  £29.1m  Liverpool First Executive  
Board  
PRG  NI 154 Net additional homes  Cath Green LCC  
provided PSA 20 *  1,592  1,950  2,234  1,950  Neighbourhoods *  
(April 07)  (08/09)  Liverpool First for  
(refer to footnote)  Housing  
PRG  NI 156 Number of households  Cath Green LCC  
living in Temporary  185  130  100  92  Neighbourhoods *  
Accommodation PSA 20 *  Liverpool First for  
Housing  
Thriving Neighbourhoods  






can influence decisions in their  
locality PSA 21 *  
 
 
NI 195 Improved street and  
environmental cleanliness (levels  
of graffiti, litter, detritus and fly  
posting) Defra DSO *  
27%  




Litter 18%  
 

























Lesley Thompson LCC  
Neighbourhoods *  
Liverpool First for safer,  
stronger, communities  
 
Andrew McCartan LCC  
Neighbourhood  
Environmental Services * 























Indicator(s), including those from 
national indicator set (designated  










LAA Improvement  
Target, including those to be designated 
(shown with a *), and including education  





Partners who have signed-  
up to the target and any 
which are acting as lead  






NI 15 Serious violent crime rate  






Violence rate  
per 1,000  





















Alison Stathers-Tracey  
Liverpool First for Safer,  
Stronger, Communities  
(based on mid-2007 
population  
estimates) - to be 
finalised  
in 2009.  
Please note the 









PRG  NI 16 Serious acquisitive crime  Alison Stathers-Tracey  
rate PSA 23 *  28.26  26.56  25.7  25.15  Liverpool First for Safer,  
























Indicator(s), including those from 
national indicator set (designated  








LAA Improvement  
Target, including those to be designated 
(shown with a *), and including education  




Partners who have signed-  
up to the target and any 
which are acting as lead  































NI 19 Rate of proven re-offending  
by young offenders PSA 23 *  
 
 
NI 20 Assault with injury crime  




















Local Indicator Dealing with local  
concerns about anti-social behaviour  




















estimates) -  
to be finalised 
in 2009.  
Please note 
the 2010/11 
figure will be  
calculated 

































































































Aileen Shepherd *  
Liverpool First for Safer,  
Stronger, Communities  
 
Alison Stathers-Tracey  
Liverpool First for Safer,  



















Alison Stathers-Tracey  
Liverpool First for Safer,  




















Indicator(s), including those from 
national indicator set (designated  








LAA Improvement  
Target, including those to be designated 
(shown with a *), and including education  




Partners who have signed-  
up to the target and any 
which are acting as lead  
partner/s (shown with a *)  
 
08/09  09/10  10/11  
PRG  NI 29 Gun crime rate PSA 23 *  Alison Stathers-Tracey  
0.7  0.67  0.63  0.6  Liverpool First for Safer,  




PRG  NI 30 Re-offending rate of prolific  Alison Stathers-Tracey  
and priority offenders HO DSO *  For 2008/09  26% reduction  28%  The target  Liverpool First for Safer,  
(April 07 -  in offences  reduction in  will be arrived  Stronger, Communities  
March 08 =  from 375  offences from  at by  
375)  baseline (no  313 baseline  applying the  
more than 278  (no more than  common ratio  
For 2009/10  offences  226 offences)  of 1.31 to the  
(Oct 07 to 
Sept 08 =  
313)  
 
For 2010/11  
(baseline 




ceiling %  
target  
identified 
after the  





PRG  NI 32 Repeat incidents of  Alison Stathers-Tracey  
domestic violence PSA 23 *  26%  Baseline  30%  27%  Liverpool First for Safer,  
(2008/09)  Year  Stronger, Communities  
 
 
PRG  NI 115 Substance misuse by  Samih Kalakeche *  
young people PSA 14 *  9.2%  Baseline  8.6%  6.8%  Liverpool First for Children &  









LI  Local Indicator number of ASB  Alison Stathers-Tracey  
incident per 1000 population as  125.1  121.3  117.6  114.1  Liverpool First for Safer, 
reported by the police  Stronger, Communities  
 
 
PRG  NI 1 % of people who believe  Lesley Thompson LCC  
people from different backgrounds  69.3%  Baseline  No  73.5%  Neighbourhoods *  
get on well together in their local  Place Survey  Year  survey  Place Survey  Liverpool First Cohesion & 












Indicator(s), including those from 
national indicator set (designated  






LAA Improvement  
Target, including those to be designated 
(shown with a *), and including education  
and early years targets  
 
 
Partners who have signed-up  
to the target and any which 
are acting as lead partner/s  
(shown with a *)  
 
08/09  09/10  10/11  
Health and Wellbeing  
PRG NI 39 Alcohol-harm related  Rates of  Paula Grey PCT *  
hospital admission rates per  alcohol harm  3,024  3,200  3,335  Liverpool First for Health &  
100,000 population PSA 25 *  related  Well-Being  
admissions  Alcohol Task Group  





PRG  NI 53 Prevalence of breastfeeding  Paula Grey PCT *  
at 6-8 weeks from birth PSA 12 *  22.6%  Baseline  26%  31%  Liverpool First for Health &  
(Q3 2008/09)  Year  Well-Being  
 
PRG  NI 56 Obesity among primary  Paula Grey PCT *  
school age children in Year 6 DCSF  17.9%  21%  21.1%  Liverpool First for Health &  
DSO *  (2006/07)  Well-Being  
(Aim is to slow increase, halt and  









PRG  NI 62 Stability of Placements of  Sandra Campbell LCC*/PCT  
looked after children *  14.6%  12.9%  11.4%  9.9%  Liverpool First for Children &  
Young People  
 
PRG  NI 120 All-age all cause mortality  Male  Paula Grey PCT *  
rate PSA 18 *  948  869  838  809  Liverpool First for Health &  
(rate per 100,000 population)  (2006)  Well-Being  
 
Female  
663  615  597  579  
(2006)  




Indicator(s), including those from  
national indicator set (designated  
indicators shown with a *)  
Baseline  LAA Improvement  
Target, including those to be designated 
(shown with a *), and including education  
and early years targets  
Partners who have signed-up  
to the target and any which 
are acting as lead partner/s  











Local Indicator (Wellbeing)  
Absenteeism / presenteeism  
attributed to emotional / mental  
distress - being developed  
 
NI 124 People with a long-term  
condition supported to be  
independent and in control of their  











baseline /  
year 1 =  
Emergency  
Bed Days  
2006/07 0.78  












































Paula Grey PCT *  




Paula Grey PCT *  
Liverpool First for Health &  
Well-Being  
 











from 2008/09  
PRG  NI 130 - Social Care clients  
receiving Self Directed Support 
(Direct Payments and Individual  






















(1,255 per  
100,000  
population)  
Joe Blott LCC- Social Care *  
























Indicator(s), including those from 
national indicator set (designated  










LAA Improvement  
Target, including those to be designated  
(shown with a *), and including education and  





Partners who have  
signed-up to the target  
and any which are acting 
as lead partner/s (shown  













NI 141 Number of vulnerable 
people achieving independent  
living CLG DSO *  
 
 
Single Homeless  
 
NI 187 Tackling fuel poverty - 
people receiving income based  
benefits living in homes with a low 




































Joe Blott LCC- Social  
Care *  
Liverpool First for  
Housing  
Supporting people  
commissioning Board  
Sue Mansfield LCC  
Housing *  
Liverpool First for  
Housing  
a) reduction in the proportion of  
households with a low energy  
efficiency rating  
 





(a) - 200  
( 4% reduction  
to 4,791)  
(a) - 300  
(6% reduction  
to 4,491)  
b)  increase in the proportion of  
households with a high 
energy efficiency rating  
(b) 29,542  (b) + 450  
(1.5% increase  
to 29,992)  
(b) + 450  
(1.5% increase  
to 30,442)  
 
PRG  NI 188 Adapting to climate change  Jan Rowley LCC  
PSA 27 *  Level 0  Level 1  Level 2  Level 3  Environment Task Group  
Liverpool First Executive  
Board  
PRG  NI 192 Household waste recycled  Andrew McCartan LCC *  




Appendix VI – List of St Helens Together Executive Board 
Members 
 St.Helens Council Leader 
 St.Helens Council Executive Member for Children and Young People 
 St.Helens Council Executive Member for Safer Communities 
 St.Helens Council Chief Executive 
 St.Helens Council Director of Urban Regeneration and Housing 
 NHS Halton and St.Helens 
 St.Helens Chamber Chief Executive 
 Merseytravel Chief Executive 
 Chair of Halton and St.Helens VCA Chief Executive 
 Helena Partnerships Chief Executive 
 Merseyside Police Area Commander 
 Merseyside Fire Service Area Commander 
 St.Helens College Principal 
 Representative from Job Centre Plus 
 St.Helens Churches representative 
 Community Representatives. 
 Chief Executive of Bridgewater Community Healthcare Trust 
 
Source: St Helens Together: 2012 
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1 % of people who believe people from different backgrounds 
get on well together in their local area 
 
2 % of people who feel that they belong to their 
neighbourhood 
 
3 Civic participation in the local area  
4 % of people who feel they can influence decisions in their 
locality 
 
5 Overall / general satisfaction with local area  
6 Participation in regular volunteering  
7 Environment for a thriving third sector  
8 Adult participation in sport and active recreation  
9 Use of public libraries  
10 Visits to museums and galleries  
11 Engagement in the arts  
12 Refused and deferred Houses in Multiple Occupation 
(HMO) license applications leading to immigration 
enforcement activity 
 
13 Migrants’ English language skills and knowledge  
14 Reducing avoidable contact: minimising the proportion of 
customer contact that is of low or no value to the customer 
 
15 Serious violent crime  
16 Serious acquisitive crime  
17 Perceptions of anti-social behaviour  




19 Rate of proven re-offending by young offenders  
20 Assault with injury crime rate  
21 Dealing with local concerns about anti-social behaviour and 
crime issues by the local council and police  
 
22 Perceptions of parents taking responsibility for the 
behaviour of their children in the area 
 
23 Perceptions that people in the area treat one another with 
respect and consideration  
 
24 Satisfaction with the way the police and local council dealt 
with anti-social behaviour  
 
25 Satisfaction of different groups with the way the police and 
local council dealt with antisocial behaviour  
 
26 Specialist support to victims of a serious sexual offence 
 
 
27 Understanding of local concerns about anti-social 
behaviour and crime issues by the local council and police  
 
28 Serious knife crime rate  
29 Gun crime rate  
30 Re-offending rate of prolific and minority offenders  
31 Re-offending rate of registered sex offenders Deleted  
32 Repeat incidents of domestic violence 
 
 
33 Arson incidents  
34 Domestic violence - murder  
35 Building resilience to violent extremism   
36 Protection against terrorist attack  
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37 Awareness of civil protection arrangements in the local 
area  
 
38 Drug-related (Class A) offending rate  
39 Rate of Hospital Admissions per 100,000 for Alcohol 
Related Harm 
 
40 Number of drug users recorded as being in effective 
treatment  
 
41 Perceptions of drunk or rowdy behaviour as a problem   
42 Perceptions of drug use or drug dealing as a problem  
43 Young people within the Youth Justice System receiving 
a conviction in court who are sentenced to custody 
 
44 Ethnic composition of offenders on Youth Justice System 
disposals  
 
45 Young offenders’ engagement in suitable education, 
training and employment 
 
46 Young Offenders’ access to suitable accommodation  
47 People killed or seriously injured in road traffic accidents  
48 Children killed or seriously injured in road traffic accidents  
49 Number of primary fires and related fatalities and nonfatal 
casualties (excluding precautionary checks) 
 
50 Emotional health of children  
51 Effectiveness of child and adolescent mental health 
(CAMHS) services 
 
52 Take up of school lunches  
53 Prevalence of breast-feeding at 6-8 wks from birth  
54 Services for disabled children  
339 
55 Obesity in primary school age children in Reception  
56 Obesity in primary school age children in Year 6  
57 Children and young people’s participation in high-quality 
PE and sport 
 
58 Emotional and behavioural health of looked after children  
59 Percentage of initial assessments for children’s social care 
carried out within 7 working days of referral 
 
60 Percentage of core assessments for children’s social care 
that were carried out within 35 working days of their 
commencement. 
 
61 Timeliness of placements of looked after children for 
adoption following an agency decision that the child should 
be placed for adoption 
 
62 Stability of placements of looked after children: number of 
placements 
 
63 Stability of placements of looked after children: length of 
placement  
 
64 Child Protection Plans lasting 2 years or more   
65 65 Percentage of children becoming the subject of Child 
Protection Plan for a second or subsequent time 
 
66 Looked after children cases which were reviewed within 
required timescales 
 
67 Percentage of child protection cases which were reviewed 
within required timescales 
 
68 Percentage of referrals to children’s social care going on to 
initial assessment 
 
69 Children who have experienced bullying  
70 Hospital admissions caused by unintentional and deliberate 
injuries to children and young people 
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71 Children who have run awayfrom home/care overnight  
72 Achievement of at least 78 points across the Early Years 
Foundation Stage with at least 6 in each of the scales in 
Personal, Social and Emotional Development and 
Communication, Language and Literacy 
 
73 Achievement at level 4 or above in both English and 
Maths at Key Stage 2  
 
74 Achievement at level 5 or above in both English and Maths 
at Key Stage 3  
 
75 Achievement of 5 or more A*- C grades at GCSE or 
equivalent 
including English and Maths 
 
 
76 Reduction in number of schools where fewer than 65% of 
pupils achieve level 4 or above in both English and Maths 
at KS2 
 
77 Reduction of schools where fewer than 50% of pupils 
achieve level 5 or above in both English and Maths at KS3 
 
78 Reduction in number of schools where fewer than 30% of 
pupils achieve 5 or more A*- C grades at GCSE and 
equivalent including GCSEs in English and Maths 
 
79 Achievement of a Level 2 qualification by the age of 19   
80 Achievement of a Level 3 qualification by the age of 19   
81 Inequality gap in the achievement of a Level 3 qualification 
by the age of 19  
 
82 Inequality gap in the achievement of a Level 2 qualification 
by the age of 19  
 
83 Achievement at Level 5 or above in Science at Key Stage 3    
84 Achievement of 2 or more A*– C grades in Science GCSEs  
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or equivalent 
85 Post-16 participation in physical sciences (A Level Physics, 
Chemistry and Maths) 
 
86 Secondary schools judged as having good or outstanding 
standards of behaviour  
 
87 Secondary school persistent absence rate  
88 Percentage of schools providing access to extended 
services 
 
89 Reduction of number of schools judged as requiring 
special measures and improvement in time taken to 
come out of the category 
 
90 Take up of 14-19 learning diplomas  
91 Participation of 17 year-olds in education or training  
92 Narrowing the gap between the lowest achieving 20% in 
the Early Years Foundation Stage Profile and the rest 
 
93 Progression by 2 levels in English between Key Stage 1 
and Key Stage 2 
 
94 Progression by 2 levels in Maths between Key Stage 1 and 
Key Stage 2 
 
95 Progression by 2 levels in English between Key Stage 2 
and Key Stage 3 
 
96 Progression by 2 levels in Maths between Key Stage 2 and 
Key Stage 3 
 
97 Progression by 2 levels in English between Key Stage 3 
and Key Stage 4 
 
98 Progression by 2 levels in Maths between Key Stage 3 and 
Key Stage 4 
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99 Looked after children reaching level 4 in English at Key 
Stage 2 
 
100 Looked after children reaching level 4 in mathematics at 
Key Stage 2 
 
101 Looked after children achieving 5 A*-C GCSEs (or 
equivalent) at Key Stage 4 (including English and 
mathematics) 
 
102 Achievement gap between pupils eligible for free school 
meals and their peers achieving the expected level at Key 
Stages 2 and 4 
 
103 Special Educational Needs – statements issued within 26 
weeks 
 
104 The Special Educational Needs (SEN)/non-SEN gap – 
achieving Key Stage 2 English and Maths threshold 
 
105 The Special Educational Needs (SEN)/non-SEN gap – 
achieving 5 A*- C GCSE including English and Maths 
 
106 Young people from low income backgrounds progressing 
to higher education 
 
107 Key Stage 2 attainment for Black and minority ethnic 
groups 
 
108 Key Stage 4 attainment for Black and minority ethnic 
groups 
 
109 Delivery of Sure Start Children’s Centres  
110 Young people’s participation in positive activities  
111 First time entrants to the Youth Justice System aged 10 – 
17 
 
112 Under 18 conception rate Y Under-18 Conception Statistics 
1998-2006 
 
113 Prevalence of Chlamydia in under 25 year olds  
114 Rate of permanent exclusions from school  
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115 Substance misuse by young people  
116 Proportion of children in poverty  
117 16 to 18 year olds who are not in education, employment or 
training (NEET) 
 
118 Take up of formal childcare by low-income working families  
119 Self-reported measure of people’s overall health and 
wellbeing 
 
120 All-age all cause mortality rate  
121 Mortality rate from all circulatory diseases at ages under 75  
122 Mortality rate from all cancers at ages under 75  
123 Stopping smoking  
124 People with a long-term condition supported to be 
independent and in control of their condition 
 
125 Achieving independence for older people through 
rehabilitation / intermediate care 
 
126 Early Access for Women to Maternity Services  
127 Self reported experience of social care users  
128 User reported measure of respect and dignity in their 
treatment 
 
129 End of life care – access to appropriate care enabling 
people to be able to choose to die at home 
 
130 Social Care clients receiving Self Directed Support per 
100,000 population 
 
131 Delayed transfers of care  
132 Timeliness of social care assessment (all adults)  
133 Timeliness of social care packages following assessment  
134 The number of emergency bed days per head of weighted  
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population 
135 Carers receiving needs assessment or review and a 
specific carer’s service, or advice and information 
 
136 People supported to live independently through social 
services (all adults) 
 
137 Healthy life expectancy at age 65  
138 Satisfaction of people over 65 with both home and 
neighbourhood 
 
139 The extent to which older people receive the support they 
need to live independently at home 
 
140 Fair treatment by local services  
141 Percentage of vulnerable people achieving independent 
living 
 
142 Percentage of vulnerable people who are supported to 
maintain independent living 
 
143 Offenders under probation supervision living in settled and 
suitable accommodation at the end of their order or licence  
 
144 Offenders under probation supervision in employment at 
the end of their order or licence 
 
145 Adults with learning disabilities in settled accommodation  
146 Adults with learning disabilities in employment  
147 Care leavers in suitable accommodation  
148 Care leavers in education, employment or training  
149 Adults in contact with secondary mental health services in 
settled accommodation 
 
150 Adults in contact with secondary mental health services in 
employment 
 
151 Overall Employment rate (working-age)  
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152 Working age people on out of work benefits  
153 Working age people claiming out of work benefits in the 
worst performing neighbourhoods 
 
154 Net additional homes provided  
155 Number of affordable homes delivered (gross)  
156 Number of households living in temporary accommodation  
157 Processing of planning applications  
158 % non-decent council homes  
159 Supply of ready to develop housing sites  
160 Local authority tenants’ satisfaction with landlord services  
161 Learners achieving a Level 1 qualification in literacy  
162 Learners achieving an Entry Level 3 qualification in 
numeracy 
 
163 Proportion of population aged 19-64 for males and 19-59 
for females qualified to at least Level 2 or higher 
 
164 Proportion of population aged 19-64 for males and 19-59 
for females qualified to at least Level 3 or higher 
 
165 Proportion of population aged 19-64 for males and 19-59 
for females qualified to at least Level 4 or higher 
 
166 Median earnings of employees in the area  
167 Congestion – average journey time per mile during the 
morning peak 
 
168 Principal roads where maintenance should be considered  
169 Non-principal classified roads where maintenance should 
be considered 
 
170 Previously developed land that has been vacant or derelict 
for more than 5 years 
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171 New business registration rate  
172 Percentage of small businesses in an area showing 
employment growth 
 
173 Flows on to incapacity benefits from employment  
174 Skills gaps in the current workforce reported by employers  
175 Access to services and facilities by public transport, 
walking and cycling 
 
176 Working age people with access to employment by public 
transport (and other specified modes) 
 
177 Local bus and light rail passenger journeys originating in 
the authority area 
 
178 Bus services running on time  
179 Value for money – total net value of ongoing cash-
releasing value for money gains that have impacted since 
the start of the 2008-09 financial year 
 
180 The number of changes of circumstances which affect 
customers’ HB/CTB benefit entitlement within the year. 
 
181 Time taken to process Housing Benefit/Council Tax Benefit 
new claims and change events 
 
182 Satisfaction of business with local authority regulatory 
services 
 
183 Impact of local authority trading standards services on the 
fair trading environment 
 
184 Food establishments in the area which are broadly 
compliant with food hygiene law 
 
185 CO2 reduction from local authority operations   
186 Per capita reduction in CO2 emissions in the LA area  
187 Tackling fuel poverty – % of people receiving income 




188 Planning to Adapt to Climate Change  
189 Flood and coastal erosion risk management  
190 Achievement in meeting standards for the control system 
for animal health 
 
191 Residual household waste per household  
192 Percentage of household waste sent for reuse, recycling 
and composting 
 
193 Percentage of municipal waste landfilled  
194 Air quality – % reduction in NOx and primary PM10 
emissions through local authority’s estate and operations 
 
195 Improved street and environmental cleanliness (levels of 
litter, detritus, graffiti and fly-posting). 
 
196 Improved street and environmental cleanliness – fly tipping  
197 Improved Local Biodiversity – proportion of Local Sites 
where positive conservation management has been or is 
being implemented  
 
198 Children travelling to school – mode of transport usually 
used 
 




Adapted from CLG: 2008 
